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1. Executive Summary 
Despite the impressive figures that point to a booming economy (with real GDP growth unofficially 
projected by the EBRD at 7% in 2007), not all is well in Montenegro. The World Bank, and other 
international observers, have pointed out that two of the “key challenges” that Montenegro needs to 
confront on its way to EU membership are “weak governance and the perceived wide prevalence of 
corruption.”  
 
Having gained independence in 2006, Montenegro has nearly completed the state-building 
processes that have monopolised the public agenda and the attention of its decision makers for the 
past decade. Citizens’ and media attention is increasingly turning to governance issues, and given 
that reform efforts in a number of crucial areas have been underway for some years, the lack of 
progress is disappointing.  
 
While reliable data on the scope and nature of corruption are difficult to come by for most 
countries, the little information that is available for Montenegro is not encouraging. Freedom 
House’s Nations in Transit 2007 report shows a decline in the ranking on corruption from the 
previous two years, in large part due to the lack of transparency in the privatisation process, delays 
in adopting the Action Plan for the Implementation of the Programme for the Fight against 
Corruption and Organised Crime, and the failure to adopt changes to the conflict of interest law. 
Two recent national surveys of small businesses showed that over 50 (and sometimes much higher) 
percent of entrepreneurs are asked for bribes by various officials.  
 
Montenegro shares many aspects of corruption with other post-communist states: the legacy of 
large, non-competitive bureaucracies, underdeveloped market economy, scarcity of resources, and 
lack of democratic governance. However, there also exist Montenegro-specific factors that not only 
inform the causes and forms of corruption in the country, but also constrain other reforms: one, a 
relatively short experience of a state that is able to exert its administrative authority over the entire 
society; two, a ruling party that – as the successor of the League of Communists – has been in 
power, albeit with internal transformations, for 60 years; three, a small population where it is almost 
a statistical certainty that persons in key leadership positions will be related; and, four, the legacy of 
a close relationship with the larger and more developed Serbia that has marginalised certain 
Montenegrin institutions. A number of these conditions directly impact on political corruption, 
which in its many facets, presents the biggest challenge for Montenegro.  
 
There have been a number of attempts to restrict political corruption, most notably the Law on the 
Prevention of Conflict of Interest that seeks to limit incompatible or multiple functions by requiring 
public officials to declare their assets, functions, and gifts. Unfortunately, the regime has a number 
of grave flaws and cannot be viewed as anything more than a first step. Dramatic modifications are 
needed. Attempts to regulate political party and campaign finance have had a similarly 
disappointing outcome. Despite the most generous subsidies to parties in the region, other state 
resources continue to be misused for electoral purposes.  
 
The parliament has not yet developed into a robust oversight institution, and for the moment, the 
institution as a whole is not leading the fight against corruption, nor are the majority of deputies 
particularly interested in ethical issues. There is potential to build the parliament’s oversight 
capacity, but the process will be long-term. 
 
While improved local governance has been noted by some international observers, others fail to see 
improved administrative functioning in most municipalities, with a number of surveys pointing to 
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highest administrative corruption precisely at the local level. Corruption in development also 
appears to play out primarily at the local level where the majority of decisions are made, especially 
in the coastal region.  
 
The most serious speculations about “grand” corruption are at the central executive level in general, 
and with the privatisation process in particular. Experience from other transition economies 
suggests that privatisation is a “one-off” issue, and that reversing privatisation contracts might be 
more damaging than beneficial for future investments and confidence in the economy. That said, the 
way in which the Montenegrin government has warded off any insight into the process despite years 
of legitimate public pressure is astonishing. Such practices, along with some other reactions by 
leading politicians that characterise legitimate criticism from NGOs as “against the country 
interest”, suggest that principles of democracy have not been truly embraced. 
 
The system of taxation and tax collection has undergone the first substantial reforms; however, 
more needs to be done to harmonise the tax regime with EU standards. Discriminatory tax 
collection, tax evasion and fraud have been identified as substantial problems. Surveys confirm that 
corruption among tax inspectors is a serious obstacle to doing business for companies. A more 
decisive look at the scale of the problem is needed, and remedial measures should be designed 
accordingly.  
 
Customs, too, has undergone some reform necessary to comply with EU standards. Corruption, 
although present, appears to be substantially lower than in neighbouring countries, and some 
progress has been made in tackling the problem: an ethics code has been adopted, and an integrity 
plan has been elaborated. There is an emphasis on repressive measures, and more needs to be done 
to prevent corruption in the customs. This will have to include, as elsewhere in the public service, 
the introduction of competitive salaries that will decrease the incentives for corruption.  
 
Progress has also been made on the time and procedures it takes a new business to register. 
However, the pre-registration process, i.e. the collection of certificates and licenses, remains a 
serious obstacle to the development of small and medium-size enterprises. There is a lack of 
consolidated, readily available information for entrepreneurs-to-be on what documentation needs to 
be submitted, and the system suffers from too many institutions involved on the local and central 
levels with substantial discretionary powers. The problems have been mapped out for a number of 
years now, but various reform efforts have failed.  
 
Recent changes to the public procurement law address many of the concerns with the previous 
system that was characterised as bureaucratic, and susceptible to non-competitive procedures. The 
integrity of the new decentralised system rests on the activism of bidders who have an interest in 
challenging non-competitive procedures. The problem is that few entrepreneurs in Montenegro have 
the capacity to do so, and many do not complain either because they fear negative repercussions or 
because they do not believe that their complaints will make a difference – a concern that is present 
also in other sectors.  
 
First attempts have been made to introduce programme-based budgeting; however, due to lack of 
capacity and resources, progress has been slow. Initial steps have been made to introduce Public 
Internal Financial Control (PIFC), with measures to set up a system of internal audit in spending 
units. More needs to be done, including through medium and long-term measures to recruit and 
train appropriate staff. The overall capacity of the parliament to oversee the preparation and 
execution of the budget is still very low, but it is hoped that the audit reports of the recently 
established State Audit Institution (SAI) will be able to inform budgetary decisions and 
parliamentary oversight. However, in order for the SAI to play this role, it needs to be genuinely 
independent. The appointment, in late 2006, of the new supreme state auditor – a person until then 
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assuming high positions in the ruling party DPS – in a hasty procedure involving changes of 
legislation to make his profile fit the requirements of the function, is an alarming development in 
this respect, which threatens to undermine the credibility of this important institution.  
 
There is a low level of public trust in the judiciary, and particularly the courts, in large part due to a 
significant backlog of cases and excessive time periods for the legal processes, but also due to a 
perception of high levels of political influence over the judiciary (and to an extent, the police). 
While a number of reform efforts have been undertaken since 2000, progress is slow, although 
observers note improvements in the functioning of certain courts. The prosecution is still widely 
distrusted, mainly due to the lack of convictions in a number of high-profile murder cases 
(including that of a senior police official investigating organised crime), as well as due to an 
apparent reluctance to initiate investigations against individuals close to the government involved in 
corruption scandals. A comprehensive judicial reform strategy adopted in June 2007 provides a 
roadmap to additional changes that would improve the independence and effectiveness of the 
system, but unease about an appropriate balance between independence and accountability remains.  
 
While the law enforcement institutions’ capacity to investigate and prosecute corruption and 
organised crime has improved through new legislation and technical means, training is still needed 
on the application of the new instruments, of judges in particular. The preconditions for a successful 
confrontation with organised crime and corruption are in place, and it will soon be time to measure 
success not only on the number of laws passed, but by the number of convictions achieved.  
 
Transparency and access to information are at a lower level than they should be. While the secrecy 
surrounding the privatisation process has been the most egregious example of all, a number of 
public institutions remain reluctant to share information about the rules or their work. To be fair, the 
majority of institutions covered in this report are quite exemplary in their transparency and 
openness, but even there, information is not always well organised, out-of-use web sites have not 
been shut down, and search facilities are poor or non-existent, creating the impression that 
information cannot be found except by those who already know where it is.  
 
The media and civil society – widely recognised as key pillars in the fight against corruption – are 
not yet as strong as they could be. The quality of journalism is generally rather poor with few 
exceptions, and while the state-owned broadcaster remains under strong political influence, there is 
a range of political sympathies in the private media that, at a minimum, provides diversity in low 
quality reporting. Only a handful of Montenegro’s 3,600 registered NGOs are truly active, but 
among them are a few doing excellent work. NGOs have been at the forefront of the fight against 
corruption, and their watchdog activities appear to be beginning to reverse public distrust generated 
through frequent misuse of non-profits status.  
 
The most comprehensive anti-corruption effort to date – and the likely roadmap for most future 
anti-corruption activities despite some flaws – is the Programme for the Fight against Corruption 
and Organised Crime adopted in 2005. Implementation is overseen by a high-level National 
Commission. The Directorate for Anti-Corruption Initiative, which has existed since 2001, provides 
some support to the Commission’s work. Success on the implementation of the Action Plan has 
been mixed. While there has been progress in a few sectors, such as the customs, quite a few other 
areas are lagging behind, most notably conflict of interest and political party finance. Still other 
fields appear to have been targeted by wrong measures, and the leadership of some institutions 
seems not to be willing to take a serious look at what the real issues with regard to corruption are 
(e.g. tax administration); finally, a small number behaves as though they do not feel part of the 
obligations in the Action Plan, posing the question of overall ownership of the document. 
Nevertheless, these are the best roadmaps available for the moment, and can be adjusted as 
implementation of measures proceeds and capacities grow.  
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This reports ends with a number of observations and recommendations: 
1. It is difficult to precisely asses the quality of governance, or the extent of corruption in 
Montenegro, without more targeted research. Donors should support high quality research and 
analysis of the mechanisms of corruption in Montenegro in order to design appropriate remedies.  
2. The government’s stubborn refusal to make public privatisation-related documents leads to the 
conclusion than that the irregularities that have occurred in the process are massive. Donors should 
strongly advocate that future privatisations be as transparent as possible.  
3. Far-reaching politicisation of public institutions and the economic sphere is a cause for concern. 
Donors should support original thinking about mechanisms to ensure depoliticisation of state 
institutions; however, given the poor track record of self-policing in bodies such as the Judicial 
Council, appropriate accountability measures must accompany increased independence.  
4. A number of key anti-corruption regimes is extremely poor: conflict of interest, financing of 
political parties, and to a lesser extent, freedom of information. Donors should strongly advocate 
the revision of the legislative framework, and particularly enforcement, of new regulations.  
5. Barriers to business caused by excessive discretionary powers and red tape have been identified, 
but decisive reforms are missing. Donors should support the private sector, particularly SMEs, in 
organising to protect their interests and encourage the implementation of systemic reforms. 
6. A new constitution is being drafted, and will likely be passed in late 2007. Donors should 
advocate incorporating extensive provisions on separation of powers and institutional 
accountability.  
7. The aspirations for EU membership are clear, and they should be used for advancing the political 
will for reform. But these reforms must be sustainable and in-depth. Donors must make clear that 
Potemkin-like institutions and superficial measures do not count as progress, and deterioration of 
institutions such as the State Audit Institution must be reversed.  
8. The Programme for the Fight against Corruption and Organised Crime is a good basic roadmap 
for anti-corruption efforts. Donors should support the programme’s implementation and 
improvement, including the development and implementation of local-level strategies and action 
plans.  
9. Size does matter. Human resources are limited, and institutions will suffer from small size, which 
can sometimes be better addressed by a more centralised system. Donors should consider these 
limitations in project design, including in consolidating their assistance structures rather than 
creating new ones or recruiting new staff, as this would contribute to drawing even more scarce 
human resources away from where they might be needed in the public administration.  
10. Competitiveness is essential to Montenegro’s future success. While family ties may still be 
strong, attitudes about the “traditional way of doing business” are changing. Donors should support 
efforts to capture the shift of attitudes and encourage the public to resist perpetuating myths.  
11. Civil servants and citizens who wish to resist and report corruption need to be protected. Donors 
should support whistleblower protection initiatives, including from the loss of livelihood.  
12. A growing number of young people resent being outside of the networks in which decisions are 
taken, and therefore have a stake in seeing the rules of the game changed. Projects should try to 
build on this, specifically targeting the young.  
14. There is a lack of information on legislation, rights and procedures, both for state officials and 
the general public. Educational efforts are still needed and should continue to be supported.  
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15. The role of independent watchdogs such as NGOs and media is extremely important in 
monitoring the reform process. Donors should continue supporting independent watchdog efforts, 
including mechanisms for their protection.  
16. The international community has been quite tolerant of the deficiencies in Montenegro’s 
governance during the state-building process, but this process is now nearly complete. While being 
mindful of the structural and historical constraints that impact the pace of reforms, moving 
forward, donors need to take a more critical stance on the delays in delivering reforms. Not doing 
so should not be viewed as “doing a favour” either to the Montenegrin government or its citizens.  
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2. Introduction 
This report was commissioned by the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency 
(Sida) to provide an analysis of corruption and the progress of anti-corruption activities in 
Montenegro, with the objective of identifying priority areas and opportunities for potential future 
reform efforts. As there is little existing research and analysis on this issue, Sida is supporting this 
study both as a part of its strategic learning, planning, and programming, as well as for use both by 
donors partners and relevant national stakeholders.  
 
Sida recognises corruption as an obstacle to democratic stability, the rule of law and social and 
economic development in South Eastern Europe, and gives correspondingly a high priority to 
corruption issues in Swedish development cooperation with this region. The fight against corruption 
is seen as one of the principal means that will enable the poor to improve their living conditions, as 
well as a condition for achieving equitable and sustainable reforms that help countries´ integration 
into European structures.  
 
Montenegro is a small state of approximately 650,000 inhabitants,1 gaining independence in 2006 
after 15 years of a joint state with Serbia. In the 1990s, during the wars of Yugoslav succession and 
its aftermath, Montenegro’s economy was damaged by economic sanctions, which also gave rise to 
extensive smuggling and other organised crime. Montenegrin society became deeply divided over 
the split with Milošević in 1997 between the part of the population that identifies itself as Serb (and 
has dominantly supported the joint state with Serbia and the Milošević regime) and the part that 
identifies itself as Montenegrin, and has largely supported the state’s independence. (National 
minorities – Bosniaks/Muslims, Albanians, Croats, Roma, which account for approx 25% of the 
population – have also generally favoured independence.) Until 2006, the majority of questions 
relating to governance reforms and economic development have been subsumed by the debate over 
independence and Serb vs. Montenegrin identity. With the question of statehood finally resolved, 
citizens’ (and media) attention is increasingly turning to governance issues. The final major 
symbolic questions will be addressed by the new constitution, which is anticipated to be adopted by 
the end of 2007.  
 
This means that now is actually a propitious time to work on governance issues in Montenegro, as 
there are no other key state building activities that can be effectively used to justify the lack of 
progress on matters that improve the lives of Montenegro’s citizens.  
 
In many ways, Montenegro is doing better than many have predicted, particularly with regard to its 
economic indicators: real GDP growth is projected to be 7% in 2007. Foreign Direct Investment – 
mainly a result of the privatisation of state-owned enterprises – has massively grown in the past 
years: from US$ 63 million in 2004 to an anticipated US$ 650 million in 2007. GDP per capita has 
more than doubled since 2001 (when it was US$ 1,688), to 3,426 in 20062; unemployment is at 
11.96% – compared with 32.7% in 2000.3  
 
Approval ratings of the ruling Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS) are high, explained in part also 
by the euphoria caused by Montenegro having made the peaceful transition to independence, and 
                                                     
1 See Government of Montenegro’s website at www.vlada.cg.yu/vijesti.php?akcija=rubrika&rubrika=70.  
2 According to data not yet published by EBRD.  
3 See “Unemployment rate falls below 12%,” New Europe-The European Weekly, 25.8.2007 at 
www.neurope.eu/view_news.php?id=76861.  
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the step forward the government made by the signing the Stabilisation and Association Agreement 
with the European Union in 2007.  
 
The government of Montenegro is riding on a wave of approval by important organisations such as 
the World Bank, which recently lauded the progress made.4 But the World Bank, as other 
international observers, also points out that two of the “key challenges” that Montenegro needs to 
confront on its way to EU membership are “weak governance and the perceived wide prevalence of 
corruption.”5 Although the Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the EU has been initialled 
in March 2007, after the massive enlargement in recent years, the EU is not likely to endorse any 
shortcuts to membership for Western Balkan states, including Montenegro, nor hand out good 
marks to aspirant countries without merit. This has been made clear in the 2006 Progress Report6 by 
the European Commission (EC), which has been very critical with regards to the results in the fight 
against organised crime and corruption in Montenegro to date. 
 
Fighting corruption requires a long-term, sustained effort, but also genuine political will by the top 
leadership to seriously tackle it. In Montenegro today, the government has embraced the goal of 
European Union membership. In this context, it has adopted a Programme for the Fight against 
Corruption and Organised Crime (hereafter: AC Programme),7 and an Action Plan8 with short and 
medium-term measures to implement the Program. However, the results to date of the 
implementation of the Action Plan, as well as numerous other previous reforms, appear to be mixed, 
at best.  
 
For the purposes of this report, we define corruption as any transaction between private and public 
sector actors through which collective goods are illegitimately converted into private interests, 
payoffs and other benefits.  
 
While it is beyond the scope of this report to engage in an extensive discussion of the theoretical 
frameworks underpinning anti-corruption approaches, this assessment is informed by the premise 
that the unique national historical and political context impact reform processes in any given 
country. The aim is to provide a qualitative analysis, supported with data to the extent available, in 
order to describe not only the current status of governance but also elucidate the structural and 
political factors that have, and will continue, to impact and constrain future reform efforts.  
 
This paper therefore begins with a brief discussion of the specific national context, and the historic 
and structural factors that impact reform efforts in a number of sectors and reappear as “recurrent 
themes” in reviewing past and future challenges. Key sectors are then treated individually in some 
detail, with a discussion of the government’s anti-corruption programme – which can be viewed as 
a roadmap for future support to the fight against corruption – rounding off the analysis. The paper 
ends with a summary of key observations and recommendations for future reform efforts.   
 
Assessing the current state of corruption in Montenegro, and the status of existing reform efforts is a 
considerable challenge. One of the main obstacles has been the scarcity of data and previous 
                                                     
4See “World Bank hails Montenegro’s ‘Amazing Progress’,’’ RFE/RL Newsline, 27.7.2007 at www.rferl.org/ 
newsline/2007/07/4-SEE/see-270707.asp.  
5 See World Bank, “Republic of Montenegro: Public Expenditure and Institutional Review. Volume 1,” 3.11.2006, p. I, at 
www.gom.cg.yu/files/1165507662.pdf.  
6 European Commission, Montenegro 2006 Progress Report, SEC (2006) 1388, Brussels, 8.11.2006, at 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2006/nov/mn_sec_1388_en.pdf.  
7 Government of Montenegro/Ministry of Internal Affairs, “Programme for the Fight against Corruption and Organised 
Crime” (“Program borbe protiv korupcije i organizovanog kriminala”) at www.gom.cg.yu/files/ 1124287629.doc.  
8 Government of Montenegro/Ministry of Internal Affairs, “Action Plan for the Implementation of the Programme for the 
Fight against Corruption and Organised Crime” (“Akcioni plan za sprovođenje programa borbe protiv korupcije i 
organizovanog kriminala”) at www.gom.cg.yu/files/1157383512.doc.  
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research and analysis, on one hand, and a preponderance of unconfirmed rumours and allegations, 
on the other. Further, while most public institutions now have their own websites, many of the key 
documents for each sector are not available, or difficult to locate. The issue of reliability of data 
received from some interview partners and in written statements/reports should also be highlighted: 
the authors were more than once confronted with discrepancies, which was an added difficulty. To 
the knowledge of the authors, no previous attempt has been made to describe, in a comprehensive 
way, the different facets of corruption in Montenegro. As the first such effort, this report should be 
considered a starting point for further analysis and research.  
 
The authors wish to thank Sida staff for their suggestions and information. Additional sincere 
thanks go to the individuals who have taken the time from their schedules to speak, correspond or 
otherwise consult with the authors during their research. Any errors or omissions are the sole 
responsibility of the authors.  
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3. Overview and Context  
3. 1 Data, Perceptions, and Experience of Corruption 
Survey data on and other analysis of corruption in Montenegro is still relatively scarce – until 2006, 
the most important international surveys have tended to provide aggregate data for Serbia and 
Montenegro, making it therefore difficult to extrapolate statements on trends and patterns for 
Montenegro.  
 
An exception has been the Freedom House annual publication Nations in Transit, which has, since 
2005, dedicated a separate analysis including corruption to Montenegro. The recently published 
2007 report rates the situation with regards to corruption – with 5.50 on a scale where 1 represents 
the highest possible, and 7 the lowest possible rating – as worse than in 2005 and 2006 (with ratings 
of 5.25 respectively). This lower rating has been attributed to the lack of political will of the 
government, manifested in its failure to render the privatisation process more transparent, delays in 
adopting the Action Plan for the Implementation of the Programme for the Fight against Corruption 
and Organised Crime (hereafter: AC Action Plan), and the failure to adopt changes to the Law on 
Conflict of Interest.9  
 
The EBRD-World Bank Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (hereafter: 
BEEPS) – a repeat survey carried out in 2002 and 2005 in transition countries in Central, South 
Eastern, and Eastern Europe and the NIS – has tried to capture trends in obstacles to doing business, 
including corruption, faced by companies. Although only a very limited number of Montenegrin 
companies participated in the 2002 and 2005 surveys,10 some trends might be cautiously 
extrapolated for Montenegro. In 2005, more firms reported that corruption was a problem in doing 
business than in 2002: while in 2002, around 30% of companies had made this statement, the 
percentage had increased, in 2005, to 50%. Companies also perceived the judiciary to be more of a 
problem in 2005 (53%) than in 2002 (38%). There was a steep increase in the frequency of bribes 
reported by firms: while in 2002, 17% of firms had said that they were frequently asked for 
unofficial payments, this figure had risen to 32% in the 2005 survey. At the same time, the bribe tax 
(i.e. the annual share of revenues paid in bribes) declined compared to 2002, indicating that 
companies had to pay more often, but smaller amounts. Bribes were reported to be frequent in 
public procurement, fire and building inspections, customs, taxes, and public services (telephone 
and electricity services).11  
 
From the private sector perspective, two national surveys, using a bigger sample of firms, have 
complemented the EBRD-World Bank BEEPS’ findings about corruption in the process of doing 
business in Montenegro.  
 
First, a recent survey by the Montenegrin Employers Federation (Unija Poslodavaca Crne Gore) 
found that 58% of employers polled felt that corruption at the local government-level was a problem 
                                                     
9 See Lisa McLean, “Montenegro,” Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2007, p. 303 at 
www.freedomhouse.hu//images/fdh_galleries/NIT2007/nt-montenegro-proof-ii.pdf.  
10 The 2002 sample covered 20 Montenegrin firms out of 250 for the whole of Serbia and Montenegro, while the 2005 
sample included 18 Montenegrin firms out of a total of 300 for the whole of Serbia and Montenegro. See World Bank 
“Republic of Montenegro: Public Expenditure and Institutional Review. Volume 1,” p.7.  
11 Ibid., and James H. Anderson and Cheryl W. Gray, Anticorruption in Transition 3. Who is Succeeding... and Why?, The 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, 2006, p. 15 at http://siteresources.worldbank. 
org/INTECA/Resources/ACT3.pdf.  
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for their doing business, and 22% of respondents felt that corruption was the greatest obstacle to the 
growth of the economy. 52.36% of respondents were convinced that it was important to make 
unofficial payments to local officials in order to get things done, and 57% of respondents felt it was 
important to give presents to tax and other inspectors.12  
 
Second, the results of a 2005 survey of the NGO Group for Changes13 (Grupa za promjene) entitled 
The Problem of Corruption in Doing Business of Small and Medium-Size Enterprises in 
Montenegro give an insight into what businesspeople commonly understand by corruption – abuse 
of political office, requests for kick-backs, and nepotism, etc. – with manipulation with data on 
VAT and income tax, requests for non-pecuniary gifts, private travel on company expenses, the use 
of company equipment for private purposes, the purchase or sale of stolen goods is not understood 
to be corruption. The survey also points to regional differences in corruption in Montenegro. 80% of 
companies on the coast reported that bribes had been requested “often or always” by inspectors and 
the financial police; in the North, 58% responded to the same question that they were “rarely or 
never” asked for bribes. In the coastal region, 75% of respondents reported that the local authorities 
were asking “often or always” for bribes, an experience that was shared by 57% in the central 
region, while 43% stated that bribes were “rarely or never” asked of them.14  
 
The Montenegrin branch of the National Democratic Institute (NDI) started, in February 2007, 
baseline surveys on a range of issues of importance for the public, including on perceptions of the 
performance of the government and the administration, the perceived impact of reform initiatives, 
etc. The baseline surveys are planned to be continued throughout 2007. In NDI’s most recent 
survey, conducted at the end of May/beginning of June 2007, 25% of respondents stated that they 
believe the government should do more to fight corruption and organised crime, while 31% felt that 
establishing equality before the law should be a priority of the government. More than half of the 
respondents felt that the biggest obstacle to building strong institutions was the fact that 
incompetent staff was occupying key positions in the government, which they had been allocated on 
the basis of party allegiances and family connections. Trust in government institutions is below 
50%, and newly established institutions (those dealing with money-laundering, anti-corruption 
initiatives, conflict of interest, and public procurement are singled out by the survey) were ranging 
lower than established institutions such as the courts, the police, and the customs. Asked about 
which structure was most likely to be able to have an impact on corruption, 28% felt that NGOs had 
the biggest potential for resolving the problem (as compared to 10% each for the police, the 
Prosecutor General, and the courts).15  
3.2 Historic and Structural Factors 
Many aspects of corruption in Montenegro are common to all post-communist states, above all the 
legacy of large, non-competitive bureaucracies, an underdeveloped market economy, scarcity of 
resources, lack of a system of checks and balances and other attributes of democratic governance in 
general. However, Montenegro-specific factors need to be understood in order to properly assess the 
                                                     
12 See Montenegrin Employers Federation, “Rezultati ankete UPCG” (Results of a survey by MEF) in Montenegrin ,at 
www.upcg.cg.yu/Dogadjaji_details.asp?ysID=290. The 2006 survey was funded in the framework of a project financed by 
the European Agency for Reconstruction (EAR). 
13 In July 2006, the NGO reconstituted itself into the political party Movement for Changes (Pokret za promjene), which 
is, with 11 seats since the 2006 parliamentary elections, the second strongest opposition party in the Montenegrin 
parliament.  
14 See Grupa za promjene “Rezultati istraživanja: Problem korupcije u poslovanju malih i srednjih preduzeća u Crnoj 
Gori” (Results of the Research: the Problem of Corruption in Doing Business of Small and Medium-Size Enterprises in 
Montenegro), pp. 4-13. Copy of the research results provided to on of the authors by UNDP Montenegro office.  
15 See NDI Montenegro, “Key Findings. Baseline Poll–February 2007,” Podgorica: NDI, 2007, in English, at 
www.accessdemocracy.org/library/2128_mn_focusgroups_030907.pdf.   
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causes and structure of corruption in Montenegro today, and to develop appropriate anti-corruption 
remedies. A number of contextual factors discussed below impact not only the fight against 
corruption, but also the overall process of reform.  
 
Great care must be taken in interpreting today’s reality through the lens of historical experience or 
structural factors. For example, there is little evidence that historically strong tribal/clan bonds still 
play a prominent role in political, social, and economic relationships. On the contrary, people who 
nominally belong to the same clan can be deeply divided on political issues, with the recent 
question of independence being the most conflictual issue of all. Nevertheless, there are certain 
historical factors that do impact Montenegrin society today.  
 
One, a centralised public administration and other attributes of modern statehood are relatively 
recent. Mountainous geography has delayed the evolution of the Montenegrin state as an effective 
system of governance: it has rather existed as a weak supra-structure over strong traditional tribal 
groups governed by informal rules. In effect, it is only with the emergence of communist rule after 
1945 that the state became the primary unit of governance in Montenegro. As a consequence, 
informal relationship and rules, and an informal way of “doing business” has not yet become 
completely displaced. In a country the size of Montenegro, such a way of transacting is moreover 
practically feasible.  
 
Two, the same party has de facto been in power for 60 years. While two key transformations have 
taken place – first in the anti-bureaucratic revolution of 1989-90, and second, following the break 
with Milošević in 199716 – today’s Democratic Party of Socialists (Demokratska Partija Socijalista, 
DPS) remains the legal successor of the Montenegrin branch of the League of Communists of 
Yugoslavia, and has as such inherited its assets and, arguably, some practices.  
 
                                                     
16 The anti-bureaucratic revolution of 1989-90 consisted primarily of purges of the pro-Yugoslav leadership in 
1989 in favour of more pro-Serbian cadres, rather than reforms: the party competed in first multi-party 
elections in 1990 under the name of League of Communists of Montenegro, changing the name to Democratic 
Party of Socialists only in 1991. The second transformation occurred with the break with Milošević in 1997 
and a split within the party. The then-party leader, Momir Bulatović, left the DPS to form a new party – the 
Socialist People’s Party (Socijalisticka Narodna Partija, SNP) – while Milo Đukanović assumed DPS party 
leadership. For a more detailed discussion of Montenegro’s history and political development, see Florian 
Bieber (ed), Montenegro in Transition. Problems of Statehood and Identity, Baden-Baden: SEER & Nomos, 
2003, at www.boeckler.de/pdf/p_seer_montenegro.pdf.  
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Box 1: 
During a parliamentary session in late July 2007, a question was raised about the 
Montenegrin government renting its 3,077 square meter premises from DPS on the 
basis of a contract dating from 1993, with the monthly rent of € 40,000 (i.e. € 
480,000 per annum).  
 
There is some lack of clarity whether this is lawful, with critics arguing that 
according to the Law on State Property (Zakon o državnoj imovini), the government 
had been obliged to make an inventory of all such property and begin a procedure of 
transferring it into state ownership. The defence rests on the argument that the 
contract was made before the Law on State Property was passed in 1999, and there 
is further uncertainty as to what extent the Law on Assets of Former Socio-Political 
Organisations (Zakon o imovini bivših društveno-političkih organizacija) may also 
apply. The final legal interpretation and outcome is pending.17  
 
DPS ownership of the building in question also explains why, unlike the opposition, 
the DPS party offices are in the same building as the Montenegrin government.  
 
The continuity between DPS and the League of Communists further implies a certain 
correspondence in the associations, if not practices, of a one-party state. During communism, the 
party was the state, and many joined the party in order to gain access to positions and privileges. 
Without a fundamental break with the past and a radical restructuring, there is reason to believe that 
the distinction between the ruling party and the state remains unclear, state and ruling party interests 
remain conflated, and the incentives for joining or supporting a party remain unchanged. Some 
observers argue that the beginnings of a new transformation are discernable, however, with the 
resignation Milo Đukanović as Prime Minister in the fall off 2006, and the emergence of new DPS 
leaders (Prime Minister and two Deputy Prime Ministers) who are widely regarded as energetic and 
uncompromised.  
 
Three, Montenegro is a small country, with a population of 650,000 inhabitants. In such a context, 
family relationships are bound to be present even in a fully competitive system of recruitment.  
 
 
Box 2: 
In April 2007, the Montenegrin independent weekly Monitor18 reported on the 
family relationships of the key positions within the judiciary, as follows: 
 
The wife of the state President Filip Vujanović, Svetlana Vujanović, is a judge of the 
Appellate Court. The President’s brother Dejan Vujanović is the Chairman of the Bar 
Association of Montenegro. The President’s brother-in-law (wife’s brother) Rajko 
Božović is a prosecutor of the Bar Association.  
 
The Special Prosecutor for Organised Crime Stojanka Radović is the sister-in-law of 
Miraš Radović, the Minister of Justice, and the kuma19 of the Supreme State 
Prosecutor Vesna Medenica.  
                                                     
17 See D.M, “Vlada daje DPS-u pola miliona eura za kiriju” (Government gives DPS half a million Euro for rent), Vijesti, 
31.7.2007, www.vijesti.cg.yu/arhiva.php?akcija=vijest&id=243281.  
18 Veseljko Koprivica, “Porodična manufaktura” (Family manufacture), Monitor No. 862, www.monitor.cg.yu/ 
ARHIVA/a_862_05.html.  
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These family relationships among leadership positions must not be construed as nepotistic and 
corrupt per definition. In a society as small as Montenegro, it is not only plausible but statistically 
probable that a few well-to-do families will have produced well-educated successful offspring, 
who, through studying and working in the same institutions may form long-lasting friendships and 
enter into marriages. This is an inescapable fact in Montenegro, but does result in a very small elite 
and a close interrelationship between political and economic power that calls for a more considered 
and in some ways more rigorous approach to conflict of interest regulation.  
 
The small size also implies a relatively small public administration, with correspondingly small 
state institutions. This limitation has consequences for institutional development, as a small 
institution is much more likely to be crippled by a turnover of key staff members, without a large 
number of managers ready to step in and replace the departure of a colleague.  
 
Constraints imposed by size also appear, for example, in arrangements necessary for the 
implementation of a meaningful witness protection programme (discussed in more detail in section 
8.4.1), which necessitates witness relocation to other countries in the region in order to assure 
sufficient anonymity.  
 
Four, the legacy of historic close relationship with Serbia, in particular after 1992 within the context 
of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (renamed in 2003 the State Union of Serbia and 
Montenegro), holds at least two relevant consequences. First, Serbian and Montenegrin political and 
economic elites as well as a number of criminal groups are closely connected, which means that 
many of the problems connected with these groups will have a cross-border dimension. Second, 
Montenegro as the junior partner in the federation (and in the Socialist Federative Republic of 
Yugoslavia before that) was marginalized in comparison to the political, administrative, and 
economic centre of Serbia.  
 
As a result, we notice, for example, a scarcity of Montenegro-specific statistic in governance data 
discussed in the previous section. A bias toward Serbia can also be observed in the proportions of 
allocation of donor funding to Serbia versus Montenegro, or the fact that donors largely operated 
Montenegro programmes out of Belgrade offices. Even a year after independence, a number of 
diplomatic representations in Podgorica do not issue visas, obliging Montenegrins to travel to 
Belgrade for consular services. Most critically for understanding the process of reforms, however, 
the development of public institutions, from universities to the statistical office, suffered as a 
consequence of the most qualified cadres seeking positions with counterpart institutions in 
Belgrade. In that respect, Montenegro has been suffering from a brain drain to Serbia for decades.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                 
19 Kum and kuma are the masculine and feminine designations for individuals related through an important traditional 
form of kinship common throughout the Balkans called kumstvo, which binds families through the act of witnessing 
weddings (equivalent to Best Man/Maid of Honour in the Anglo-American tradition) or christenings (equivalent to 
Godfather/Godmother).  
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4. Political Corruption 
Politicisation, or political influence, is nearly universally viewed as the most serious form of 
corruption that permeates all aspects of public and economic life in Montenegro. In the current 
context, the discussion extends beyond the term’s most common usage as an equivalent for “grand 
corruption,” although that aspect is also relevant, particularly in context of privatisation (section 5.1, 
below). Political corruption in Montenegro is most present in the form of political influence over 
the entirely of the administrative and economic processes in the state. Key aspects are discussed in 
some detail below.  
 
Box 3: Key Manifestations 
 
Nepotism and Protectionism 
Family and other social networks play a role in obtaining high level positions in the 
economic and political life in all societies, even the largest and most competitive 
democracies. In a country the size of Montenegro, the role of these networks is 
particularly dominant. Nepotism is often cited as the most common form of 
corruption in Montenegro. However, there are no quantitative or comprehensive 
qualitative analyses of this practice.  
 
Accumulation of Functions/Concentration of Power 
Holding of more than one (public) function is problematic from an anti-corruption 
perspective in several respects: one, it can serve as a clientelistic system of 
rewards for party loyalists; two, it can create a situation where there is a conflict of 
interest among the demands of the various positions, particularly if one or more of 
the functions are related to political or business interests; three, it can permit the 
concentration of power among few individuals, facilitating state capture; and four, 
in a country as small as Montenegro, there is already a dominance of a small elite 
that stifles competition.  
 
4.1 Conflict of Interest  
Two relevant laws attempt to prevent the above forms of corruption: the Law on Conflict of Interest 
(Zakon o konfliktu interesa),20 adopted in June 2004, and, less explicitly, the Law on Civil Servants 
and State Employees (Zakon o državnim službenicima i namještenicima),21 adopted in April 2004.  
 
The Law on Conflict of Interest introduces the concept of conflict of interest and restricts the 
number of function a public official can hold. It requires public officials to make pubic declarations 
of assets and functions, and provides rules on acceptance and declaration of gifts.  
 
The law is quite poor in several important respects. The definition of public official is incomplete, 
based only on the criterion of election or appointment, rather than function, leaving out certain 
important civil service positions that are filled through regular recruitment procedures. A number of 
concepts is imprecise, allowing for contradictory interpretations, including the definition of what 
                                                     
20 Available in Montenegrin at www.konfliktinteresa.cg.yu/regulativa/zakon.htm.  
21 Available in English at www.uzk.cg.yu/eng/aboutus/legislation/doc/law/law-on-civil-servants-and-state-employees.doc 
and in Montenegrin at www.uzk.cg.yu/onama/propisi/doc/zakoni/zakon-o-dsluzbenicima-i-namjestenicima-sa-
dopunama.doc.  
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constitutes a public function. Further, there are no thresholds stated for assets to be declared, and the 
rules allow public officials to serve on Boards of Directors of state or majority state-owned agencies 
and enterprises and to receive compensation for it. Post-employment restrictions are likewise 
missing, and adequate sanctions are entirely lacking.22  
 
 
Box 4: 
The NGO Network of the Affirmation of the Non-Governmental Sector (MANS) has 
repeatedly challenged the implementation of conflict of interest rules. A number of 
cases involved officials holding additional functions contrary to law. Rulings on 
these questions reveal a high level of discretion in the interpretation of the concept 
of public official: 
 
The President of the Administrative Court was ruled permitted to serve as 
President of the Republic Electoral Commission, as the latter is a function in a 
“technical/expert body” and furthermore not a full-time “professional” function. On 
the other hand, a member of the Privatisation Council was ruled prohibited because 
of the “importance of the function.”  
 
 
The Law on Civil Servants cannot be seen as supplementing the gaps, as neither it nor the 
December 2005 Code of Ethics for Civil Servants and State Employees (Etički kodeks državnih 
službenika i namještenika)23 address conflict of interest issues adequately. In fact, the Code of 
Ethics explicitly permits gifts that represent “customary hospitality” (item 13) despite emerging 
evidence that such gifts are no longer commonly considered voluntary nor a matter of gratitude or 
hospitality (see section 5.2). While a Human Resources Management Authority (Uprava za 
kadrove)24 was set up in 2004 as part of the Strategy of the Public Administration Reform, a truly 
competitive system of recruitment is far from being firmly in place.  
 
The body overseeing the implementation of the law is the Commission for Determining Conflict of 
Interest (Komisija za utvrđjivanje konflikta interesa),25 established in July 2004, but becoming 
operational only in early 2005. The competencies of the Commission include producing the forms 
for income and asset declarations; keeping registers of income, property/assets, and gifts of public 
officials; carrying out the procedure for deciding on the existence of a conflict of interest; and, as 
necessary, making recommendations for dismissal of officials for breaches of obligations imposed 
by the Conflict of Interest Law. The Commission has a legal obligation to initiate procedures upon 
identifying breaches, and also on the basis of citizens’ reports/complaints. It does not, however, 
assess the veracity of the declarations.  
 
The Commission is composed of a President and 4 additional members, appointed by parliament for 
a renewable term of 5 years. Commission members are not prohibited from membership in political 
parties or elective bodies such as local parliaments, and the question of their political independence 
has been called into question. At the time of this assessment, the Commission was staffed by 7 
                                                     
22 Analyses of the existing law and its shortcomings, as well as recommendations for improvement, are included in the 
Commission’s Annual Report. See in Montenegrin “Zaključna razmatranja,” Izvještaj o radu Komisije za utvrđivanje 
konflikta interesa za 2006. godinu. ( “Concluding Considerations,” Report on the Work of the Commision for Determining 
Conflict of Interest for 2006) at www.konfliktinteresa.cg.yu/programi/IZVESTAJ%202006.htm and more extensively in 
The Monitoring Center (CEMI), Manual on Conflict of Interest of Public Officials, Podgorica, 2006, at 
www.cemi.cg.yu/publikacije/download/prirucnik_o_konfliktu_interesa.pdf.  
23 Available in Montenegrin at www.upravazakadrove.cg.yu/onama/propisi/doc/ppropisi/Eticki-kodeks.doc.  
24 www.uzk.cg.yu  
25 www.konfliktinteresa.cg.yu  
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professional and administrative staff, anticipating one additional staff member in 2007. The 
Commission’s budget was € 103,350 in 2005, just over € 166,000 for 2006, but €157,000 for 2007. 
Salaries are not particularly competitive.  
 
The Commission has, in co-operation with the NGO Centre for Monitoring (CEMI) published and 
distributed to public officials a manual for complying with conflict of interest rules, and has 
conducted a number of trainings on the regulatory provisions and officials’ obligations therein. It 
has also developed a programme of training, educational and outreach activities, and is actively 
engaged in fundraising for those activities.26 While the Commission has noted shortcomings in the 
conflict of interest regime, and has reported to the public prosecutors 4 cases of “illegally obtained 
assets” gained from functions held in contravention of the law,27 it is not viewed as an overly 
activist body, and a number of its decisions have been publicly criticised as politically biased by the 
NGO MANS.   
 
The strongest sanction available under the current regime is a non-binding but public 
recommendation for dismissal of the public official issued by the Commission for Determining 
Conflict of Interest in cases of failure to submit the asset declaration, failure to correct incomplete 
declarations or other breaches of rules, or in actual situations of conflict of interest. It is important to 
note that such recommendations are meaningless in case of public officials who are directly elected 
by Montenegrin citizens and cannot be dismissed by a superior.  
 
The shortcomings of the system have been repeatedly highlighted by a number of international 
organisations, including the OSCE and the Council of Europe, and noted in both the GRECO 2006 
Evaluation Report28 and the European Commission’s 2006 Progress Report. Despite these 
recommendations, in July 2006, the Montenegrin parliament failed to pass a new draft law, or 
amend the existing one.  
 
With such a deficient regulatory framework in place, it is perhaps no surprise that compliance with 
the rules is low. In its 2006 report, the Commission noted that 6% of state-level and 38% of 
local/municipal level officials are in violation of the conflict of interest rules, and these are almost 
exclusively elected (vs. appointed) officials. Recommendations for dismissal are not respected by 
the authorities, especially at the municipal level; however, quite a number has corrected the 
problematic situation. Further, public warnings are not always perceived as damaging: in a 
conversation with one of the authors, the Commission President cited a case when an opposition 
politician claimed that the effect was to improve his “rating” among his constituency! He further 
attributed non-compliance with a troubling lack of awareness of public officials of their legal 
obligations, and the misperception that conflict of interest regulations are in fact measures to 
determine the origin of assets (a fear which is perhaps even more problematic).   
 
Educational measures to promote the purpose and obligations under the conflict of interest rules do 
appear to be needed, not only with regard to public officials, but other segments of society. 
Journalists are only slowly becoming familiar with the law, but their reporting largely consists of 
transmitting challenges submitted to the Commission and its decisions, rather than any investigative 
work that leads to new reports to the Commission. The Commission in addition recognises the need 
for further education of its own members and staff.  
 
                                                     
26 The programme proposal is available to interested potential donors upon request.  
27 Notices were forwarded to the public prosecutor in December 2006, and the cases still in progress. The text of the 
notices is available in Montenegrin at www.konfliktinteresa.cg.yu/rjesenja/TUZIOC.htm.  
28 Council of Europe/GRECO, Evaluation Report on the Republic of Montenegro, Greco Eval I-II Rep (2005) 4E, 
Strasbourg, 13 October 2006, at www.coe.int/t/dg1/greco/evaluations/round2/GrecoEval1-2(2005)4_Montenegro_EN.pdf.  
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On the positive side, the searchable register of public officials’ assets, public functions, and gifts is 
public and available on the Commission’s web site.29 Accessing the web site is highly entertaining, 
although it does raise some doubt as to the veracity of the declarations, with a number of 
government officials wearing suits that cost more than the stated value of their assets. The available 
information is beginning to be accessed by NGO activists and journalists, but much more could be 
done to put public pressure on officials to properly disclose their assets.  
 
A new law regulating conflict of interest is under discussion, but it will not reach the public agenda 
before the new constitution is adopted. Therefore, there exists an important opportunity for 
international donors to engage in a public discussion about how to most effectively regulate conflict 
of interest, given the specific challenges imposed by Montenegro’s size.  
4.2 Financing of Political Parties and Electoral Campaigns 
While questions of financing of political parties have been regulated by law since the introduction 
of multiparty democracy,30 the current rules have been set by the Law on Financing of Political 
Parties (Zakon o finansiranju političkih partija)31 passed in 2004, and amended in May 2005.  
 
In brief, the current law prohibits certain sources of funds for parties; determines permitted types of 
expenditure; establishes an extensive system of state subsidies which provides funds for both the 
ordinary activities of political parties already represented in parliament of local councils, and for the 
electoral campaigns of registered participants; imposes a general obligation on parties to disclose 
their income and spending; and defines sanctions for violations of provisions of the Law.  
 
While there are a number of difficulties with the law – including those relating to the dominance of 
state subsidies and the criteria for their distribution, illogical restrictions on private contributions to 
political parties, insufficient definition and regulation of election campaign expenditure, and 
contradictory disclosure requirements – the central problem nevertheless lies in the completely 
inadequate provisions for their control and enforcement.32  
 
There has been a heated debate among political parties over the initial law and its amendments, but 
the conflict had been primarily directed to questions of equal access to funds by all electoral 
contestants, including non-parliamentary parties. In fact, in June 2006, at the initiative of a national 
NGO in co-operation with the Directorate for Anti-Corruption Initiative, the Constitutional Court 
reversed certain amendments introduced in 2005 on the grounds of creating unequal status for 
political parties that do not have parliamentary status. However, there has been very little interest in 
the effective implementation of the law, and numerous breaches of its provisions are committed by 
nearly all political parties to a certain extent, with little consequence.33  
 
 
 
 
                                                     
29 www.konfliktinteresa.cg.yu/funkcioneri/EvidencijaFun.php  
30 For a brief history of political party finance regulation, see CEMI, Financing Political Parties in Montenegro: Report 
for year 2005, Podgorica, 2005, pp. 21-35, at www.cemi.cg.yu/publikacije/download/finansiranjepolpartija.pdf.  
31 Available in Montenegrin at www.gom.cg.yu/files/1187683267.pdf.  
32 For a detailed analysis of the existing regulations, see Quentin Reed, Assessment of Regulation of Political Party 
Finance in Montenegro and Recommendations for Changes in the Legal Framework, Council of Europe PACO-Impact 
Technical Paper PC-TC (2006)21, available upon request from the Council of Europe.  
33 CEMI filed a request to the State Prosecutor to start an investigation procedure against political parties that failed to 
financial reports for the 2005 municipal election campaign. At the time of writing of this analysis, no visible measures had 
been taken. 
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Box 5: 
According to the NGO CEMI, “although opposition parties often complained [about 
the] much better position of the governing party, none of them initiated the question 
of financial dealings’ control. The basic characteristic of this process is a ‘pact of 
non-aggression’ between political parties i.e. non-interference related to financial 
questions.”34  
 
 
Failure to comply with disclosure requirements is the most common form of disrespect of the law, 
although the government has also been criticised for attempts to deny state funds for particular 
campaigns in contravention of the law.35 Lack of transparency has also been noted with the 
Republic Electoral Commission and local electoral commissions, bodies mandated to oversee the 
law’s implementation. In response, CEMI has led a civic effort to increase transparency of the 
system. Using freedom of information provisions, they have actively sought to obtain party finance 
declarations, and have posted them on a public searchable database on their web site.36  
 
While state funding to political parties is the most generous in the region, it is estimated that it still 
falls short of covering all campaign and operational expenses and is supplemented by private 
donations. Poor regulation of this issue, coupled with the lack of effective oversight and 
enforcement, makes it impossible to know much about the actual flows of private financing to 
political parties, and potential corruption occurring through these relationships. As elsewhere in the 
region, no studies on the actual financing of political parties and electoral campaigns exist. 
Informed observers, however, maintain that it is largely informal and not declared in official forms.  
 
 
Box 6: 
Informed observers cite numerous instances of informal campaign funding 
practices. One such assertion involves activities surrounding the independence 
referendum campaign in May 2006, were party members allegedly approached 
businesses, informally asking them to contribute in-kind, for example through 
sponsoring air tickets for diaspora voters.  
 
It is unlikely that any written records of these or similar transactions would exist, as 
there is no other documented evidence to support these assertions. 
 
4.2.1 Misuse of state resources 
Misuse of state resources for the financing of political parties and election campaigns37 is likewise a 
serious concern, particularly in view of the incomplete transfer of the assets of the League of 
Communists to the state, as noted in text box 1 above. While Article 7 of the law prohibits the 
                                                     
34 CEMI, Financing Political Parties in Montenegro: Report for year 2005, p. 16.  
35 In preparation for the autumn parliamentary and local elections in 2006, the Prime Minister and Minister of 
Finance announced that the competing parties would not receive state campaign financing because budgeted 
funds had been spent on the referendum campaign. After a public outcry, the government reversed its 
decision.  
36 www.transparentnost.cg.yu/Pretraga/Kampanje.php 
37 For a discussion of a misuse of state resources, in particular budgetary, institutional, and coercive resources, see 
Monitoring Election Campaign Finance: A Handbook for NGOs, New York: Open Society Institute, 2005 at 
www.justiceinitiative.org/db/resource2?res_id=102367.  
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donations from public institutions and enterprises, and institutions and enterprises that receive state 
funding, the lack of oversight and control mechanisms opens quite a wide space for abuse.  
 
Budget resources 
 
A number of questionable budgetary expenditures preceding and during the campaign for the 
independence referendum in 2006 has been noted by Freedom House’s Nations in Transit Report 
for Montenegro for 2006: “the government’s largesse was in full swing in the run-up to the 
referendum, providing subsidised credits for housing and small and medium-sized enterprises, 
livestock premiums, and salary increases for police, customs, and other state employees.”38  
 
 
Box 7: 
The CEMI monitoring report on the financing of the independence referendum 
captures campaign-related advertising by a number of governmental agencies, 
including the Development Fund of the Republic of Montenegro, the municipality of 
Podgorica, the government of Montenegro, the Directorate for the Development of 
Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises, and the Customs Administration.39  
 
As the actual content of these advertisements has not been analysed in the study, it 
cannot be determined whether any of these state bodies actively campaigned for or 
against independence. Nevertheless, even if the content simply urged citizens to 
exercise their democratic rights (a “neutral” get-out-the-vote message), it begs the 
question of whether agencies such as the Development Fund or the Customs 
Administration should be involved in electoral issues at all.  
 
 
Coercive resources  
 
Coercive resources include the police and other law enforcement institutions, and any bodies with direct 
coercive powers, ranging from customs to intelligence agencies. Coercive resources may be used to 
intimidate, harass, obstruct, or even eliminate political opponents. 
 
The state-owned enterprise Port of Bar (Luka Bar) terminated its contract with the candidate for 
mayor of the newly-formed opposition party Movement for Change (Pokret za Promjene, PzP) in 
the municipality of Bar, claiming that his employment contract had expired in early 2004. The 
candidate claimed that his dismissal was punishment, and the OSCE/ODIHR noted that “questions 
remain about the timing of the decision.”  
 
In another problematically timed event, the police questioned PzP leader Nebojša Medojević about 
tax evasion based on an anonymous tip three days before the election.40  
4.2.2 Vote buying 
During the campaign for the independence referendum, the “no” campaign made a number of 
accusations of pressure and vote buying. The most vivid of these was the March 2006 videotape 
showing individuals offering to pay a €1,500 electric bill for a “yes” vote at an illegally taped 
                                                     
38 Freedom House, p. 313.  
39 See in particular section 2.2 and tables on pp. 27-31. The Monitoring Centre CEMI, Monitoring finansiranja 
referendumske kampanje (Monitoring the Financing of the Referendum Campaign), Podgorica, 2006, available in 
Montenegrin at www.cemi.cg.yu/publikacije/download/frk.pdf.  
40 Nations in Transit, p. 315.  
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private meeting. Allegations of a setup followed, but in an uncharacteristically swift court 
procedure, two DPS activists were convicted and sentenced to 8 and 10 months in prison for 
offering to pay a bill in exchange for a vote, while the videographer was sentenced to 10 months in 
prison.41 Allegations of vote buying have been persistent in Montenegro for years, but 2006 was the 
first time it was documented by international election observers.42 The practice is cause for serious 
concern.  
4.3 Local Self-Government 
Corruption at the local level appears to be a significant problem. The available survey data, 
discussed in more detail in section 3.1 above, shows that 58% of business respondents believe that 
corruption is widespread among local officials, and 52.36% feel that it is necessary to make 
unofficial payments to representatives of the local authorities in order to do business at the local 
level, while only 3.38% of respondents felt that the local administration poses no obstacles to the 
development of the company.43  
 
 
Box 8: 
A great deal of corruption relating to real estate purchases and construction plays 
out at the local level. In a 2005 study – Corruption in Spatial Planning and 
Development – the NGO MANS has outlined a number of opportunities for 
corruption in the process and presented a number of case studies where corruption 
is strongly suspected.44 
 
 
A comprehensive plan for the reform of local self-government – predicated above all on the 
principle of decentralisation – was outlined in the 2003 Strategy of the Public Administration 
Reform in Montenegro (Strategija Upravne Reforme Crne Gore 2002–2009).45 A significant step in 
the decentralisation process began in July 2003 with the passage of the Law on Local Self-
Government (Zakon o lokalnoj samoupravi)46, and the Law on Local Self-Government Financing 
(Zakon o finansiranju lokalne samouprave)47 that entered into force in January 2004. Now, each of 
the 21 municipal governments adopts its own budget and plans for development, construction, 
urban planning, capital improvement, and environmental development, and has responsibility for 
social service delivery, communal services, and public transport. Most municipalities, especially 
those in the much poorer north, operate with limited financial resources and bloated bureaucracies.48  
 
Capacities of local government administrations are low in general, and there is a considerable 
challenge in coping with the additional responsibilities imposed by decentralisation. Effective 
implementation of a number of laws, including the Law on Public Procurement and Freedom of 
Information, among others, is greatly hampered by the shortcomings of municipal administrations.  
 
                                                     
41 Ibid, p. 313.  
42 OSCE/ODIHR, “Republic of Montegro Referendum on State-Status in Montenegro 21 May 2006” Final Report, at 
www.osce.org/item/20077.html.  
43 The 2007 results of the repeat survey conducted among 114 member companies by the Montenegrin Employers 
Federation.  
44 Vanja Ćalović, Corruption in Spatial Planning and Development, MANS, Podgorica, 2005, at 
www.mans.cg.yu/korupcija/publication/publication_corruption.htm.  
45 Available in Montenegrin at www.gom.cg.yu/files/1063023752.pdf.  
46 Available in Montenegrin at www.gom.cg.yu/files/1059742068.doc.  
47 Available in Montenegrin at www.gom.cg.yu/files/1084888918.doc.  
48 Nations in Transit, p 322.  
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Some international observers nevertheless see some improvements in the quality of governance at 
the local level. The Freedom House Nations in Transit report for 2006 notes a “new crop of mayors 
[that] appears to be committed to delivering improved services to citizens.” It also notes an 
improvement in local party politics, with politicians having managed “to overcome party divisions, 
and in municipalities with divided governments, there appear to be none of the decision-making 
obstructions such as those seen previously in the northern tourist municipality of Žabljak, where 
local government did not function for nearly two years.”49  
 
The report attributes this advance to the 2005 amendments to the Law on Local Self-Government, 
which transferred the power of appointing the city manager from the municipal assembly to the 
mayor. As the city manager has the mandate to appoint the rest of the city administration, and the 
mayor the power to dissolve the assembly if it did not make decisions within its sphere of 
responsibilities, the mayor’s power has greatly increased. Despite intense criticism at the time by 
the opposition for “practically putting 80 percent of the authority in the hands of the mayor,” the 
report contends that the amendment may have contributed to more responsible politics in 2006.50  
 
No information is available on the potentially greater political influence over the public 
administration or aspects of economic life – and increased corruption – by political parties whose 
candidates won these more powerful mayoral positions. On the contrary, the Freedom House report 
maintains that “the new class of mayors from both opposition and ruling parties exhibits a greater 
sense of responsibility….Both sides understand that citizens closely follow municipal management 
and will harshly judge those who do not deliver.”51 This view is contradicted by findings of a survey 
by the Montenegrin Employers Federation (section 5.4), which finds that entrepreneurs face severe 
problems with regards to corruption, quality of service delivery, and red tape, precisely at the local 
level.  
 
The AC Action Plan defines a single general responsibility for local governments: that they, 
together with NGOs, develop local anti-corruption action plans with measures not included in the 
national programme, an obligation that echoes GRECO recommendations. The First Report on the 
Realisation of Measures from the Action Plan for the Implementation of the Programme for the 
Fight against Corruption and Organised Crime (hereafter: the First AC Progress Report)52 concludes 
that the measures have not been implemented on the basis of non-receipt of reports by the 
municipalities (through the Union of Municipalities of Montenegro). The authors of the Progress 
Report were seemingly unaware that a draft Programme for Fighting Corruption and Organized 
Crime within Local Self-Government and an action plan were in fact being drafted by an inter-
agency team led by the Police Administration, with some technical support from the Council of 
Europe. While the draft text of the programme was not publicly available at the time of writing this 
report, Council of Europe expert assessments to date point to a number of shortcomings in the first 
version of the programme and its implementation plan that need to be addressed in the final 
document. In brief, the draft is said not to be based on a real needs and situation assessment, and has 
been prepared without the prescribed public consultation. As a result of the former, it was difficult 
to determine whether the objectives or measures represent adequate responses to the actual needs. 
Further, timeframes for implementation, entities who would be implementing the specific measures, 
the financial resources required, and a mechanism for monitoring and evaluating progress were not 
                                                     
49 Ibid.  
50 Ibid, p. 323.  
51 Ibid, p. 324.  
52 See Government of Montenegro/National Commission for Monitoring of the Realisation of the Action Plan for 
Implementation of the Program for Fight against Corruption and Organized Crime, “First Report on the Realisation of 
Measures from the Action Plan for the Implementation of the Programme for the Fight against Corruption and Organised 
Crime,” p.34 at www.vlada.cg.yu/eng/antikorup/index.php?akcija=vijesti&id=25152.  
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defined.53 Flawed as the initial version may be, the elaboration and implementation of such a 
programme should be supported, and the incorporation of expert recommendations strongly 
encouraged.  
4.4 Parliament 
While corruption scandals involving members of parliament (MPs) may not be as prevalent as those 
involving executive branch officials where power is in fact concentrated, the Montenegrin 
parliament has not been at the forefront of the fight against corruption. In fact, the parliament has 
voted against a number of legislative changes that would strengthen anti-corruption efforts, 
including a draft law on conflict of interest in July 2006, changes to the Criminal Procedure Code 
that would permit the use of special investigative means (e.g. surveillance) for suspected corruption 
crimes, or a reduction in the scope of their immunities. In addition, the parliament approved 
changes to the law on the State Audit Institution that are widely seen to degrade the independence 
and effectiveness of the institution (see section 6.3).  
 
Furthermore, the parliament has refused to lift the immunity of a number of officials under 
investigation for corruption. The notable examples include Dragan Šoć who was, as Minister of 
Justice in 2001, under investigation for violating public procurement regulations; Vesna Perović, 
opposition representative who was in 2004 under investigation of extorting a € 1 million “donation” 
from a Russian/Montenegrin firm as part of a real estate purchase deal with a municipality where 
her political party dominated; and, former Health Minister Miodrag Pavličić, also under 
investigation in 2004 for violating procurement rules.54 In general, interest in integrity issues 
appears to be quite low.  
 
 
Box 9: 
Among its parliamentary activities, in early 2007, the National Democratic Institute 
(NDI) organised a study trip to the US that included a visit to the Maryland General 
Assembly (state parliament) and its Ethics Committee. While the initial reactions by 
Montenegrin MPs were enthusiastic – resulting in NDI translating and distributing 
the Maryland parliamentary Ethics Manual55 – a follow-up roundtable on ethics in 
Podgorica, with the Chairman of the Maryland Ethics Committee as a guest, was 
attended by only a handful of MPs, not even all the deputies who had taken part in 
the US visit.  
 
 
Being a member of parliament is not a full-time professional position, necessitating engagement 
elsewhere to supplement a deputy’s income. This aspect has been the primary argument for 
permitting MPs to serve as members on Boards under conflict of interest rules. A number of 
international organisations recommend professionalisation of the position with remuneration to 
reflect the expanded scope of engagement, not only to restrict the possibility of conflict of interest, 
but also to promote a more effective parliament.  
 
There are a number of challenges in the way of the parliament becoming a robust representative 
body, as well as an effective oversight mechanism for the executive branch of government. Most 
importantly, the influence of political parties is quite strong, and can be seen in the ruling parties 
                                                     
53 Expert comments available upon request from the Council of Europe.  
54 See Zoran Radulović, “Reporter's Notebook: Republic of Montenegro,” Global Integrity, 2006 Country Reports, at 
www.globalintegrity.org/reports/2006/MONTENEGRO/notebook.cfm.  
55 Available in Montenegrin at www.ndicrnagora.org/files/EthichsManualFinal.pdf?mod_download_id=238.  
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repeatedly scheduling urgent parliamentary sittings for dubious reasons in order to satisfy the 
executive’s last-minute political priorities. 
 
 
Box 10: 
The 2006 Nations in Transit report notes the widely-shared perception that the 
2006 Law on Amnesty, which reduced all but the most serious prison sentences by 
25 %, was rushed for adoption before the September 2006 parliamentary elections 
because of a pre-referendum promise to prisoners to get them to vote “yes.”56 
 
 
There are also visible efforts to enforce party discipline through demands for a repeated open vote 
in two cases where the outcome of the original vote had contradicted the position of the 
government.57 Nevertheless, some basic conditions for fostering parliamentary independence exist. 
While Montenegro’s single-constituency proportional representation election system undermines to 
an extent direct accountability to voters, the law obliges election contestants (parties and groups of 
citizens) to allocate won seats to candidates in the top 50% of their electoral list in the order they 
appear on the list. Deputies “own” their mandates, and in a case of conflict between an MP and the 
party, the MP cannot be stripped of the mandate by the party leadership, which provides some space 
for independent thinking and action.  
 
Furthermore, new Rules of Procedure (Poslovnik)58 adopted in July 2006, open other opportunities. 
There is now a requirement that the deputy chair of a committee be from the opposition if the chair 
is from the governing majority (and vice versa). Such an arrangement should lead to more 
opposition committee chairs and a more active role of the opposition, in general. Special sessions 
for MP questions of government, and a special “prime minister’s hour” that must be held once every 
two months, have also been introduced, although time will be needed until these new mechanisms 
become more than a formality.  
 
 
Box 11: 
Some international observers believe that parliamentary sittings held in November 
and December 2006 demonstrated that the new rules are having an impact in moving 
legislative discussion to substantive issues in the setting of committees: the 
Committee for Budget, Economy, and Finance held two five-hour sessions on the 
2007 budget and even invited NGOs to participate in the debate and offer their 
commentary – a first in Montenegro.59  
 
 
The new opposition appears eager to use the instruments of control provided in the new Rules of 
Procedure and even urge that these instruments be codified into the new Constitution. Deputies 
from the recently formed party Movement for Changes have already used the instrument of 
interpellation to review the much suspected privatisation process (see section 5.1). But several of 
these instruments require approval of a parliamentary majority, and their reach is therefore limited.  
 
Many recent laws require state institutions to report to the parliament, with the prosecutor and 
police, for example, reporting to the Committee on Security and Defence (Odbor za bezbjednost i 
                                                     
56 Nations in Transit, endnote 12, p. 331.  
57 Ibid, p. 310.  
58 Available in Montenegrin at www.skupstina.cg.yu/files/downloads/Poslovnik%20Skup__tine.doc.  
59 Nations in Transit, endnote 11, p. 331.  
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odbranu). A recent NDI needs assessment60 has a number of recommendations on increasing the 
oversight potential of the parliament, including the promulgation of a special law on parliamentary 
control over security services and explicit definitions of which services parliament exercises control 
and what that control implies, among other issues. A number of recommendations were also made 
with regard to establishing an effective budget and public finance committee.61 
 
Of course, the development of parliamentary oversight is also hampered by objective material 
limitations. For one, there are not enough professional, administrative and technical personnel 
within the parliamentary service. As elsewhere in the public service, t is difficult to recruit qualified 
new individuals due to low salaries and poor working conditions. Second, there are constraints with 
the physical facilities: presidents of committees lack office space, and there is frequently no 
appropriate space for meetings. Overall, a great deal more time and resources will be needed in 
order to transform the parliament into a vibrant oversight institution, but initial small steps can be 
observed.  
 
 
Box 12:Independent Institutions: Ombudsman 
The Ombudsman institution (Zaštitnik ljudskih prava i sloboda)62 was established in 
2003 and has now been in operation for 4 years. It is a small institution (20–21 
staff, compared to 40 in Croatia or 80 in Macedonia) with modest capacities, which 
does not permit specialisation on specific forms of violations that are being 
reported. 
 
The institution appears to be slowly raising its profile as a citizens’ defender. The 
European Commission notes improved cooperation between the Ombudsman and 
the Ministry of Interior, with appropriate disciplinary or criminal measures taken in 
each of the 13 cases involving ill-treatment that referred to the Ministry.63 The 
Ombudsman also confirms that state institutions are increasingly implementing his 
recommendations, with the rate of compliance now standing at some 80%. 
 
One of the obstacles to becoming a more forceful actor in the fight against 
corruption is the fact that the vast majority of persons making complaints (some 
1,200 annually) wish to remain anonymous; some clients do not even wish to have 
the complaint recorded in written form. Time will be needed to change this frame of 
mind. For the time being, at least with regard to corruption, the Ombudsman is not 
likely to emerge as the institution that encourages and effectively channels 
citizens’ reports.  
 
 
                                                     
60 NDI, New Challenges for a New Mandate – Analysis and Recommendations for a Strategy to Develop a Key Pillar of 
Montenegro’s Democracy: the Parliament of the Republic of Montenegro, Podgorica, August 2006, 
www.accessdemocracy.org/library/2078_yum_finalmonteneg_100106.pdf.  
61 Ibid, pp. 19-20.  
62 www.ombudsman.cg.yu  
63 European Commission, Montenegro 2006 Progress Report, p. 12.  
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5. Corruption in the Process of Doing Business 
5.1 Privatisation  
The process of privatisation in Montenegro has, for years, been marred by massive corruption 
allegations, voiced by non-governmental organisations, opposition parties, and the media. The 
government has reacted to these allegations with an appalling disregard for the legitimate interests 
the citizens take in the process. Requests for insight into the documentation of completed 
privatisations, made in particular by the NGO MANS64 under the Law on Freedom of Access to 
Information, were often initially refused by institutions who claimed not to be competent for such 
requests, demonstrating a disconcerting lack of knowledge about the legal framework they are 
supposed to operate in. Once the refusal was appealed to the courts, and the institutions were 
ordered to provide the information, the requests were still denied on the grounds of being “business 
secrets.” After additional appeals, MANS was granted information in a certain number of cases.  
 
 
Box 13: 
When MANS was finally formally granted access to privatisation files containing 
information on the composition of the members of the tender commissions in a 
number of privatisation deals, they continued to be obstructed in a number of ways: 
for example, by insisting that documentation be viewed in the respective agency’s 
premises, with time available to do so being very limited; copies of the documents 
are not being made available on the grounds of the agency claiming not to have 
sufficient technical equipment (copy machines etc.); the institution delaying the 
scheduling of an appointment65 for no clear reason; and restrictions on taking 
notes.66  
 
 
Against the background of MANS’ Sisyphean efforts, the sometimes farcical ways in which these 
efforts are routinely being warded off are all the more unsettling. This make it difficult to conclude 
anything other than that those in charge for past privatisations have a massive interest in 
information not becoming public.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
64 MANS has published a compendium of documents tracking the organisation’s requests under the Freedom of Access to 
Information legislation, the responses from the authorities, and the legal rulings on these responses. See Vanja Ćalović, 
Milena Deletić, Behind the Closed Door – Free Access to Privatisation Information: Case Study Aluminium Plant 
Podgorica, 2006.  
65 In one case, MANS had to make 46 written requests before an appointment at the Agency for Economic Restructuring 
and Foreign Investment was finally granted. See Behind the Closed Door, pp. 55-67.  
66 Ibid.  
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Box 14: 
In light of the secrecy in which the process is shrouded, it is difficult to even 
speculate what might have preceded the various privatisation deals. What seems 
clear, though, is that there have been frequent and blatant breaches of conflict of 
interest provisions. The NGO MANS has repeatedly and publicly highlighted 
instances in which members of the Privatisation Council had obvious conflicts of 
interest. In a press statement of September 2006, for example, it is pointed out that 
the prosecution had started an investigation against Veselin Vukotić, Vice-
President of the Privatisation Council (and close ally of now ex-Prime Minister 
Đukanović), on substantiated suspicions of abuse of public office in the process of 
hiring a consultant for the privatisation of Jugopetrol. The other person against 
whom allegations were made was Branko Vujović, the Director of the Agency for 
Restructuring. Both remained in their functions, despite theses allegations and an 
investigation underway. The investigation did not yield any results.67  
 
 
The post-privatisation process, likewise, has been marred by scandals, with new owners of 
companies not fulfilling the contractual obligations regarding the investments into the companies 
they purchased, as well as regarding the social programs, the exploitation of concessions, the 
protection of minority shareholders’ interests, and the protection of the environment (all of which 
form part of the privatisation contract).  
 
An interpellation by a group of opposition politicians in spring 2007 requesting a parliamentary 
debate about the privatisation process (quoted below in more detail) yielded a reply, in writing, 
from the government on the allegations made. However, in absence of any possibility to 
independently verify the documentation quoted by external groups, the credibility of the reply is 
rather questionable.  
 
Some of the outstanding key strategic privatisation deals have, for the moment, been put on hold. 
This concerns, for example, the planned privatisation of the power plant (which generates one-third 
of Montenegro’s electricity) and coal mine in Pljevlja.68 International observers offer three possible 
explanations: 1) the authorities have understood that selling the companies to the best bidder – in 
the case of the Pljevlja power plant and coal mine this is the En Plus Group of Russian oligarch 
Oleg Deripaska who also owns the Podgorica Aluminium Plan – would bring major parts of the 
economy and key infrastructure into the ownership of one single owner; 2) a principle shift away 
from the neo-liberal approach of complete privatisation; and 3) those in charge of – behind the 
scenes – sealing the deal are unsatisfied with the amount of kick-backs to them.  
 
At least two of the three explanations are probably supported by a number of arguments.  
 
First, the post-privatisation problems linked with the allegedly largely unfulfilled investment 
programme of the Podgorica Aluminium Plant (Kombinat Aluminijuma Podgorica, KAP)69 – he 
largest industrial company in Montenegro accounting for 20% of the GDP and keeping between 900 
and 1100 smaller companies in business70 – probably makes it difficult to justify another sale to the 
                                                     
67 See in Montenegrin MANS’ press statement “Problem korupcije u Crnoj Gori se marginalizuje” (The problem of 
corruption in Montenegro is being marginalised), 6.9.2006, at www.mans.cg.yu/MANS/press/2006/ 
septembar2006/06.htm.  
68 See “Montenegrin Parliament Votes to Halt Energy Privatisation,” RFE/RL Newsline, Vol. 11, No. 108, Part II, 
13.6.2007 at www.rferl.org/newsline/2007/06/4-SEE/see-130607.asp.   
69 Details of the contract have been made public largely as a result of public pressure by MANS in March 2007.  
70 See “Der russische Herr der Schwarzen Berge” (The Russian Lord of the Black Mountains), Der Standard, 10.7.2007.  
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En Plus Group.71 Also, through shares in STRABAG, which in the beginning of 2007 bought 
Montenegro’s biggest building company Crnagoraput, Deripaska is now also part of the country’s 
building business (estimations put the volume of road building to be carried out in the years to come 
at €2.8 billion).72 There appear to be problems in making the new owner of KAP comply with his 
contractual obligations, which might forebode potential future problems.  
 
Second, the already quoted baseline survey conducted by the National Democratic Institute shows 
that 76% of respondents are against the privatisation of the Pljevlja power plant and coal mine, and 
79% believes that the state should have key infrastructure under its control.73 This might coincide 
with a shift in thinking in the government.  
 
The third option mentioned above – that of insufficient kick-backs for key persons in the process – 
is based on unconfirmed rumours. Certainly, there are conflicts inside the ruling coalition on the 
course of the privatisation process;74 however, a detailed assessment of such an explanation is 
outside the scope of this report.  
 
In addition, speculations have abounded over the years on who Deripaska’s business partners are. 
Observers say that they might include a number of Montenegrin businesspeople who have benefited 
from the war and who are now trying to bring back in a legal way assets from countries such as 
Cyprus (a mechanism known, for example, from the privatisation process in Serbia).  
 
It is unfortunate that the big international financial organisations have taken – throughout the region 
– a very pragmatic approach to the privatisation process, basically promoting a radical approach to 
get loss-making companies off the state budget. Organisations such as MANS are aware that once 
everything has been privatised, it might be difficult, if not impossible, to review or reverse any of 
the murky deals, and the public will have left no other option than to accept the new circumstances.  
 
Technically and legally, the privatisation process in Montenegro is governed by a number of laws 
(some of which experts say are severely outdated), including the Law on the Transformation of 
Ownership and Management (Zakon o svojinskoj i upravljačkoj transformaciji)75 and the Law on 
the Privatisation of the Economy (Zakon o privatizaciji privrede).76 Privatisation can take place 
through public auction, public tender or public offer.  
 
The Privatisation Council (Savjet za privatizaciju), established by the Law on Privatisation, is 
appointed by the government in order to “administer, control and ensure the implementation of the 
privatisation.” To that end, the Council has executive authorities; its work is funded through the 
state budget. Privatisation is being carried out in accordance with annual plans, which are adopted 
on the recommendations by the Council; the plans are public.77 The terms of reference of the 
                                                     
71 En Plus Group pledges to invest €195.4 million in the Pljevlja power station, and €78.7 million in the Pljevlja coal 
mine, but its investment stipulated in the privatisation contract in the case of the Aluminium plant have become subject of 
substantial criticism. The refusal, to date, to sell both companies to the En Plus Group has, however, been caused by its 
reluctance to revise the sale contract of the Aluminium plant “[...] under which the Russian-owned smelter receives 
subsidised electricity from Montenegro’s state power company, Elektroprivreda Crne Gore (EPCG). EPCG wants to avoid 
buying power from the Russian-owned Pljevlja plant at a higher price than it supplies KAP [...].” See: “Country Report 
Montenegro,” The Economist Intelligence Unit, January 2007, p. 15.  
72 See “Der russische Herr der Schwarzen Berge.”  . 
73 See NDI, “Key Findings. Baseline Poll–February 2007,” p.32. 
74 See “Montenegrin Parliament Votes to Halt Energy Privatisation.”  
75 A list of relevant laws is provided on the website of the Agency for Economic Restructuring and Foreign Investment, 
without, however, providing the texts or the links to the relevant laws. See for the list in Montenegrin 
www.agencijacg.org/pocetna/htm, and in English www.agencijacg.org/englishver/homepage/htm.  
76 Available in Montenegrin at www.scmn.cg.yu/dokumenta/zakoni/Zakon%20o%20privatizaciji%20privrede.doc.  
77 The 2007 Privatisation Plan (Plan Privatizacije za 2007.godinu) can be found in English at 
www.agencijacg.org/englishver/homepage.htm and in Montenegrin at www.agencijacg.org/pocetna.htm.  
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Council are defined by the Decision on the Scope of Work and the Composition of the Privatisation 
Council (Odluka o djelokrugu i sastavu Savjeta za privatizaciju).78; The Council is responsible, 
inter alia, for nominating the members of the Tender Commission (or the Auction Commission), 
adopting the report of the Tender Commission on the outcome of a tender, and deciding on the 
merit of appeals during a tender procedure. The Council represents the interests of the Republic of 
Montenegro, and is accountable to the government. The Council is composed of a president, a 
deputy president, members of the Council (the number of which is established by appointment), and 
a secretary, all of which are appointed by the government. The tenure for all except the secretary is 
four years with the possibility of renewal. Article 4 of the Decision puts limitations on the 
compatibility of Council members’ and their close relatives’ functions in the Council and their 
potential economic interests: members are not to have any business interest in the enterprise to be 
privatised – a provision that is known to have been violated in the past. 
 
 
Box 15: 
Veselin Vukotić, Head of the Privatisation Council, is, for example, member of the 
executive board of the to-be-privatised ´Plantaže´ wine factory (the privatisation 
of which has been put on hold).79  
 
 
The Centre for Transformation and Privatisation of the Montenegrin Agency for Economic 
Restructuring and Foreign Investment (Agencija Crne Gore za prestrukturiranje privrede i strana 
ulaganja)80 controls each privatisation procedure, including the monitoring of the compliance with 
the privatisation contract. The Centre has four departments, as follows: a) department for 
estimation, transformation and privatisation; b) department for organisational transformation and 
quality system, c) department for the valorisation of spatial potentials of the Republic and 
processing of data, and d) department for specialized consultancy questions at the disposal of the 
Privatisation Council. Formally, the Agency accepts complaints with regards to corruption in the 
privatisation process. An information leaflet on the Agency’s website stipulates that a complainant 
has to, inter alia, identify which part of the legislation he/she feels has been violated in order to 
fully comply with the procedure. From the above it is clear that it is actually almost impossible to 
make such a complaint given the fact that all privatisation documents are closed to the public. 
Possibly in recognition of the problem, by decision of 10 May 2007, a Commission has been 
formed which deals with complaints submitted by citizens in relation to the privatisation process.81 
The Commission is headed by the Minister of Justice, and its members are from the three funds 
through which privatisation contracts are being done the Development Fund (Fond za razvoj Crne 
Gore)82; the Republican Fund for Pension and Invalidity Insurance (Republički Zavod penzijskog i 
invalidskog osiguranja);83 and the Employment Bureau (Zavod za zapošljavanje Crne Gore),84 the 
Chamber of Commerce (Privredna komora Crne Gore),85 the Council of the Association of Trade 
Unions (Vijeće saveza sindikata Crne Gore),86 the Montenegrin Employers Federation, and 
independent advisors from the Ministry for Health, Work and Social Care and the Ministry of 
                                                     
78 See in Montenegrin the Decision at www.agencijacg.org/odluke/odluka%20o%20djelokrugu%20i%20sastavu2007.pdf.  
79 See, in Montenegrin, www.montenegroberza.com/ProspektPLAP.htm.  
80 www.agencijacg.org  
81 See Odluka o obrazovanju Komisije za razmatranje prigovora, pritužbi, predloga i sugestija građana na proces 
privatizacije (Decision on the Formation of a Commission for the Review of Reservations, Complaints and Suggestions by 
Citizens Concerning the Privatisation Process), available in Montenegrin at www.agencijacg.org/odluke/ 
odluka_o_prigovorima_prituzbama.pdf.  
82 www.fzrcg.cg.yu  
83The fund does not appear to have an own site.  
84 www.zzz.cg.yu  
85 www.pkcg.org/set.php  
86 www.ssscg.cg.yu  
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Finance. However, the specific terms of reference, scope and methodology of work, and the 
authorities of the Commission are not defined by the Decision. It stands to anticipate that the 
composition of the Commission – which, to the authors’ knowledge, has yet to convene for its first 
meeting – is such that it is unlikely to review, in an unbiased way, or criticise any of the complaints 
that might be addressed to it, given that the majority of the members would be expected to 
challenge the work of their superiors.  
 
The Privatisation Council has had a number of obligations under the AC Action Plan. These ranged 
from measures to be undertaken to control conflicts of interest, the opening of an internet site of the 
Council, the implementation of the Law on Free Access to Information, etc. The First AC Progress 
Report on the fulfilment of these obligations is, however, bordering on the grotesque and begs the 
question whether those who prepared the report have made the effort to double-check and question 
the submissions from the Council. The report states that the Council has set up its own internet 
presentation on the site of the Agency for Restructuring. It is, however, not clear where this site is 
supposed to be – the only section that deals with the Council is the provision of the text of the 
Decision establishing the Scope of Work and Composition of the Privatisation Council. Further, the 
First AC Progress Report considers the measure on elimination of discretionary powers of the 
Agency for Restructuring fulfilled on the basis of the Agency reporting that it has no such powers. 
Further, the Agency points out that there is a way of reporting corruption in the privatisation (see 
above), but that there have been no such complaints. The latter points again to the problem 
mentioned elsewhere in this report, namely that it is probably not adequate to expect that complaints 
will be addressed to the structure that is alleged to be part of the problem. The measures as they 
stand, and the reporting on their implementation, however, is nothing more than window-dressing.  
5.2 Taxation and Tax Collection  
Although not in a systematic fashion, some of the surveys noted in section 3.1 provide indications 
on the spread of corruption in the area of taxation and tax collection. The already quoted survey by 
the Montenegrin Employers Federation, published in July 2007, finds that 57% of the employers 
captured by the survey believe that it is important to give gifts to tax inspectors at the municipal 
level. The survey also finds that 97.28% of respondents believe stronger measures are necessary to 
tackle the problem of the black market/illegal work, i.e. de facto that of tax evasion tolerated by the 
authorities. And while respondents in the Group for Changes’ survey on corruption in the SME 
sector do not associate tax evasion of the value-added tax and of income taxes with corruption, the 
findings indicate that this is a frequent practice among companies. The survey offers as a possible 
explanation the fact that entrepreneurs feel the system of taxation to be unjust, a view supported by 
the findings of the Employers Federation survey in which 49% of respondents state that taxes and 
fees at the local level are neither fair nor proportionate.87 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
87 This view is supported by scholars who find that there is an inverse correlation between perceived levels of corruption 
and tax morale, i.e. where corruption is perceived high, tax morale is low. See Benno Torgler, “Tax Morale, Trust and 
Corruption: Empirical Evidence from Transition Countries,” CREMA Working Paper No. 2004-05, at www.crema-
research.ch/papers/2004-05.pdf.  
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Box 16: 
Other sources suggest that tax evasion is common, and the fact that it is practised 
seems well known. An interpellation, filed by 38 members of parliament in spring 
2007 to review the privatisation process, makes strong accusations against a 
number of owners of recently privatised enterprises: “Because of the insufficiently 
developed institutional framework and the lack of resources in the responsible 
governmental institutions (Ministry of Finance, revenue administrations, police, 
commercial court, etc.) as a rule, and taking advantage of the systemic weaknesses 
and the lack of political will in the government, the new owners have dressed up 
financial records and the recorded profit (Jugopetrol, Telekom, KAP, and others). In 
this way, the state budget has suffered substantial losses due to unpaid taxes on 
company profits [...]. The companies have recorded non-existing losses, so that they 
could then, in the following years, through book-keeping use the recorded profit to 
cover their non-existing losses”.88  
 
While it is not known whether these allegations can be substantiated, they would 
almost certainty trigger a financial investigation by the responsible authorities in 
Western countries where tax inspections and tax police rely heavily on hints and tip-
offs by outsiders..  
 
 
The area of taxation has undergone significant reforms in recent years, and legislation has been 
partly (VAT and excise duties) brought in line with the EU acquis communautaire.89 The European 
Commission, in its 2006 Progress Report, notes that substantial reforms are still ahead to fully align 
the Montenegrin tax system in order to fulfil the obligations under the Stabilisation and Partnership 
Agreement. Currently, taxes are collected in a discriminatory way, and more efforts were needed to 
reinforce the fight against corruption in this field. More importantly for the topic at hand, the 
Commission is concerned about the “problem of fraud in the area of excise duties, including 
smuggling [...]” and the fact that “[r]isk analysis has not been fully implemented.”90  
 
The Department of Public Revenues of Montenegro (Poreska Uprava),91 a central agency of the 
Ministry of Finance, has been included in the AC Programme, and in the AC Action Plan through a 
number of specific measures. A telephone hotline for the reporting of corruption cases has been 
opened at the Department of Public Revenues. To date, however, no single complaint has been 
received that involved corruption cases. The Department’s Unit for Internal Control was to be 
strengthened through intensified training of its staff, the elaboration of Rules of Procedure of the 
Work of the Internal Control, and through the preparation of reports, every six months, about the 
internal controls carried out. Whilst this set of measures has been implemented, the report also 
found not a single case of corruption. Also, implementing a measure of the AC Action Plan, the 
Ministry of Finance appointed a special external Supervisor of the work of the Department of Public 
                                                     
88 See “Interpelacija za pretresanje pitanja o vođenju unutrašnje politike Vlade Republike Crne Gore u oblasti 
privatizacije” (Interpellation for a thorough review of questions concerning the internal politics of the government of 
Montenegro in the area of privatisation), p. 7 in Montenegrin at www.skupstina.cg.yu/files/cetvrta_sjednica/ 
13._nterpelacjia_pzp_iz_oblasti_privatizacije.doc. Translation by the authors of the original document in Montenegrin.  
89 A list of the changes n the area of taxation and customs that took place from 1 January 2003 to 1 August 2006 numbers 
20 laws, of which 10 new ones and 10 laws amending/changing existing laws, three draft laws submitted to parliament, 
and 35 by-laws, see, “Pregled poreskih i carinskih propisa koji su doneseni u periodu od 1. Januara 2003.–1. Avgusta 
2006. godine” (Overview over tax and customs rules which were adopted in the period from 1 January 2003 to 1 August 
2006) in Montenegrin, at www.vlada.cg.yu/minfin/vijesti.php?akcija=vijesti&id=15870.  
90 See European Commission, Montenegro 2006 Progress Report, p. 25. Advice on risk analysis has been provided in the 
framework of the EU´s CAFAO programme.  
91 The English version of the Department of Public Revenues can be found at www.vlada.cg.yu/eng/djp/, the Montenegrin 
version at www.poreskauprava.vlada.cg.yu.  
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Revenues, who is supposed to report, every six months, about his work; the report is to be published 
on the website of the Ministry of Finance and the Department of Public Revenues. While the 
supervisor was appointed, no report appears to have been issued so far; at least, none is available on 
the website for public access.  
 
An Ethics Code for Officials Employed in the Department of Public Revenues (Etički kodeks 
službenika uposlenih u Poreskoj upravi)92 was adopted in November 2006. The Code identifies, 
inter alia, situations and circumstances that could lead to conflicts of interest, and specifies the 
responses to such situations. Breach of the conflict of interest provisions is considered to be a grave 
disciplinary offence for which sanctions can vary from a fine of up to 30% of the monthly salary to 
dismissal from duty. A specific article (article 8) is dedicated to the receipt of gifts: while the 
acceptance of gifts by the Department of Public Revenues’ staff and their closer family is banned by 
the Code, an exemption from these provisions concerns “gifts of lower market value and such 
[gifts] that represent customary hospitality.”93 While the problem of gifts is being discussed in the 
section on the Law on Conflict of Interest, it should also be pointed out that in the survey by the 
Employers Federation, 57% of respondents felt that giving gifts to tax and other inspectors was 
necessary in order to do business; the question was asked in the set of question that concerned the 
spread of corruption in their municipality, i.e., it was understood that giving gifts was a form of 
corruption – the fact that respondents felt that it was a precondition for their working also seems to 
suggest a problem, rather than an interpretation of gifts as a sign of gratitude.  
 
The Code contains a number of provisions that, without closer analysis, seem to be out of the remit 
of such a document, and which appear to primarily concern rules and procedures of work (such as 
the prohibition of smoking and making coffee in the premises, and of carrying weapons and small 
arms into the office). The Code of Ethics is, according to its Article 26, to be distributed to all 
offices of the Department of Public Revenues, where it is to be made public. The Code does not 
contain any provisions on a body inside the Department that would guide staff on the provisions of 
the Code. Judging from a meeting with the Head of the Unit for Internal Control, no specific 
trainings have been undertaken to acquaint tax inspectors on the provisions of the Code.  
 
The AC Action Plan further stipulated rotation of tax inspectors as a measure against corruption; to 
an extent, rotation has been practised, in a limited form, for some time. Namely, during the summer 
period, tax inspectors from other regions of Montenegro are routinely being deployed to the tourist 
hotspots on the coast to reinforce the capacities at the local level; this does not, however, seem to 
fall under what had been the idea of this measure, which, as a result seems not to have been 
implemented.  
 
Progress has been made on the automatisation of the tax procedures through the introduction of a 
single data base, and training of officials has taken place. While Memoranda of Understanding to 
facilitate co-operation between the Department of Public Revenues, the Police, and the Prosecutor 
General’s Office have been signed, the access to the single database as foreseen in the AC Action 
Plan has not, yet, been established. According to the Department of Public Revenues, not a single 
suspicious case has been forwarded to the Financial Police. 
 
The measures foreseen in the AC Action Plan primarily target the central level Department of 
Public Revenues. As has been noted elsewhere, the Action Plan failed to address measures to be 
undertaken at the local level, including with regards to municipal tax inspectors (municipalities 
impose and collect taxes through their own inspectors). An anti-corruption strategy for the local 
                                                     
92 See in Montenegrin, Vlada Republike Crne Gore, Poreska uprava, “Etiči kodeks službenika uposlenih u Poreskoj 
upravi,” 20.11.2006 at www.gom.cg.yu/print.php?id=17238&jezik=1.  
93 The same applies for all civil servants. The problem is also noted above in the section 4.1 on conflict of interest.  
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self-government is currently drafted, and it will be a major disappointment if it fails to address what 
seem to be substantial problems in the tax collection at that level. The above mentioned July 2007 
survey by the Employers Federation clearly highlighted that there is a serious problem; it is not 
clear to what extent respondents made a clear distinction between the municipal level tax inspectors 
and the tax inspectors of the Ministry of Finances´ branch offices in the different municipalities. 
The view expressed by almost all respondents in the survey that illegal business was a serious 
problem should, however, also be reason for concern by the Department of Public Revenues: a hard 
look has to be taken at who is turning a blind eye to businesses that are not registered and, thus, 
evade taxes. The Agenda for Economic Reform of Montenegro 2002–2007 had also highlighted the 
need to create, inside the Department for Public Revenues, “a unit that would deal with the 
discovery of and search for those not submitting tax return forms.”94 No official information has 
been available on the status of implementation of this measure. Other concerns raised by the 
Employers Federation survey, namely that of double standards, are echoed by the European 
Commission in its Progress Report, and are directly attributed to corruption.  
 
It stands therefore to argue that the measures identified in the AC Action Plan might need to be 
reconsidered if the Department of Public Revenues is indeed to make some serious progress on this. 
First, as had been recommended by Council of Europe experts at the early stages of drafting the 
Programme of the Fight against Corruption and Organised Crime, a strategy and appropriate 
measures have to be designed in knowledge of incentives, patterns and manifestations of corruption 
in the specific sector. Carrying out research to understand the forms and opportunities for corruption 
was one of the obligations for the Department of Public Revenues contained in the AC Action Plan; 
this obligation, to date, has not been fulfilled.  
 
The absence of any case of corruption being reported to the newly established hotline does, quite 
simply, not mean that there is no corruption. It might, however, mean that the measure might not be 
appropriate. In the above mentioned survey by the Group for Changes, 31% of entrepreneurs 
captured stated that they were not willing to report corruption, partly because of fear of negative 
consequences; 39% stated that they would be willing to report if they were convinced that their 
report would be treated completely anonymously.95 The survey did not capture who, in case of 
willingness to report, complainants would be ready to report to. So, to assume that a telephone 
hotline against corruption at the Department of Public Revenues itself will necessarily yield a lot of 
responses might be a bit naive at best. The absence of any such calls can not be taken as proof of the 
absence of corruption, either, nor can the absence of a single suspicious case having been forwarded 
to the financial police.96 Questions as to the criteria according to which cases have to be forwarded 
to the police have not yielded any convincing answers from the Department of Public Revenues 
staff. While the analysis of the Ethics Code of the Department of Public Revenues would be subject 
of a separate study, measures should be intensified for implementing ethics provisions through 
compulsory training encompassing all of the approximately 800 tax inspectors, through the 
establishment of structures inside the different tax offices to offer case-to-case guidance on how to 
interpret ethics provisions, and though public outreach to make taxpayers aware of the limitations 
the Code puts on tax inspectors.  
 
The government’s Action Plan for the Implementation of the Recommendations in the European 
Partnership, adopted in May 2007, points to another gap that might currently pose a corruption risk: 
                                                     
94 See Vlada Republike Crne Gore,“Agenda ekonomskih reformi u Crnoj Gori 2002–2007” (Government of Montenegro, 
“Agenda of Economic Reforms in Montenegro 2002–2007”), p. 65, in Montenegrin at www.vlada.cg.yu/biblioteka/ 
1114173857.pdf.  
95 Grupa za promjene “Rezultati istraživanja,” p. 23.  
96 This information was provided during a meeting of one of the authors with officials of the Department for Public 
Revenues, and was confirmed during two other meetings. However, the Action Plan progress report cites two cases having 
been forwarded by the Department to the financial police.  
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the plan specifies the need for increasing the qualifications of the Department’s staff, including 
basic computer skills.97 A written request to the Department for Public Revenues asking, inter alia, 
specifically about the mechanisms in place to carry out training on recently adopted changes to tax 
legislation yielded no reply to this specific question; by analogy (and in absence of any official 
information), experience from other countries in the region suggests that a low level of knowledge 
of new legal provisions provides substantial scope for corruption. Finally, salaries of those 
employed in the Department of Public Revenues need to be raised to cut incentives for corruption. 
5.3 Customs Administration 
In 2006, a survey was carried out with the objective to assess the level of corruption in the 
Montenegrin customs, and in particular, with an emphasis to capture progress over the past couple 
of years. The survey was carried out with financial support from the World Bank and conducted by 
the Podgorica-based Centre for Entrepreneurship and Economic Development (Centar za 
preduzetništvo i ekonomski razvoj, CEED), a private sector consultancy company. The survey 
involved three border crossings (Tivat airport, the port of Bar, Debeli Brijeg) and three customs 
terminals (Podgorica, Nikšić, Bijelo Polje) and covered a cross-section of 154 companies, based on 
criteria of business volume and the number of customs declarations.  
 
The results of the survey were overwhelmingly positive, which critics have attributed to the fact that 
the questionnaires were administered by customs officers themselves. This is difficult to verify, as 
the survey documentation and results, including the methodology of the survey, are not publicly 
available on the internet. Nevertheless, the contractor, CEED, is co-owned by Veselin Vukotić, a 
personality extremely close to the government; while it might be taking this too far to suspect that 
the results might have been dressed up or the methodology adapted in such a way as to make the 
customs administration look good, the question of impartiality of results does arise. Some 92% of 
respondents are reported to have felt being correctly treated by the customs officers, 78% of 
respondents stated that the customs procedure was efficient, and 54% of respondents stated that the 
procedures were being carried out faster than in 2002. The customs service had, according to 34% 
of respondents, changed most of all services present at border crossings. Asked about corruption, 
46% of respondents believed corruption to be on a low or very low level, while 5.2% stated that 
they considered it to be very high; 10.4% of respondents refused to answer this question. 22.7% of 
respondents admitted to having given bribes, the amount of which ranged from €5 to €100; more 
than a third of those that had bribed had given less than €10, 25% gave up to €5.  
 
These relatively low amounts of bribes seem to correlate with the fact that – compared to other 
countries in the region (such as Bosnia-Herzegovina), where posts are reported to be “sold” by the 
top leadership of the Ministry of Finance – there is a shortage of applicants for customs stations, 
indicating that financially, working at the customs is not as “lucrative” as one might think, and that 
the amounts changing hands are relatively small.  
 
A telephone hotline, in operation since January 2005 and primarily aiming to encourage citizens to 
report cases of suspected smuggling, resulted in 53 calls, 4 of which were complaints about the 
work of customs officers. Looking at the problems described in a policy paper by the Agency for 
the Development of Small and Medium-Size Enterprises on barriers to business, it appears that 
there are remaining issues with regards to discretionary powers of customs officials, and the 
adequate sanctioning of abuse of these powers. Further, the absence of a possibility for external 
                                                     
97 See Vlada Republike Crne Gore “Akcioni plan za implementaciju preporuka Evropskog partnerstva” (Government of 
Montenegro, “Action Plan for the Implementation of the recommendations of the European Partnership”), May 2007, p. 
47, in Montenegrin at www.vlada.cg.yu/minunutr/vijesti.php?akcija=vijesti&id=12153. 
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control of the customs to date is highlighted as an area that needs improvement, as is the fact that 
there is insufficient co-ordination between the tax and customs authorities.98 
 
The reform of the customs regime is one of the priorities under the European Partnership.99 The 
European Commission’s 2006 Progress Report acknowledges some progress made, in particular 
with the majority of customs legislation having been brought in line with the acquis 
communautaire. The Commissions stresses some progress in the adoption of simplified procedures, 
the introduction of risk analysis, and the fight against corruption, while also urging continued 
efforts in order to comply with EU standards.100 The Customs Law101 (Zakon o Carinskoj službi) 
defines the responsibilities of the customs administration. In 2003, a Unit for Internal Control 
(Odjelenje za unutrašnju kontrolu) was formed. As stipulated in the Rules of the Internal 
Organisation and Systematisation of the Customs Administration of Montenegro (Pravilnik o 
unutrašnjoj organizaciji i sistematizaciji Uprave carina Crne Gore), it reports to the Director of the 
Customs Administration, and suggests adequate measures to him. The Unit for Internal Control is in 
charge of controlling the officers’ work’s adherence to the law, is carrying out fraud risk 
assessments, and is in charge of conducting initial investigations into illegal and negligent work of 
customs officers. Investigations are carried out using information being supplied from outside the 
customs administration, but also from other departments, such as the Joint Team for the Control of 
the Proper Application of Procedures (Objedinjeni kontrolni tim za pravilne primjene carinskih 
propisa), the Unit for the Fight against Smuggling (Odjelenje za suzbijanje krijumčarenja), and the 
Information Branch (Odsjek za obavještajni rad). Since the beginning of 2007, 16 investigations 
have been conducted, 7 of which resulted in recommendations for disciplinary measures.102 
Decisions are taken by the Disciplinary Commission of the Customs Administration (Disciplinska 
komisija Uprave carina), while the actual sanctions are issued by the Director. Sanctions can be of 
financial nature (up to 30% of the officer’s salary for grave misconduct) or even dismissal from 
duty. During the first 5 months of 2007, 4 officers were dismissed (compared to one dismissal for 
the same period in 2006).  
 
According to the First AC Progress Report, the Customs Administration has been successful in 
implementing a number of measures. The customs administration practices a regular rotation of 
staff. An Ethics Code was adopted, as well as an integrity plan, and a telephone hotline to report 
cases of corruption and smuggling has been in operation for some time; on the website of the 
Customs Administration, a special section has been dedicated to the fight against corruption. 
Unfortunately, it is difficult to assess the merits of these policy documents, or to get an insight into 
the anti-corruption program, as the website is not up-to-date: the link to the anti-corruption section 
is empty, and it is not clear where to find the Ethics Code or the integrity plan – it certainly is not 
given high visibility on the site. Likewise, the survey on corruption in the customs, which has been 
widely quoted, is not on the address provided in the First AC Progress Report, making it difficult to 
make any sort of assessment. While one is inclined to attribute these lapses to a lack of resources 
                                                     
98 Vlada Republike Crne Gore/Direkcija za razvoj malih i srednjih preduzeća, “Eliminisanje biznis barijera. Radna versija 
3.0” (Government of Montenegro/Agency for the Development of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises, “Elimination of 
Business Barriers. Working version 3.0”), November 2006, p. 74. Document submitted to one of the authors by the SME 
Agency. 
99 In 2006, a total of 425,081 customs declarations were processed, representing an increase to the previous year of 27%. 
Electronic customs declarations were introduced in May 2006, and 65% of all declarations are now submitted in this way. 
In 2006, the collection of customs duties and tax increased by 41% compared to 2005, and the total revenue collected by 
the customs is now at €365,4 million, making up a total of 68,7% of the entire Montenegrin customs revenue. Data 
received from the Montenegrin office of CAFAO.  
100 See European Commission, Montenegro 2006 Progress Report, p. 25. 
101 The English version of the law can be found at www.gom.cg.yu/files/1165594951.doc; the Montenegrin version 
appears not to be on the site. The Law was adopted in 2003 and has been amended in 2005.  
102 According to the Head of the Unit for Internal Control of the Main Customs Administration; information submitted in 
writing to one of the experts in July 2007. 
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and awareness of the importance of public outreach to maintain and up-date the website, it is 
certainly an opportunity lost to raise the profile and reputation of the Customs Administration in the 
fight against corruption. Beyond the immediate topic of corruption, it would also be valuable in 
order to increase transparency and openness – both in the Customs Administration and the 
Department of Public Revenues – to publish organigrammes providing an overview over the 
internal structures in both administrations.  
 
The Customs Administration’s Unit for Internal Control has been the recipient of various technical 
assistance projects since its establishment in 2003. The regional World Bank-led Trade and 
Transport Facilitation in South-eastern Europe (TTSE)103 project has focused on the reduction of 
corruption risks at border crossings. In the framework of the project, the Customs Administration 
was assisted in the application of the World Customs Organisation’s (WCO) guidelines on 
increasing integrity, including in the conduction of a self-assessment. The results of the self-
assessment were the basis for the elaboration and adoption, in October 2004, of an Action Plan for 
the Development of Integrity in the Customs Service of Montenegro (Akcioni plan za razvoj 
integriteta u carinskoj službi Crne Gore). 104The objective of the Action Plan is the implementation 
of procedures and standards to increase integrity and minimise the risks of corruption in the customs 
administration. Among the objectives of this Action Plan is the computerisation of all customs 
procedures,105 which has been facilitated by various donors, such as the UK and the EC. As with 
other key documents, these papers appear not to be publicly accessible.  
 
The Customs Administration faces the same challenges as other parts of the public administration: 
in particular the low salaries – at approx. € 320 the lowest in the entire region, including Albania – 
of its 543 staff is likely to perpetuate incentives for corruption.  
 
The Customs Administration pointed out that the fight against corruption is currently primarily 
focussing on repressive measures, as work on prevention and education that could lead to an 
increase in standards of customs officers cannot be conducted due to the lack of financial and other 
resources. A project by the EU Customs and Fiscal Assistance Office (CAFAO) on the development 
and implementation of a Programme for the Fight against Corruption and Increasing Integrity 
(Program borbe protiv korupcije i razvoja integriteta)106 with the Unit for Internal Control will 
commence in September 2007, but given that CAFAO is phasing out its operations, it will provide 
limited, if valuable assistance.  
5.4 Licensing  
A new Law on Enterprises (Zakon o privrednim društvima) has reduced the duration and 
complexity of the registration process for businesses significantly. For example, for the registration 
of a limited liability company, it takes now 3 instead of the previous 45 days (putting Montenegro 
ahead of other countries of the region), and the costs have come down from approx. € 3,600 to €1, 
while the previously 38 steps have been reduced to 4, thereby significantly simplifying the 
process.107  
 
                                                     
103 For more detail on the programme, see www.ttfse.org.  
104 It has not been possible to verify in which way the measures in this Action Plan relate to those in the Action Plan for 
the implementation of the Program for the Fight against Corruption and Organised Crime (a specific question had been 
submitted, in writing, to the Customs Department, but yielded no reply).  
105 Some of the disciplinary investigations mentioned above are likely to concern the refusal of some staff to use the 
computers.  
106 See Government of Montenegro, “Action Plan for the Implementation of the recommendations of the European 
Partnership,” p. 45.  
107 See “Elimination of Business Barriers. Working version 3.0,” p. 32.  
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However, the real problem is that of the process preceding the registration, i.e., the process of 
obtaining licenses, permits and certificates. This process can take anywhere between 1 week and 6 
months. Both local and central level authorities are involved in issuing licenses and certificates, but 
no clear rules and consolidated information exist on what a local business precisely needs, how 
many licenses and certificates are required, and from which parts of the administration. The 2007 
results of the already quoted survey conducted among 114 member companies by the Montenegrin 
Employers Federation also captured the unpredictability and lack of precise information on the 
number and duration of the process for licenses and certificates. 65.9% of respondents could not 
give an estimate on how long the pre-registration process (collection of licenses and certificates 
prior to registration of the company) would take; 75.6% were unable to estimate the time necessary 
to get a building permit. Further concerns were raised over the lack of transparency and access to 
necessary information at the local level.  
 
 
Box 17: 
A 2006 study of the Agency for the Development of Small and Medium-Size 
Enterprises108 of barriers to the development of business points out that: “In order 
to receive a work permit, it is necessary to obtain at least 13 documents, not 
including the need to instigate similar compulsory processes with other institutions. 
However, the chain does not stop here, because for each of these documents it is 
necessary to approach additional institutions, which creates a labyrinth in which 
orientation is difficult.” It also cites instances of an “entrepreneurial twilight zone”: 
almost 250 documents are necessary in order to obtain permission to open a mill, 
while in the building industry, there are examples showing that time required to 
collect all documents necessary for the building of business premises constitutes 
52% of the time necessary to build the actual object, and all permits cost 15% of 
the market value of the object.”109 
 
 
The problems related to obtaining certificates and licenses, i.e. the pre-registration process, and the 
impact this has on economic development and competitiveness have been known for many years.110. 
The evaluation in the framework of the Council of Europe’s GRECO contained a recommendation 
to Montenegro to “limit licenses and permits to those that are indispensable; ensuring a reasonable 
time-frame for obtaining licenses and permits; and to encourage the compilation and editing – by 
the competent authorities – of guidelines for civil servants handling licenses and permits as well as 
for the general public.”111  
 
A multitude of attempts have been made to reform the process. In spring 2004, a Working Group 
under the leadership of the Agency for the Development of Small and Medium-Size Enterprises was 
tasked to elaborate, in a joint effort with representatives of the Ministry of Economy and USAID, a 
draft Law on the Issuance of Permits for the Conduction of Business (Nacrt Zakona o izdavanju 
odobrenja i saglasnosti za obavljanje djelatnosti) that would have simplified the process of 
obtaining licenses and certificates needed to start up a business to one month. The final draft – 
adopted by the Working Group in July 2005 – incorporated views of a range of stakeholders, 
including private sector groups. The draft law foresaw: a) a clear definition of deadlines on the local 
level ranging from 3 to 7 days according to the type of business, and a maximum of 30 days for 
                                                     
108 www.nasme.cg.yu  
109 “Elimination of Business Barriers. Working version 3.0,” p. 127. 
110 See, for example, the full results of a 2003 Business Environment Report carried out by USAID, which are available at 
the website of the Centre for Entrepreneurship and Economic Development at www.visit-ceed.org.  
111 See GRECO, Evaluation Report on the Republic of Montenegro, p. 32. 
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licenses to be submitted by the central level; in case that the authorities failed to comply with these 
deadlines, it would automatically be assumed that the permit had been issued; b) a ceiling was put 
on the cost for obtaining permits, which were no longer to exceed the real costs; c) the introduction 
of a One-Stop-Shop system would reduce the counterparts at the local level for entrepreneurs-to-be 
to one, and d) the introduction of a central registry for work permits, which would be administered 
in a centralised fashion. The draft law was rejected on the grounds of it being illegal and 
unconstitutional to assume that that silence of the administration could be interpreted as a positive 
reply. Instead, a Working Group composed of representatives of the Ministry of Economy, the 
Ministry of Tourism, and the Ministry for the Protection of the Environment and Spatial Planning, 
in co-operation with the Ministry of Justice and the respective parts of the local administrations 
were to elaborate new guidance on the process of permits and licenses, including building permits. 
This, however, has not happened to date.  
 
A USAID project tried, at the local level, to introduce One-Stop-Shops to cut the number of local 
administrations an entrepreneur-to-be would have to approach in order to obtain all necessary 
licenses and certificates, with limited success. Other donor initiatives, such as that of the European 
Agency for Reconstruction to facilitate the removal of business barriers were not embraced by the 
government.  
 
It is difficult to get final clarity over what causes the resistance to these reforms – all the more that 
the problems have been well known for some time, and are mapped out in the government’s own 
policy documents. The government’s programme on Economic Policy of Montenegro in 2007 
(Ekonomska politika Crne Gore za 2007), for example, lists the “support to business development 
and private entrepreneurial initiative” and “the elimination of business barriers, in particular at the 
local level” as two of the main tasks.112 A Programme for the Elimination of Business Barriers for 
the Development of Entrepreneurship of Montenegro (Program za eliminsanje barijera za razvoj 
preduzetništva u Crnoj Gori) and an Action Plan for the Elimination of Business Barriers (Akcioni 
plan za eliminsanje biznis barijera) were supposed to be drafted, but little progress has been made 
so far. The 2007–2010 Government’s Strategy for the Development of Small and Medium-Size 
Enterprises (Strategija razvoja malih i srednjih preduzeća) also lists the main directions of policy 
reforms necessary to reduce discretion and arbitrariness, and to introduce transparency into the 
process of doing business, including recommendations on the simplification of the pre-registration 
procedures at the local and central level, a reform of the system of inspections, and a number of 
measures to increase transparency and efficiency in the customs and tax administrations. Finally, 
the need to limit discretion and increase transparency is part of the 2006 Strategy for the Facilitation 
of Foreign Direct Investments (Strategija podsticanja stranih direktnih investicija Crne Gore).113  
 
One of the explanations for the lack of progress offered by counterparts is that the majority of 
licenses and certificates are being issued at the local level, where the resistance to a profound 
reform of the process is accordingly the most persistent, and where cutting down on the number of 
documents and procedures would mean to give up substantial discretionary powers. Relevant 
measures should certainly be introduced as part of the anti-corruption strategy for the self-
government level.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
112 See Vlada Crne Gore, “Ekonomska politika Crne Gore za 2007. godinu” (Government of Montenegro, “Economic 
Policy of Montengro for 2007”), p.4, in Montenegrin at www.gom.cg.yu/files/1167054478.doc.  
113 Available in Montenegrin, p. 15, at www.gom.cg.yu/files/117067686.doc.  
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Box 18: Inspectorates 
With regards to inspectorates, 39.5% of respondents of the Employers Federation 
survey believe that local inspectors do not behave professionally. 57% of 
respondents believe that it is necessary to give presents to municipal-level tax and 
other inspectors.114 A policy paper on business barriers, drafted by the Agency for 
Small and Medium-Size Enterprises, maps out the structural reasons that facilitate 
arbitrariness and discretion in the work of inspectors. First, there appears to be an 
overlap of inspections at the national and the local levels; second, no clearly 
established criteria exist according to which businesses are being inspected, and 
third, co-ordination between the different inspectorates is weak, leading to 
substantial uncertainty and disturbances for companies, and creating opportunities 
for corruption.115 A Law on Inspection Control (Zakon o inspekcijskom nadzoru)116, 
developed in the framework of the EAR’s support to the Public Administration 
Reform Strategy, has apparently not had much influence on the situation. 
 
5.5 Public Procurement System 
Until 2006, the public procurement regime was widely criticised by domestic and international 
observers as not in line with a number of EU directives, and as “stiff, costly, time-consuming, 
bureaucratic and inflexible… [allowing] too freely for the application of non-competitive 
procedures.”117 The new Public Procurement Law (Zakon o javnim nabavkama),118 adopted in July 
2006, addresses some important gaps, such as sanctions for both contracting entities/responsible 
persons and bidders, and there is a more clearly spelled out set of definitions of procedures and 
procurement methods. Transparency has been improved, and there is recourse for bidders that wish 
to challenge the procedures and decisions.  
 
The system is highly decentralised, with procurements carried out by authorised officials with each 
contracting authority, i.e. national government institutions, municipal governments and other large 
state (-funded) institutions. Each contracting authority is responsible for providing an annual 
procurement plan for procurements in excess of € 100,000, and for appointing authorised public 
procurement officials119 responsible for preparing and administering the public procurement tender.  
 
A centralised administrative body – Directorate for Public Procurement (Direkcija za javne 
nabavke)120 – plays a coordinating role in the system. Its responsibilities include the preparation of 
legislation, standardised forms, and other procurement regulations; monitoring and reviewing the 
implementation and performance of the system, and notifying relevant authorities on cases of 
violations; giving prior approval to contracting authorities for non-competitive procedures; 
participating in staff training in public procurement activities; providing for centralised publication 
for invitations to tender and award decisions; providing informational services to contracting 
authorities and bidders on public procurement regulations; initiating the development of electronic 
                                                     
114 The Montenegrin Employers Federation is currently working on a specific survey trying to capture the precise nature 
of this, and other, statements from the survey.  
115 See “Elimination of Business Barriers. Working version 3.0,” p. 115. 
116 Available in Montenegrin at www.uzk.cg.yu/publikacije/dokumenti/zakon-o-drzavnoj-upravi-i-inspekcijskom-
nadzoru.pdf.  
117 OECD/Sigma, “Montenegro Public Procurement Assessment June 2006,” p. 4 at www.sigmaweb.org/dataoecd/ 
18/56/37739619.pdf.  
118 Available in Montenegrin at www.nabavka.vlada.cg.yu/vijesti.php?akcija=rubrika&rubrika=182.  
119 The most recent list of authorised public procurement officials published at the time of writing this assessment puts the 
number of persons at 180. 
120 www.djn.vlada.cg.yu  
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procurement and communication practices; collecting information from contracting authorities and 
submitting to the government annual public procurement reports.  
 
Bids are publicly opened by a (minimum) 3 member Commission for Opening and Evaluation of 
Tenders (Komisija za otvaranje i vrednovanje ponuda) at each contracting entity, which is formed 
on an ad hoc basis at the time of initiating the public procurement procedure. Its mandate is to, inter 
alia, ensure that the tender documents are prepared in accordance with the needs of the contracting 
authority and provisions of the law, offer explanations of the text and tender documents, carry out 
the public opening of tenders, evaluate the conformity of received tenders with requirements 
specified in the tender documents, perform inspection, evaluation and comparison of received 
tenders, and propose to the contracting authority the award of contract to the bidders whose tenders 
have been evaluated by the largest number of points. The ultimate decision on the contract award, 
however, is taken by the contracting entity’s authorized staff person or body.  
 
Challenges to the procedure, at any phase of the process, are directed to the state Commission for 
Control of Public Procurement Procedure (Komisija za kontrolu postupka javnih nabavki)121 – 
hereinafter the State Procurement Commission. The Commission is formally independent and 
autonomous. Its 3 members, however, are appointed by the government at the proposals of the 
Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Finance and the Community of Municipalities. They can also, at the 
same time, hold other functions, which can bring into question both their independence, and their 
ability to attend Commission meetings frequently and examine complaints addressed to the 
Commission on a timely basis. The Commission is atypical for bodies of its type in that its 
decisions are binding and it has the authority to annul tenders it finds irregular. Its decisions can be 
appealed to the Administrative Court, however, in a regular administrative process. No such 
processes have been initiated as of the date of writing this report.  
 
The integrity of the system rests on the premise that control will be carried out by participants in the 
system bidders who have a personal interest in ensuring that procedures are fair and competitive. 
Bidders who believe that the process has been compromised can lodge complaints first with the 
contracting authority, and if not satisfied, with the State Procurement Commission, and, if still 
dissatisfied, to the Administrative Court. This model puts the burden of responsibility on the bidder, 
and requires a high degree of knowledge and capacity of the bidder in order to operate effectively. It 
makes particularly difficult for control of integrity of the pre-tendering process, where it is the 
exclusive authority of the contracting authorities to define the terms of the conditions of a tender, 
which can be biased in favour of a particular bidder.  
 
The effectiveness of system is also predicated on high levels of administrative capacity of the 
contracting entities. One of the major current weaknesses in the system lies precisely in the lack of 
capacity not only by the bidders, but also by public procurement officials, as well as other actors in 
the system. A CARDS funded project “Capacity Building of Public Procurement Commission” 
currently underway and due to complete in October 2007, addresses precisely this concern by 
providing training to public procurement officials, potential bidders, and other participants in the 
procurement process, and through the assignment of an international public procurement expert to 
advise and assist in the development of additional tools, such as a Handbook for Bidders. However, 
additional capacity building, particularly increase in technical expertise is necessary also in terms of 
additional staff, both with the State Procurement Commission and the Directorate.  
 
The information dissemination and training needs will continue beyond the duration of this project, 
however, as the starting point for many of the participants in the process is quite low. Time (and 
repetition) is needed to fully entrench some basic concepts such as the benefits of principles of 
                                                     
121 www.nabavka.vlada.cg.yu  
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competitiveness that are the cornerstone of modern procurement systems, and which are 
fundamentally different from the usual way of doing business. Additional support will also be 
necessary to encourage bidders to assume a more proactive role, particularly with regard to brining 
challenges to procurement proceedings. Observers report that bidders are often reluctant to 
complain due to fear of reprisals, particularly in the form of being blacklisted and barred from 
future competitions. This frame of mind needs to be transformed.  
 
Furthermore, there is a need to devote additional attention to the risks of corruption in other phases 
of the procurement process, particularly in the contracting phase, which is especially prone to 
manipulation through annexes to contracts that allow for additional “unforeseen” costs, and to the 
effectiveness of the sanctions mechanisms. A comprehensive study of the entire procurement 
system, including the contract execution phase, would be extremely useful in identifying 
opportunities for corruption beyond the public procurement institutions as such. Such an analysis 
might be made in late 2008 or later, giving some time for the system to become more fully 
operational.  
 
The AC Action Plan foresees a number of measures relating to public procurement, to be 
implemented by the Human Resources Management Authority, the State Procurement Commission, 
and the Directorate for Public Procurement. These include measures to increase responsible staff’s 
knowledge of the provisions of the new law, the elaboration of a manual on public procurement 
mentioned above, the elaboration of a comparative analysis of procurement practices in the Balkans, 
the opening of a telephone hotline for the public to report complaints, the coordination with the 
responsible authorities in cases of suspicion of corruption, the introduction of an electronic system 
as foreseen in the law, IT training, and the elaboration of a report on irregularities discovered in the 
public procurement process. The First AC Progress Report finds that most of the measures have not 
been completed. Some training has taken place, and the preparation of the public procurement 
manual is underway. Other measures have not been carried out due to a lack of funding, while the 
telephone hotline has not been instituted on the grounds that there is no legal basis in the Law for it 
(raising the question on how the measure was designed in the first place).122 Many of the gaps are 
likely to be addressed by a new project currently being designed for submission for IPA funds.123 
Further donor interest could be guided by the tasks defined in the AC Action Plan, with the caveat 
that it is incomplete and that other needs exist, particularly the knowledge/capacity gap of the 
central bodies, and the risk assessments of opportunities for corruption in the procurement system as 
a whole.  
5.6 Corruption and the International Presence 
While corruption among international donors does not appear to be a serious concern, some 
suspicions exist with a lack of transparency and unclear criteria for (consistently) supporting 
particular grantees. However, there have been no public cases of corruption among the donor 
community as such.  
 
It is the presence of foreign investors that is more troubling. Russian businesspeople are viewed 
with particular suspicion as to the origin of the money; however, the recent anti-money laundering 
provisions address many of the concerns there. The greater worry lies with the possible payments to 
                                                     
122 See “First Report on the Realisation of Measures from the Action Plan for the Implementation of the Programme for 
the Fight against Corruption and Organised Crime,” p.80.  
123 The IPA project is currently planned to focus on further information dissemination and training, as well as the 
introduction of e-procurement, which, provided adequate funding is secured, is envisioned to become operational by 2010. 
Decisions on IPA funding are anticipated by the EAR in October 2007.  
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officials to permit foreign investors to build on lands that should be protected in the public interest, 
such as the Adriatic coast or the national parks in the Tara mountains. 
 
 
Box 19: 
The debate surrounding the draft Spatial Plan for the Republic of Montenegro until 
2020, underway during the writing of this analysis, illustrates a number of concerns 
relating to the influence on decision makers by foreign (and domestic) investors on 
the management of irreplaceable public goods such as natural resources.124  
 
Current concerns are informed, in large part, by past questionable development 
permissions, including, for example, on the island of Sveti Nikola near Budva, known 
as “Hawaii.” Construction permission was granted, then revoked, to the former 
owner and developer of the land Nenad Đorđević, a Serbian businessman and a close 
friend a party colleague of the wife of the former Serbian president and ICTY 
indictee Slobodan Milošević. The land was later purchased by Stanko Subotić 
“Cane,” another “controversial businessman” from Serbia, and extensive 
development permission was granted (contrary to previous spatial plans for the 
area) to Subotić and business partners that include the son of Svetozar Marović, 
one of the leading figures of DPS.125  
 
The timing of the decision on construction was unlucky in that it was closely 
followed by the June 2006 indictment of Subotić by the Serbian Special Prosecutor 
for Organised Crime as the organiser of cigarette smuggling in the mid- to late-
1990s.126  
 
 
There are also reports that foreign business, or even individual purchasers of real estate, may be 
routinely paying bribes to expedite administrative procedures that are entirely legal, but slow 
(“grease money”). This boosts the demand side of the problem, particularly in the coastal 
municipalities that have seen a tremendous increase in west European, in addition to Russian, 
holiday house purchasers.  
 
 
 
 
                                                     
124 See Garret Tankosić Kelly, UNDP Resident Representative “Statement on Montenegro draft Spatial Plan” at 
www2.undp.org.yu/montenegro/home/news/Statement%20on%20Draft%20Montenegro%20Spatial%20Plan%20until%20
2020%20-%20June%202007.pdf  
125 Branka Plamenac, “Canetu, kopno i more” (To Cane, the land and the sea), Monitor, no. 865, at www.monitor.cg.yu/ 
ARHIVA/a_865_01.html.  
126 “Eight arrested in cigarette smuggling bust,” B92 News, 6.6.2007, at www.b92.net/eng/news/society-
article.php?yyyy=2007&mm=06&dd=06&nav_category=113&nav_id=41641.  
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6. Public Financial Management 
6.1 Budget Preparation and Execution 
A Budget Law (Zakon o budžetu)127 that provides for budget formulation and budget execution was 
adopted in 2001. The budget is prepared by the government starting in July each year; the proposal 
is submitted to parliament in November. There is little time for parliamentary discussion on the 
proposal, and the capacities of the parliamentary Budget Commission to scrutinise the budget prior 
to the discussions is very limited. The Budget Law extends to the government budget and the 
municipal budgets, there are three extra-budgetary funds (health, pensions, employment), the 
control of which is, according to the Budget Law, with the Ministry of Finance.  
 
According to the OECD’s Sigma program, “[the budget] law as it currently stands is not compatible 
with the circumstances in Montenegro as initially it was not developed to meet the specific needs of 
the country and it also does not reflect recent developments – including the fact that there is no legal 
basis for strategic planning, the Medium-Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) or programme 
budgeting.”128  
 
Considerable efforts have been made to implement program-based budgeting in recent years 
through technical assistance projects (primarily led by USAID), the introduction of which by 2008, 
had been one of the priorities of the government in its Economic Reform Agenda 2002–2007.129 
Given a lack of human and technical resources, this timeline had to be adjusted.130 It has been 
pointed out, for example by the World Bank, that in order to implement program-based budgeting, 
decisions will need to be taken now that will have a medium to long-term impact on the amount and 
profile of staff dealing with budget examination: “In the future budget examiners will need to be 
able to engage in discussions with line ministries about programme objectives and the cost-
effectiveness of specific programs [...]. In addition, staff in the line ministries who prepare the 
budget need to change their skill sets – instead of viewing budget preparation as an administrative 
task prepared by administrative staff of the ministry, it should be intertwined with ministries 
strategic planning processes.”131 
 
In accordance with the Budget Law, the Treasury (Državni trezor)132 in charge of, inter alia, cash 
and debt management, was established in 2002. The European Agency for Reconstruction 
facilitated the development of a hardware system to which now almost all spending units at central 
level are connected (municipalities are not yet linked to it). This system is now being connected to 
the Revenue and Expenditure Entry System (developed under the auspices of USAID) which is 
supporting the budget preparation process. The annual Law on the Execution of the Budget is being 
presented to the parliament at the same time as the proposal for the following year’s budget. 
                                                     
127 Available in Montenegrin at www.gom.cg.yu/print.php?id=3288&jezik=1. The Law has been amended since.  
128 See OECD/Sigma, “Montenegro Public Expenditure Management Assessment June 2006,” p. 2, at 
www.sigmaweb.org/dataoecd/18/53/37739539.pdf. 
129 See Government of Montenegro, “Agenda of Economic Reforms in Montenegro 2002–2007,” p. 70.  
130 According to the “Report on the Review of Programme Budgeting in Montenegro and Strategy for Future 
Implementation,” adopted in July 2007, provided to one of the experts by the USAID contractor of the Programme for 
Consolidating Economic Policy Reform in Montenegro, BearingPoint.  
131 See World Bank “Republic of Montenegro: Public Expenditure and Institutional Review. Volume 1,” p. 61.  
132 For a more detailed description of the role of the treasury, in Montenegrin, see the Ministry of Finance’s site at 
www.vlada.cg.yu/minfin/vijesti.php?akcija=vijesti&id=5965.  
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However, capacity constraints of the parliament (noted in section 4.4) extend also to the analysis of 
budget execution.  
 
Sigma identified a “general lack of transparency, mainly concerning the scope and coverage of the 
budget as well as the budgeting process”133 as a point for future development. This lack of 
transparency included the fact that foreign funding such as external grants should, according to the 
Budget Law, be part of the annual budget. In practice, however, Sigma estimates that this is the case 
only for 50% of the funds, caused by poor donor co-ordination and the lack of an institution with an 
overview of the inflow of foreign funding. The lack of control over commitments is a further 
concern, and the World Bank states that “[t]he absence of commitment recording could be a result 
of limitations in SAP [the hardware used] or a conscious policy decision.”134 Sigma also laments the 
fact that relevant reforms in the area of public expenditure management are poorly co-ordinated in 
general, a view echoed by some implementers on the ground.  
6.2 Internal Audit135 
The 2001 Budget Law provides also for the internal control, accounting and auditing of the budget; 
the 2001 Treasury Directions (Uputstvo o radu trezora)136 set out the legal framework of financial 
control. There is no law on internal audit, and internal audit is established by the Rulebook on the 
Internal Structure and Organisation of the Ministry of Finance137 of September 2006. This Rulebook 
establishes the Internal Audit Sector (Sektor za internu reviziju)138 in the Ministry of Finance. In 
2004, an Internal Audit Charter and an Internal Audit Manual139 set out the framework for internal 
audit and provided guidance on good audit practices, including audit requirements and procedures.  
 
The Treasury Directions establish the principle of functional independence (i.e. that one and the 
same official can not be in charge of authorisation, execution and control of expenditures). Since 
2003, one of the Deputy Ministers of Finance is the Head of the Internal Audit Unit within the 
Ministry of Finance. With the assistance of USAID, an audit team was set up, which foresees 10 
staff (three posts are currently vacant). This unit is responsible for internal audit in the Ministry of 
Finance, other ministries, spending units, and municipalities. Also, some other spending units have 
established internal audit units (the Customs Administration and the Pension Fund) and more such 
units are planned in other organisations/structures, which is a good development towards genuine 
internal control (as the current set-up is more an external function carried out by the Ministry of 
Finance).  
 
Internal audit is being carried out according to a strategic plan covering a period of three years, 
which forms the basis for the respective annual audits. The plan takes into account risk areas, 
applying the criteria of staff, budget and scope of activity; it covers all auditable units in the 
Ministry of Finance, extra-budgetary funds, spending units, and municipalities.  
 
The OECD/Sigma report seems to suggest strong leadership at the senior level of the Ministry of 
Finance driving the reforms. A Policy Paper on Public Internal Financial Control (PIFC) has been 
                                                     
133 See OECD/SIGMA, “Montenegro Public Expenditure Management Assessment June 2006,” p. 2.  
134 World Bank “Republic of Montenegro: Public Expenditure and Institutional Review. Volume 1,” p. 64. 
135 Information in this section is heavily drawn from the OECD/Sigma paper “Montenegro Public Internal Financial 
Control Assessment June 2006” at www.sigmaweb.org/dataoecd/18/54/37739560.pdf.  
136 See the Treasury Directions (Uputstvo o Radu Trezora) in Montenegrin at www.vlada.cg.yu/ minfin/ 
vijesti.php?akcija=vijesti&id=3287.  
137 It has not been possible to find the document on the internet. August 2007.  
138 For a description of the responsibilities of the Sector for Internal Audit, see, in Montenegrin only, 
www.gom.cg.yu/print.php?id=59628&jezik=1.  
139 It has not been possible to find the document on the internet. August 2007. 
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drafted, yet needs to be reviewed and finalised, including a medium and long-term strategy for 
developing a sustainable financial control environment, strengthening the internal audit system, and 
establishing functionally independent internal audit (currently, this is not ensured, as the Deputy 
Minister of Finance in charge of internal audit can, de facto, also assume executive functions).140 
There is also a need to enshrine the principles of internal audit in a Law on Internal Audit. 
Increasing the capacity to carry out internal audit beyond the Ministry of Finance to include line 
ministries, through systematic recruitment and training of younger staff will also be crucial.141  
6.3 External Audit: State Audit Institution (SAI) 
The Law on the State Audit Institution (Zakon o državnoj revizorskoj instituciji),142 elaborated with 
the help of the German GTZ, was adopted in spring 2004, and has since been amended in December 
2006). Rules of Procedure143 (also supported by GTZ) regulate the work of the SAI.  
 
The SAI reports to the parliament (and the institution audited), but the need to enshrine the SAI’s 
independence in the new Constitution has been pointed out repeatedly; this is also a necessary 
precondition for the SAI’s compliance with INTOSAI and EURSAI standards. The SAI “audits the 
authorities, budget-users managing the budget and property of the state and local self-government 
units as well as the Central Bank of Montenegro and other legal entities in which the state holds a 
share.”144 The SAI submits an annual report – the financial statement on the republic’s budget 
(Izvještaj o reviziji Završnog računa budžeta Republike Crne Gore) – in October each year, and the 
parliament has an obligation to consider the annual report prior to approving the budget for the next 
year. Audits of the budget have been carried out for 2005 and 2006 (albeit with delays); the 2005 
report is on the SAI’s website.145 So far, the budgets of two municipalities have been audited, as 
well as the (extra-budgetary) health fund. To date, only financial audits have been carried out, 
although the SAI can also do performance audits. In the framework of advancing the programme 
budgeting approach, the SAI is planned to start training on performance audits in 2008; from 2009, 
it is to carry out the first performance audits of selected budget users and will, as of 2011, carry out 
regular performance audits as part of a performance audit schedule.  
 
The SAI is composed of a Senate (currently with a membership of 4), headed by a president. The 
Senate is appointed by the parliament; the parliament also appoints the president of the Senate from 
among its members. The president of the Senate is elected for a period of 9 years, and his/her term 
of president cannot be extended beyond that time; upon expiry of the 9-year period, the president 
becomes an “ordinary” member of the Senate, whose tenure is permanent. A member of the Senate 
cannot hold any other professional duty, nor can he/she be a member of parliament, or member of 
any political party or body of a political party. This has lead, in 2006, to the resignation of the first 
president of the SAI, who also held a post at the University of Podgorica.  
 
                                                     
140 Although efforts have been made to ascertain the status of the introduction of the PIFC, no more detailed information 
was available at the time of writing. 
141 See World Bank “Republic of Montenegro: Public Expenditure and Institutional Review. Volume 1,” p. 64. 
142 The 2004 version of the law is available in English at www.dri.cg.yu/podaci/Zakoni/Engleski/Law.pdf and in 
Montenegrin at www.dri.cg.yu/podaci/Zakoni/Crnogorski/ZakonDRI.pdf. The amended version appears not to be on the 
website. 
143 The English language version is available at www.dri.cg.yu/podaci/Zakoni/Engleski/Procedure.pdf, the Montenegrin 
version at www.dri.cg.yu/Zakoni/Crnogorski/PoslovnikDRI.pdf.  
144 See OECD/Sigma “Montenegro External Audit Assessment June 2006,” p. 2 at www.sigmaweb.org/ dataoecd/ 
30/52/37739505.pdf.  
145 The reports – although not all (the audit report of the health fund is, for example, not yet on the site) – are available in 
Montenegrin at www.dri.cg.yu/index.php?lang=cg&action=revizije.  
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The president of the Senate is responsible for, inter alia, the distribution of tasks, suggestions for 
specific audits, and the consolidation the annual audit plans (which are to be adopted by the 10 
January for the current year) and the annual reports.  
 
The Senate is in charge of defining the strategic directions of the work of the SAI; it also decides on 
extra-ordinary audits (i.e. not covered by the annual audit plan), confirms the budget for the 
institution (which is then being submitted to parliament for approval), and ensures the application of 
equal standards for the conduction of audits.  
 
Each member of the Senate is in charge of a sector (department). The sectors – anticipated to grow 
from the current 3 to 5 – are led by a head of sector and staffed by state auditors [currently 13, but 
projected to be 35], who are in charge of preparing and participating in the field work according to 
the audit plan.  
 
Instructions for the Methodology of Work of the State Audit Institution146 establish, inter alia, an 
obligation of the SAI to co-operate with the office of the State Prosecutor, upon the request of the 
Supreme State Prosecutor; the SAI can also share information with law enforcement agencies if, as 
the result of the audits, it deems necessary to do so. To strengthen the capacity of the SAI for 
effective co-operation with the State Prosecutor has been one of the recommendations from the 
evaluation Montenegro has undergone in the framework of the Council of Europe’s GRECO.147 
 
The SAI had a promising start, particularly due to the technical assistance by GTZ. The quality of 
the first financial audits of the government budget have been lauded for comprehensiveness, level of 
detail and clarity, leaving hope that they could serve as a good basis for parliamentarians to fulfil 
their oversight role and to scrutinise future budget proposals.148 It remains to be seen to which 
extent the reports of the SAI will be taken into account for future budgeting decisions.  
 
However, the State Audit Institution is plagued by a number of difficulties that will need to be 
addressed. First, the salary of the state auditors is, at around € 300, not competitive enough to attract 
qualified personnel (members of the Senate and the president of the Senate receive more than this, 
though). Second, there is a shortage of state auditors, given that this profession did not exist in the 
past. Third, there is a continued need for training of those working in the SAI. SAI representatives 
themselves are approaching donors with requests for funding of a regional school for state auditors, 
which the government of Montenegro is apparently ready to host in Cetinje. However, according to 
international experts, there appear to be more pressing needs to be addressed in order to genuinely 
develop the capacity of the national SAI in the first place.  
 
More importantly, the independence of this important institution is also in danger of being eroded. 
In December 2006, Miroslav Ivanišević was appointed as the new president of the Senate. Until his 
appointment, Mr. Ivanišević – who has also previously held the post of Minister of Finance – was 
member of the presidency and member of parliament of the ruling DPS. His appointment was a 
foregone conclusion, and had been announced in the media149 prior to the session of parliament that 
had to approve the nomination. What is more, the Law on the State Audit Institution had to be 
changed so that Mr. Ivanišević would qualify for the post, and the changes were approved at the 
very same parliamentary session during which his actual appointment took place. While experts 
have confirmed that the quality of the first audit reports issued during Mr. Ivanišević’s tenure was 
                                                     
146 Available in Montenegrin at www.dri.cg.yu/index.php?lang=cg&action=zakoni, and in English at 
www.dri.cg.yu/podaci/Zakoni/Engleski/Methodology.pdf.  
147 See GRECO, Evaluation Report on the Republic of Montenegro.  
148 See World Bank “Republic of Montenegro: Public Expenditure and Institutional Review. Volume 1,” p. 65. 
149 See “Ivanišević kontroliše ministre” (Ivanišević will control ministers), Vijesti 18.12.2006, at 
www.vijesti.cg.yu/naslovna.php?akcija=advview&id=221912.  
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very high, there are also concerns that his proximity to the DPS will have an impact on the annual 
audit plans, i.e. on the selection of entities to be audited, and that the impartiality of the reports will 
ultimately be compromised.  
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7. Service Delivery 
7.1 Health 
Information on corruption in the health sector is rather scarce. The World Bank 2006 Public 
Expenditure and Institutional Review of Montenegro names financial sustainability, equity in access 
and insufficient governance of the sector as some of the challenges facing the health care system. 
While the Health Insurance Fund finances most of the health care service delivery, “an unknown 
share is paid for out-of-pocket funds through private sources.”150 The 2006 Global Integrity Country 
Report states that “[m]edical patients must ‘treat’ the doctor before any treatment, regardless of 
health insurance. Special care during childbirth costs 42,000 dinars ($US636), while surgeons get 
42,000 dinars to 126,000 dinars (US$636 to US$1,900) for more complicated operations. 
Sometimes a bribe is necessary just to get a bed in a hospital room.”151 The same report also pointed 
out that two former Ministers of Health have been charged with violating the Law on Public 
procurement and for the misuse of international donations. The State Audit Institution carried out a 
financial audit of the extra-budgetary health fund in 2006; the report is not yet public, but it is said 
that the auditors did not uncover any irregularities that might have been caused by corruption. The 
Directorate for Anti-Corruption Initiative is planning, with funding from UNDP, to carry out, in the 
near future, a research into the causes and patterns of corruption in the health care system. The 
World Bank has, since 2004 (and expected to last until 2009), carried out a project aiming to 
introduce reforms and to build capacities in the delivery of primary health care in Montenegro.152  
7.2 Education 
There is no specific data available on corruption in the education sector, although the already above 
quoted 2006 Global Integrity Country Report states that ´[i]n the education system, grades are 
bought and sold.153 The Directorate for Anti-Corruption Initiative is planning, with funding from 
UNDP, to carry out in the near future a research into corruption in the education sector. A World 
Bank project, to last until 2009, is addressing more structural issues to reform the primary and 
secondary education systems. 154 
 
 
                                                     
150 See World Bank, “Republic of Montenegro: Public Expenditure and Institutional Review. Volume 1,” p. 17.  
151 See “Reporter's Notebook: Republic of Montenegro,” Global Integrity, 2006 Country Reports.   
152 See press release “World Bank approves US$12 Million Credit in Support of Health in Serbia and Montenegro,” 
Washington, 8.6.2004 at http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/eca/eca.nsf/General/3A0A27D683EBCAF785256EAF00514618? 
OpenDocument and http://web.worldbank.org/external/projects/main?pagePK=64283627&piPK=73230&theSitePK= 
3339535&menuPK=3339610&Projectid=P082223.  
153 “Reporter's Notebook: Republic of Montenegro,” Global Integrity, 2006 Country Reports.  
154 See for more information on the project http://web.worldbank.org/external/projects/main?pagePK=64283627&piPK= 
73230&theSitePK=3339535&menuPK=3339610&Projectid=P084597.  
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8. Justice System 
In the context of the fight against corruption, the justice system needs to be examined from two 
perspectives: one, to determine the level of corruption within the system itself, and two, to evaluate 
the system’s capacity to effectively fight against corruption and organised crime. These two matters 
will be addressed in separate sections below.  
8.1 Courts 
There is a low level of public trust in the judiciary, and particularly the courts, in large part due to a 
significant backlog of cases and excessive time periods for the legal processes, but also due to a 
perception of high levels of political influence over the judiciary.  
 
Judicial reform has been on the reform agenda in Montenegro since 2000 within the framework of 
the Judicial System Reform Project 2000–2005, with a primary emphasis on the reform of the court 
system which has been appallingly inefficient and laden with backlogs. During this period, priority 
was placed on developing a modern and democratic normative framework, and more than 20 
relevant laws have been drafted and passed, including the 2002 Law on Courts (Zakon o 
sudovima)155 that redefined the system to consist of 15 Basic Courts for crimes with a maximum 
sentence of 10 years, 2 High Courts for more serious crimes and for appeals from the basic courts, 2 
Commercial Courts, an Administrative Court, an Appellate Court that hears high court appeals 
when the latter operates as a first instance court, the Supreme Court, which deals with questions of 
law referred to it, and the Constitutional Court. The system employs a total of 258 judges plus 5 
Supreme Court justices.156  
 
A Judicial Training Centre, JTC (Centar za edukaciju nosilaca pravosudne funkcije)157 was 
established in 2000, with the aim of training judges (initially called the Judges’ Training 
Centre/Centar za obuku sudija), but its mandate broadened to include prosecutors and other judicial 
professions with the adoption of the Law on Judicial Education (Zakon o edukaciji u pravosudnim 
organima) in January 2007. The JTC holds a great deal of potential, but suffers from a lack of 
funding and human capacities typical to a number of state institutions.158 Nevertheless, all future 
training of judges and prosecutors is foreseen to take place through the JTC, and as such it is 
intended to play a crucial role in the implementation of the judicial reform. It will require additional 
financial and technical support in order to effectively fulfil its mandate.  
 
Other major changes in the system have included the introduction of Appellate and Administrative 
Courts, mediation practices in the basic courts, introduction of modern case-management 
techniques, as well as much-appreciated renovation of a number of court buildings and other 
upgrades of infrastructure, including computerisation and other methods to increase efficiency, 
                                                     
155 Available in Montenegrin at www.gom.cg.yu/files/1059741524.doc.  
156 List of judges as of January 2007, posted on the web site of the Judicial Training Center, www.coscg.org/test/ 
Editor/assets/sudije%20u%20CG-jan.07..doc.  
157 www.coscg.org; formerly the Centre for Training of Judges, established in 2000 through Montenegro Government 
Reform project initiated in 1998. The founding agencies were the Montenegrin Ministry of Justice, Association of Judges 
of Montenegro, the Foundation Open Society Institute together with COLPI (Constitutional and Legislative Policy 
Institute) from Budapest, and the American Bar Association-Central and Eastern European Law Initiative (ABA-CEELI). 
158 At the time of the writing of this report, the work of the JTC was greatly impaired due to personnel changes (Executive 
Director was on family leave, and it was difficult to find an adequate replacement.). Typical of small organisations, the 
functioning greatly depended on the drive and the capacity of the director. 
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accessibility, and transparency.159 Under its capacity development programme, the UNDP has 
assigned a staff person and an expert to the Ministry of Justice to assist in the reform process.  
 
The 2002 Law on Courts also attempted to strengthen the independence and accountability of the 
judiciary through the creation of a Judicial Council (Sudski savjet) as the body responsible, inter 
alia, for selection of and disciplinary proceedings against judges (Section/Chapter VII, Articles 75–
82).160 The Council is composed of a President and 10 members appointed for 4-year terms, with 
the President of the Supreme Court ex officio serving as the President of the Council. The 
parliament appoints the remaining members (6 judges, 2 law faculty professors, and 2 reputable 
legal experts) on the nomination of the Supreme Court, the Law Faculty, and the Lawyers 
Association.  
 
Under the current system, judges are recommended for appointment by the Judicial Council but it is 
the parliament that actually appoints them. A system common throughout the region, it has been 
criticised by international observers for allowing excessive political influence on judges, with strong 
recommendations that appointments and dismissals be done by the Council alone. While 
acknowledging “some progress in terms of continuous strengthening of the judiciary,” the European 
Commission explicitly notes the risk of politicisation in “the parliament’s involvement in personnel 
management in the judiciary [which] raises serious concerns for the independence of the judicial 
system. There is a clear risk of political interference in appointments and dismissals.”161  
 
Certainly, political influence on all aspects of governance is a matter of concern in Montenegro, but 
in the case of the Judicial Council, there are also valid concerns that such a solution leaves the fate 
of the judiciary to a body made up of people from a very tight circle (see text box 2 on the family 
relationship among some of the highest members of the judiciary), which cannot police itself and 
needs some form of outside control. In fact, this is one of the key debates taking place with regard 
to the new Constitution.  
 
 
Box 20: 
Concerns about the accountability of the Judicial Council are illustrated by the 
fiasco surrounding the Council’s reappointment in December 2006, when the 
parliament failed to vote on the nominees. In this process, no effort was made to 
enlighten the public or the parliament about the merits of the nominated 
candidates. There were no stated criteria, and nominating meetings were not open 
to the public. The Judicial Council failed to create public confidence with 
professional and transparent procedures.162  
 
 
Furthermore, despite the existence of the Judicial Council, the broad acknowledgment of poor 
performance of judges, and a great deal of public criticism – not to mention the emphasis on 
integrity dictated by the anti-corruption program – decisive sanctions for poor performance are 
missing. In 2006, for example, presidents of the various courts responsible for initiating disciplinary 
                                                     
159 Notable among these is USAID Montenegro Justice Sector Reform Project (2003-2006) implemented by Checchi and 
Company Consulting.  
160 Disciplinary measures against judges who damage the standing of the profession include a disciplinary notice, warning, 
or a 20% salary reduction for a 6-month period. Proposals for a disciplinary investigation can be initiated by the president 
of the relevant court, president of the immediate higher court, and the president of the Supreme Court. The proceedings 
are conducted by the Disciplinary Council of the Judicial Council. 
161 European Commission, Montenegro 2006 Progress Report.  
162 Nations in Transit, p. 326 
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proceedings against judges proposed the dismissal of only two judges for “unskilled and 
unscrupulous” work.163  
 
In addition, the Judicial Council’s Administrative Office – a body established to provide technical 
support – was embarrassed by a number of incidents indicating, at best, incompetence, culminating 
in the December 2006 arrest of a former employee for embezzling €190,000. A number of other 
staff, including the director of the Administrative Office and a judge was implicated in the 
scandal.164 
 
Progress on ethics issues and transparency appears slow. A judges’ Code of Ethics had not yet been 
adopted at the time of writing this analysis, and while a Citizens’ Complaints Office (Kancelarija za 
prijem i pritužbe građana) is said to have been established at the Supreme Court, there are no 
visible announcements of this measure on state institutions’ web presentations, nor does the 
Supreme Court have a web presence at all.165  
 
Despite these discouraging examples, observers do note progress on several fronts. The Basic Court 
of Podgorica and the Administrative Court are frequently cited as examples of how the system can 
be transformed under good leadership and adequate technical support. The budget for the court 
system has been increased by 51% in 2007, which suggests some increase in the political will to 
intensify judiciary reform as part of the requirements of the European partnership.  
 
The next phase of reform is defined in a new Judicial Reform Strategy spanning the period of 2007–
2012 (Strategija reforme pravosudja, 2007–2012),166 adopted by the Montenegrin government in 
June 2007. The new strategy is broadly consistent with the obligations set by the AC Action Plan, 
and aims to consolidate previous efforts and introduce the final structural adjustments. It proposes 
measures to explicitly increase independence of judges and prosecutors through the introduction of 
clear and unambiguous rules for the appointment, promotion, and disciplinary measures (which also 
needs to be adequately reflected in the new Montenegrin constitution) and strengthening of the role 
of the Judicial and Prosecutorial Councils in the respective processes, as well as a redefinition of the 
role of the prosecution so that it would no longer act as attorney for the state in property and legal 
matters, and it would assume the leading role in criminal investigation (a more extensive discussion 
of the Prosecution can be found in the next section). There is also a great deal of emphasis on 
information and public outreach measures, and improvements of efficiency that could increase 
public trust in the judiciary. Extensive trainings for judges and prosecutors in implementing new 
regulations are also prominently featured. This will be as important as measures to insure 
independence, as there exists a widespread perception that the levels of competence among judges 
is quite low, particularly with regard to ruling on cases of organised and economic crime and 
corruption. More competitive salaries that would halt the defection of the most qualified judges to 
private law practices is another key measure. An Action Plan is being drafted with the support of 
the UNDP, and it is foreseen to be completed by the end of 2007.  
 
The Judicial Reform Strategy, taken together with the Anti-Corruption Programme, provides a solid 
road map for future judicial reform, although additional accent should be placed on the question of 
accountability of the judicial governing bodies. At the time of writing this report, USAID was 
preparing an evaluation of past programs which should contain an assessment of current situation 
and future needs, which should present yet another useful prism for prioritising future donor 
                                                     
163 Ibid, p. 325.  
164 Ibid.  
165 The Constitutional Court has a web presence and there is a USAID-sponsored web site of the Courts of Republic of 
Montenegro (www.sudovi.cg.yu), but guidance on filing complaints is not present, including on the latter site’s FAQ 
section.  
166 Available in Montenegrin at www.gom.cg.yu/files/1183364296.doc.  
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assistance to judicial reform. For the moment, there appear to be sufficient donor resources from 
donors in judicial reform, which includes the World Bank, Sida, Canadian Cida, and other bilateral 
donors. Nevertheless, as the tasks ahead are numerous and demanding, continued support will be 
needed.  
8.2 Prosecution 
In Montenegro, there exists a widely-shared negative public view of the prosecution, due largely to 
a perceived reluctance to investigate state officials involved in corruption scandals and the failure to 
successfully prosecute a number of high profile, organised crime-related murders.  
 
 
Box 21: 
On December 28, 2006, the only suspect in the 2004 murder of a Dan journalist was 
released after the court ruled the prosecutor had not proved the case against the 
suspect. This long-awaited conclusion of this two-year trial was a disappointment 
to many. After the dust settled, the public was left wondering whether it is the 
courts, the prosecutors, or the police who are at fault. The prosecution has appealed 
the decision to the high court.167  
 
 
Throughout the region, prosecutors tend to receive a disproportionate share of the blame for the 
failure of criminal investigations. There are objective reasons for a lack of results by a prosecutor’s 
office. Quality of other links in the criminal justice system – the police and courts – are essential in 
the success of prosecutions. The Montenegrin State Prosecutor has voiced a great deal of 
disapproval about the work of the courts. In the 2004 and 2005 reports, the Supreme State 
Prosecutor criticised the courts for their lengthy investigations and trials, poor decisions, and 
inadequate sentences. While the relations and communications with the police had improved, the 
report notes that 47 percent of the 4,933 requests for investigations remained unresolved by the end 
of 2005: “The data on the number of unresolved investigations leads to the conclusion that in 2005 
the courts were behind schedule, even though there were 10.8 percent fewer unresolved 
investigations compared with 2004. Investigations require quick and efficient processing because 
from that depends the quality of the gathered evidence and the outcome of the case.”168  
 
Legal constraints further impede effective prosecution of corruption and organised crime. One is the 
lack of possibility of using special investigative means (see section 8.4 on capacity to combat 
organised crime and corruption, below); the other, the current legal status of the prosecutor, which, 
like in most other post-socialist states, divides responsibility with the institution of the Investigative 
Judge. A fundamental change to the role of the prosecution is envisioned through the Judicial 
Reform Strategy, which will place the prosecutor in the lead of the investigative process. 
Amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code will be required in order to make this possible, and 
these are anticipated by the end of 2007. However, the preparation of prosecutors for this new role 
is a longer-term process, and it is anticipated that the new system will require a minimum of 1–2 
years to become operational. When it changes its role, the number of staff will need to be doubled. 
There appears to be recognition of the resources needed to begin preparing the service for this 
challenge in the increase in budget of the state prosecutor by more than 50 % in 2007.169 
 
                                                     
167 Nations in Transit, p. 325 
168 Ibid, p. 324.  
169 Ibid, p. 306.  
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Despite these objective reasons, there is still a troubling perception of the prosecution’s reluctance 
to initiate investigations, particularly of individuals who may be close to the ruling party. The 
Supreme State Prosecutor has in particular been a frequent target of media criticism, including 
insinuations about her integrity.  
 
 
Box 22: 
Montenegrin media frequently criticise the Supreme State Prosecutor Vesna 
Medenica for failing to bring charges in a number of high-profile organised crime 
and economic crime cases. Occasionally, questions are also raised about her living 
above her means, for example, regarding her being able to afford payments for an 
expensive “status” jeep with the relatively modest salary of the Supreme State 
Prosecutor.170  
 
 
The risk of political influence cannot be downplayed in a setting where it so prevalent in all spheres 
of public and economic life, and where the existing institutional safeguards appear inadequate. The 
Law on the State Prosecutor (Zakon o državnom tužiocu),171 which entered into force in December 
2003, sets out the current framework for the functioning of the prosecutorial services. Prosecutors 
and deputy prosecutors are appointed by the parliament, at the recommendation of the Prosecutors 
Council for a renewable term of 5 years. The 11 member Prosecutors Council is appointed by 
parliament based on the nominations for 10 slots by the Law Faculty, the Bar Association, 
Ombudsman, and the Minister of Justice, with the Supreme State Prosecutor the ex officio President 
of the Council. International observers unanimously recommend that the process of selection and 
appointment of prosecutors be removed from parliament and remitted exclusively to the Prosecutors 
Council to reduce the possibility of political influence. However, that imperative must be 
counterbalanced with appropriate accountability provisions, as concerns about the “closed ranks” of 
the profession, similar to those voiced with regard to the Judicial Council above also apply with 
regard to the prosecution. Self-policing has not yielded any disciplinary measures at the time of 
writing this assessment despite an existence of a Code of Ethics, various instructions, as well as 
rules of procedure that instruct prosecutors even on appropriate off-duty behaviour – which the 
managers (“higher” prosecutors in charge of “lower” prosecutors) are responsible for monitoring.  
 
The State Prosecutor is subject to parliamentary oversight, which includes an annual report to the 
parliament. If the parliament can grow into an effective oversight institution, this may be sufficient 
to address the above concerns, but that time has not yet arrived, and other mechanisms should be 
considered. In a conversation with one of the authors, the Supreme State Prosecutor suggested that 
exempting prosecutors from immunity, except for functional immunity, may be an appropriate 
additional step. Perhaps, provided it is weighed against the possibility of misuse that could result in 
more potential for political pressure, not less.  
 
Obligations set by the AC Programme regarding the State Prosecutor in greatest part focus on the 
institution’s capacity to combat corruption and organised crime, which is addressed in some detail 
in section 8.4 below. Measures to promote integrity include an increase in salaries (which has been 
done but not at a level deemed completely satisfactory by prosecutors) and the adoption of a Code 
of Ethics,172 undertaken in November 2006.  
                                                     
170 Milka Tadić Mijović, “Porodična tužiteljica” (Family prosecutor), Monitor No. 872, 
www.monitor.cg.yu/ARHIVA/a_872_02.html.  
171 Available in English at www.tuzilastvocg.cg.yu/dokumenti/law%20on%20state%20prosecutor.pdf and in Montenegrin 
at www.gom.cg.yu/files/1075209436.doc.  
172 Available in Montenegrin at  
www.tuzilastvocg.cg.yu/dokumenti/E%20T%20I%20C%20K%20I%20%20%20%20K%20O%20D%20E%20K%20S.pdf 
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While increased transparency is often a way to increase accountability of state institutions, in the 
case of prosecutorial services this mechanism is not entirely applicable. There is a need for 
confidentiality of ongoing investigations, not only to ensure their effectiveness, but also to protect 
the human rights of suspects who must be treated as innocent until proven guilty in a court of law. 
Similarly, as prosecutors do not provide a direct service to citizens, citizens’ complaints cannot be 
used as an indicator of integrity. The Montenegrin State Prosecutor is more transparent than many 
of its counterparts in the region: the institution has a web presence173 that clearly posts relevant laws 
and annual reports, although more can always be done, particularly with regard to educating citizens 
about the prosecution’s role in the criminal justice system, considering the extensive negative public 
perceptions. .  
 
Continued assistance in increasing the capacities of the service in view of the challenging process of 
transformation into the leading institution in the investigative phase, should remain a donor priority.  
8.3 Police 
Police in Montenegro shares a similar history with its Serbian counterparts during the early years of 
the wars of Yugoslav succession, with regard to tolerating, or even participating, in smuggling and 
other criminal activities that were rife during the 1990s, particularly cigarette smuggling that 
provided critical resources for Montenegro’s survivals during the years of international isolation 
under UN sanctions, and continued for most of the 1990s. As a result, the Montenegrin police have 
a historic working relationship with smugglers and other organised crime actors that are difficult to 
quickly and completely uproot. In contrast to Serbia, however, as the Montenegrin government 
gradually distanced itself from Milošević, the police force was purged (both voluntarily and not) of 
pro-Milošević/pro-Serbia cadres. As the standoff between the republics escalated, and the 
population of Montenegro grew sharply divided between pro-Milošević vs. pro-Đukanović 
segments (which threatened to escalate into violence in the late 1990s, particularly during the 1999 
NATO bombing) the police was expanded and groomed into an informal Montenegrin army that 
could assume that role in case of civil strife, or external aggression by Serbia.174 As a result, the 
Montenegrin police remained heavily politicised, per definition Democratic Party of 
Socialists/Đukanović loyalists, hired on the basis of political allegiance and family ties, rather than 
any professional qualifications or competence.  
 
Police reform that would begin to decriminalise, professionalise, and depoliticise the police began 
in 2001. The OSCE took the early lead in this process, but a number of important additional 
resources have come in since. A strategic Vision Document on police reform was adopted April 
2005, and a new Law on Police (Zakon o policiji)175 was passed at the same time.  
 
The Montenegrin police have instituted some formal structural reforms that are largely absent from 
many other police organisations in the region. For example, the new police law separated the Police 
Administration from the Ministry of Interior, and defined the position of the Police Director (as 
opposed to the Minister of Interior) as a professional, rather than political, function. Similarly, 
Montenegro’s police service is one of the rare to have established a Strategic Planning Unit. A 
decree on the Police Academy was adopted in March 2006, and the body became operational in 
                                                     
173 www.tuzilastvocg.cg.yu 
174 For additional background information, see Željko Šević and Duško Bakrač, “Police Reform in the Republic of 
Montenegro,” Transforming Police in Central and Eastern Europe, in Marina Caparini and Otwin Marinen (eds.), 
Münster: LIT Verlag, 2004, pp. 239-263.  
175 Available in Montenegrin at www.upravapolicije.vlada.cg.yu/vijesti.php?akcija=vijesti&id=12571.  
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September 2006. Considerable investment has been made to upgrade the capacities to investigate 
organised crime and corruption (more detail in section 8.4).  
 
The AC Action Plan imposed a number of specific requirements relating to police integrity and 
accountability. These include:  
• application of the Code of Police Ethics (initially adopted in 2003, and updated in January 
2006)176 and the effective functioning of the Ethics Board (Etički odbor) composed of 7 
members, of which 3 are not employed by the police;  
• introduction and advertisement on the central and local level of procedures for reporting 
police corruption; 
• establishment of objective recruitment criteria;  
• reorganisation, human resource capacity-building, and equipment provision to the 
Department for Internal Control (Odjeljenje za unutrašnju kontrolu rada policije); 
• formation of a unit for oversight of the police administration; and, 
• annual analyses of causes and forms of corruption within the police.  
 
According to the First AC Progress Report for the period September 2006–May 2007:  
• the Ethics Committee examined 7 cases of possible violations, all of which were forwarded 
to the responsible disciplinary prosecutor until the end of March 2007;  
• there had been 1 criminal procedure initiated against a police offer for accepting a bribe; 
• new recruitment criteria were not elaborated, as the existing procedures – public 
advertisements and recruitment procedure through the Human Resources Management 
Authority – appeared to satisfy the stated requirements;  
• a Sector for Security and Protection Tasks and Oversight (Sektor za bezbjednosno-zaštitne 
poslove i nadzor) has been formed, which includes a unit for complaints, reports, and 
second-instance procedures and oversight of the police (Odsjek za pritužbe, predstavke i 
drugostepeni postupak i nadzor policije); and, 
• the Department for Internal Control was reorganized for a total of 23 employees divided in 
3 sectors: lawfulness in carrying out police duties (4 persons), lawfulness of the application 
of authorities (3 persons in the central office in Podgorica and 7 in regional centres), 
intelligence and internal investigations (6 persons), along with 1 analyst and 1 IT specialist. 
At the time of the report, the Department was staffed with 13 employees, but training had 
not taken place nor was necessary equipment provided due to a shortage of office space.  
 
A study of the causes and forms of corruption within the police had not been undertaken per se, but 
the Police Administration claims that such analysis is carried out continuously in the processing of 
identified disciplinary and other violations. The definition of procedures for reporting police 
corruption had also not been elaborated.  
 
The progress may appear considerable, but informed observers feel that impact is still a long way 
off. For example, Internal Inspection still exists largely only on paper, lacking knowledge and 
equipment to carry out its functions. The police organisation is still hierarchical, and decision-
making needs to be fundamentally decentralised to give more autonomy to the local units if any real 
change in the way the police operate is to take hold. The institution is also still significantly 
overstaffed and dominated by middle-management from the previous era. Salaries remain low, and 
there is a difficulty in recruiting qualified people,177 while the recruitment process has in fact not 
been fully professionalised. Politicisation likewise remains a concern.  
 
                                                     
176 Available in Montenegrin at www.upravapolicije.vlada.cg.yu/vijesti.php?akcija=vijesti&id=12592.  
177 The exception to this appears to be traffic police; informed observers claim that there is significant interest in these 
posts.  
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Box 23: 
The Police Director was widely criticised for making a visit to campaign 
headquarters of a political party during the local elections in 2005, giving rise to a 
debate on whether current provisions are adequate in preventing politicisation of 
the service.178  
 
 
External oversight exists both in the forms of a parliamentary committee, which is becoming 
increasingly active, and a Council for the Civilian Control of Police (Savjet za građansku kontrolu 
rada policije), whose 5 members are appointed by parliament for 5 year terms at the 
recommendation of the Bar Association, the Medical Chamber of Montenegro, the Lawyers 
Association, the University and human rights NGOs,179 and to which the police are obligated to 
provide all information requested.  
 
The Council is a good example of the discrepancy between the image on paper vs. the reality on the 
ground. The Council lacks even the basic working conditions: limited office space has been made 
available in parliament and occasional use of meeting rooms. In the first draft of the state budget for 
2007, the Council was not assigned any funding for its functioning. Further, threats made on the life 
of one of the Council members, human rights activist Aleksandar Zeković who had publicly 
condemned a number of cases of police misconduct and other serious violations of human rights,180 
were dismissed by the Police Director as “unserious” and a proper investigation was never 
undertaken.  
 
Transparency is also far from ideal, and some of the key documents, such as the Vision document or 
internal regulation codes providing for the terms of reference of the Ethics Board or the newly-
created Sector for Security and Protection Tasks and Oversight (Sektor za bezbjednosno-zaštitne 
poslove i nadzor) are not to be found on the web site. Annual reports are not available, although 
there does not appear to be a resistance to sharing information per se, as witnessed in the extensive 
reporting on the implementation of the AC Programme. Additional support is necessary to help 
transform such reporting into a habit and move it a step further toward publicly presenting the 
results of their work as a matter of routine. Continued efforts are also needed to empower local 
police units, and accountability needs to be further strengthened.  
8.4 Capacities to Combat Organised Crime and Corruption: 
Organised crime remains a source of serious concern in Montenegro, where it is almost exclusively 
international in character, with the country serving as a transit point. The most serious forms are 
trafficking in narcotics, cigarettes, arms, and human beings, with Montenegro being both a country 
of transit and destination for trafficking victims due to demand arising, in part, from the tourist 
industry.  
 
The Programme for the Fight against Corruption and Organised Crime, unsurprisingly, focuses on 
the repressive capacities in this area.  
 
                                                     
178 See for example “Zaštita građana od zloupotreba policije” (Protection of citizens from misuse of the police), Danas, 
16.1.2006, www.danas.co.yu/20060116/hronika1.html.  
179 Law on Police, Article 93.  
180 See for example the statement on the incident by the NGO Centre for Civic Education at 
www.cgo.cg.yu/en/press/CCE%20State%20must%20protect%20Aleksandar%20Sasa%20Zekovic.pdf.  
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8.4.1 Legal Framework  
The legal framework for combating organised crime (and corruption) is becoming increasingly in 
line with international standards and GRECO recommendations. There is intensive work underway 
reported in some detail in the First AC Progress Report on preparation of changes to the criminal 
code and the criminal procedure code providing for confiscation of assets obtained through criminal 
activity and allowing for the use of special investigative means (SIMs) for corruption crimes 
(previously permitted only for crimes that carry the minimum penalty of 10 years of 
prison).Adoption of the new Criminal Procedure Code is expected in fall 2007. A Law on 
International Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters is also being drafted, while the Law on Criminal 
Liability of Legal Persons was adopted in December 2006 and has entered into force as of January 
2007. A law on whistleblower protection has not been drafted, with the First Progress Report 
suggesting confusion over which body is responsible for the process. A law on witness protection 
exists; a ministerial commission for the implementation of the Witness Protection Programme, and 
a Protection Unit have been established, but the implementation poses additional challenges: 
considering Montenegro’s size and close-knit communities, relocation of protected witnesses needs 
to be to another country in the region, which requires extensive international arrangements that have 
not yet been secured. A number of other laws are also reported being reviewed, including some of 
the key measures for preventing corruption such as the Law on Conflict of Interest and Law on 
Political Party Finance.  
 
There is also an initiative underway under the auspices of UNDP to undertake an analysis of the 
compliance of the national legal framework with the requirements set by the UN Convention 
Against Corruption (UNCAC). While progress on some fronts is slow, as indicated elsewhere in 
this analysis, overall, on the legislative front, there appears to be considerable progress.  
 
The next challenge is to provide training on new legal instruments, including the use of SIMs, 
undercover agents, and protected witnesses for all branches in law enforcement, including courts. 
Lack of knowledge on new laws and techniques is repeatedly cited as the most serious obstacle to 
effectively investigating and prosecution crime and corruption (concerns with political influence 
noted above notwithstanding).  
8.4.2 Anti-Money Laundering Regime 
The “follow-the-money” approach can be a useful method for identifying corruption, with the actual 
crimes generally being difficult to detect at the time they are committed. Proceeds of corruption and 
organized crime can be identified when they enter the financial system, however, when an effective 
anti-money laundering regime is in place.  
 
Montenegro established the Administration for the Prevention of Money Laundering, APML 
(Uprava za sprječavanje pranja novca)181 in December 2003. The Law on the Prevention of Money 
Laundering (Zakon o sprječavanju pranja novca),182 passed in October 2003 and amended183 in 
March 2005, requires financial institutions to declare all financial transactions exceeding €15,000 as 
well as all “suspicious” transaction to the APML. In addition to banks, the list of those obliged to 
report on suspicious transactions was expanded to include attorneys-at-law and currency exchange 
offices. The US Treasury has been a key partner in developing the capacities of the APML, 
providing training and equipping the APML office The APML was admitted to the Egmont Group 
in June 2005.  
                                                     
181 www.gom.cg.yu/aspn.  
182 Available in Montenegrin at www.gom.cg.yu/files/1147855872.doc.  
183 Amendments to the Law on the Prevention of Money Laundering (Zakon o izmjenama i dopunama Zakona o 
sprječavanju pranja novca) is available in Montenegrin at www.gom.cg.yu/files/1147856680.doc.  
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A database for collecting and analysis data on financial transactions has been set up, with additional 
analytic refinements still under development. The APML has progressed in developing guidelines 
on what should be considered as a suspicious transaction, but it needs to further extend the scope of 
monitoring of financial transactions beyond the banking system, especially in relation to real estate 
sales and “inward investment.”184 One of the reasons for the lack of progress noted in the First AC 
Progress report is the delay in forming and staffing a new monitoring unit. Additional 
improvements to the Law on Prevention of Money Laundering are also under consideration. 
8.4.3 Police 
A special unit for the fight against organised crime was formed in February 2003. A considerable 
amount of investment and support had been made in the form of equipment provision and training 
of these investigators, but more continues to be needed, especially with regard to financial 
investigations. A Sida project that strengthened intelligence and analysis capacities is viewed as 
particularly valuable in its attempt to change the relationship between the prosecutors and police, 
and move Montenegrin police toward an agreement with Europol. Such an agreement will be an 
important indicator of success; for the moment, there is a lack of trust from Europol, exacerbated by 
poor flow of information across borders. Montenegro has, however, become a member of Interpol 
in 2006.  
8.4.4 Prosecution 
Within the State Prosecutor’s office, there exists a Special Unit for Organised Crime, headed by a 
Special Prosecutor, and including one deputy prosecutor focusing on corruption. There are a total of 
3 operational prosecutors in the Special Unit, and this appears to be enough for the time being, with 
the Special Prosecutor reporting in an interview with one of the authors that no cases were late and 
no deadlines were missed. Members of this Special Unit have received training, but more is needed, 
particularly with increasingly complex investigations relating to economic crime and corruption. 
The prosecutor’s office has designed a project describing training needs and outlining a programme 
of cooperation with US authorities on the development of an information system and cooperation 
with the Croatian Administration for Combating Corruption and Organised Crime (USKOK); this 
has been presented to the Council of Europe, US agencies, and the OSCE. There is also confidence 
that support will also be coming through the EU IPA funds to support the challenging 
transformation of the State Prosecutor into the leading investigative institution as foreseen in the 
Judicial Reform Strategy, discussed above.  
8.4.5 Courts 
There are repeated suggestions that the Courts are the weakest link in the system, lacking 
specialized knowledge for ruling on cases of organised crime and corruption. There is no special 
court for organised crime and corruption, and arguably there is no need for it in a system as small as 
Montenegro’s. Nevertheless, there is recognition that some form of development and concentration 
of capacities is needed, which will be undertaken within the larger framework of judicial reform.  
 
The training of judges is greatly hampered by the lack of functioning of the Judicial Training 
Centre, noted above in section 8.1. While personnel issues, i.e. recruitment of an Executive 
Director, are the first priority, ongoing financial support will also be needed for conducting 
trainings, as state resources appear to be inadequate.  
 
                                                     
184 European Commission, Montenegro 2006 Progress Report, p. 38.  
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8.4.6 Inter-Agency Cooperation 
Cooperation among the various services – police, prosecution, customs, tax authorities, and the anti-
money laundering unit – is improving, with memoranda of cooperation signed, for example, 
between the prosecution and the tax administration and will shortly be done between the 
prosecution and customs. 185 Each of the services is nearing the completion of electronic databases 
that will facilitate the analysis and exchange of information. While the databases will not be 
completely unified (as different services track cases according to different criteria, e.g. number of 
criminal acts for the police vs. number of persons committing criminal acts for the prosecution), 
they will likely become fully networked within the next year. There is confidence that this database 
will prove a considerable asset, particularly in the work of the prosecution.  
 
The APML also reports that cooperation with law enforcement is very good, but the European 
Commission warns that “coordination and exchange of information between the [APML] and law 
enforcement bodies as well as tax authorities needs to be substantially upgraded in order to tackle 
money laundering concerns in Montenegro.”186 Similar recommendations have been also made by 
GRECO, and while inter-agency cooperation may not be entirely satisfactory, there are indications 
that international advice is being heeded and efforts in the right direction are being made.  
8.4.7 International Cooperation 
Considering the international character of organised crime in Montenegro, international cooperation 
is perhaps the most important element in efforts to combat it. A number of formal agreements have 
been made with counterparts in the countries in the region and beyond (e.g. the Supreme State 
Prosecutor has signed bilateral agreements with the prosecution services in Russia and Ukraine). 
The Police Administration has likewise recently entered into cooperation protocols signed with 
Austria, Belgium, Kosovo/UNMIK, and Romania. Montenegro is a member of Interpol and aspires 
to closer cooperation with EUROPOL. The Customs Administration likewise has bilateral 
agreements with counterparts in the region, as well as Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine, and 
negotiations are underway with neighbouring Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and 
Kosovo on protocols for joint tracking of excise goods.187  
 
Lack of the knowledge of English has been noted by international observers as one of the key 
obstacles to effective international cooperation, which results in collaboration with regional 
counterparts being much more effective. However, the real indicator of effectiveness of cooperation 
will come through monitoring the progress on a number of high-profile international investigations, 
including a cigarette-smuggling investigation recently initiated in Serbia against a close associate of 
the top Montenegrin political leadership, Stanko Subotić “Cane” (see text box 19).  
 
 
 
                                                     
185 See “First Report on the Realisation of Measures from the Action Plan for the Implementation of the Programme for 
the Fight against Corruption and Organised Crime,” p. 87.  
186 European Commission, Montenegro 2006 Progress Report, p. 38.  
187 For details, see “First Report on the Realisation of Measures from the Action Plan for the Implementation of the 
Programme for the Fight against Corruption and Organised Crime.” 
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9. Transparency and Watchdogs 
9.1 Transparency and Access to Information  
The Law on Free Access to Information (Zakon o slobodnom pristupu informacijama)188 was passed 
in 2005, but secondary legislation outlining specifics of implementation is still pending. The 
Ministry of Culture, Sports and Media is the institution responsible for the implementation of the 
law, and is working on unified instructions to public institutions. However, neither the Ministry, the 
Directorate for Anti-Corruption Initiative, nor the Ombudsman has the law posted on their web 
sites, and it is difficult to find it in electronic form in general. However, most government agencies 
have prominently posted on their web pages instructions (vodič) for accessing information of public 
importance, including the contact information for the official responsible for freedom of 
information (FOI) requests. Some notable exceptions include the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry 
for Environmental Protection and Physical Planning [spatial planning], and the Directorate for Anti-
Corruption Initiative.  
 
International organisations have supported a number of initiatives to help implement the law, 
including trainings of civil servants, starting with central government bodies. Among others, the 
OSCE has planned trainings for the police and the judiciary through the Human Resources 
Management Authority, which also strengthens cooperation between the police and the prosecution.  
 
Non-governmental organisations have by far done the most to promote freedom of information. The 
NGO MANS has been very active in testing the implementation of FOI regulation through the range 
of available administrative and legal remedies. They have followed non-responsiveness of the 
public administration bodies with complaints addressed to the Administrative Court, with mixed 
results. The Administrative Court had ruled against MANS requests in a number of cases, but major 
victories were won when challenges were followed through to the Supreme Court, which has 
annulled several of the Administrative Court decisions. The process appears to have served to set 
important legal precedents which have helped shape Administrative Court rulings afterward. It is 
one of the rare instances in the region where litigation as a mechanism to realise citizens’ rights 
seems to have helped to set norms through judicial practice, as well as promoting public awareness 
on freedom of information. However, litigation cannot remain as the principal means to ensure 
access to information. Court cases last 6 months on average, and the procedure for raising legal 
challenges, as set out in the Law on Administrative Procedure, is far too complicated for ordinary 
citizens. At the time of writing this assessment, only one legal challenge had been mounted by an 
“ordinary citizen.”  
 
The Association of Young Journalists was one of the first organisations to tackle the question, and 
they were one of the drafters of the freedom of information law. They have undertaken an initiative 
to broadly monitor and test the implementation of the law across the public sector, and a number of 
outreach and education activities. Efforts also include the creation of a database of government 
institutions’ instructions for access to information on a dedicated web site.189  
 
One of the key problems with the implementation of the law is that the rules specify only on-the-
spot review (uvid) of the information, but not explicitly the reproduction of the materials. MANS 
                                                     
188 Unofficial English translation is available at www.slobodanpristup.com/spi/index.php?option=com_content&task= 
view&id=29&Itemid=36; Montenegrin language version is available at www.mans.cg.yu/FAI/zakoni/Zakon_o_SPI.pdf.  
189 www.slobodanpristup.com  
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has, in fact, had considerable difficulties with some authorities preventing them from reproducing 
information, even by reading out loud and tape recording the content of specific documents (see text 
box 13). As there is no unified price list for the charges of reproducing (photocopying, scanning and 
e-mailing, or other) documents, others have, on the other hand, permitted reproduction at a very 
high cost (e.g. Municipality of Podgorica charging €1,000 for photocopying a certain number of 
documents). The Administrative Court has been silent on the issue to date.  
 
Many international observers believe that the principal challenge lies with the limited capacity of 
the administration, as obligations under the freedom of information rules stand in addition to other 
responsibilities they may have. Legislative gaps, such a Law on State Secrets and a Data Protection 
Act and a Law on the Protection of Personal Data contribute to a lack of clarity on the application of 
the law, but nevertheless, norms are slowly being established through practice.  
 
Nevertheless, more work remains to be done in order to achieve a satisfactory level of transparency. 
A great deal of information is not actually available on the agencies’ web sites. Many government 
bodies that have enormous of influence in some of the key economic decisions do not have an 
internet presence at all (e.g. Privatisation Council or the Commission for Concessions). Information 
that government agencies do readily provide on their web pages tends to be poorly organised, and 
there are countless instances of old web sites not being shut down when government agencies move 
to a new web site. This carelessness creates much confusion, which actually reduces transparency.  
9.2 Media  
The Law on Media (Zakon o medijima)190 that entered into force in May 2003 provides the legal 
basis for an environment that fosters independent and pluralistic media. The OSCE positively 
evaluates the existing legal framework, and there is a vibrant and diverse media scene despite 
Montenegro’s very small market.  
 
The vast majority of the media are private, with the daily Pobjeda in the process of privatisation, 
and the daily Vijesti co-owned by the state and the German WAZ Group. WAZ and Serbian Pink 
are the largest foreign investors in the Montenegrin media market. Nevertheless, even private media 
are far from being seen as independent and unbiased.  
 
The quality of reporting in both electronic and print media is very poor in general, with the weekly 
Monitor, daily Vijesti, and Radio Antena M (which is also an internet news source), among the few 
exceptions. There is still much to be done before the media can play a constructive and reliable 
watchdog role. Corruption of individual journalists is seen as far less of an issue than poor capacity, 
and a strengthening of journalists’ skills remains a priority.  
 
Proper investigative journalism in Montenegro is limited not only by a shortage of skills, but also 
due to limited resources of most media organisations. While journalists do appear to be increasingly 
using freedom of information provisions and beginning to address corruption issues, access to 
information and reliable facts remains difficult, and few people are willing to make statements on 
the record due to a fear of reprisals (not necessarily in the form of physical violence, but rather as a 
threat to jobs and livelihood of individuals who dare to challenge the powerful). The 2006 Nations 
in Transit report notes that “investigative pieces sometimes result in anonymous threats, lawsuits, or 
personal verbal attacks in public, although there were no cases of physical assaults on investigative 
journalists in 2006.”191 The same could not be said for 2007, however. A serious physical assault 
did take place during the writing of this assessment, with one of the editors of the independent daily 
                                                     
190 Available in Montenegrin at www.rtcg.org/referendum/regulativa/zakon_o_medijima.pdf.  
191 Nations in Transit, p. 321 
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Vijesti, Željko Ivanović, attacked and severely beaten as he was leaving the newspaper’s 10th 
anniversary celebration on 1 September 2007.   
 
There exist a number of initiatives to promote professionalisation and performance of Montenegrin 
journalists. All existing journalist associations in Montenegro, at the initiative of the Media 
Institute, have adopted a unified Code of Conduct (Kodeks Novinara Crne Gore)192, whose 
implementation is monitored by the Journalists’ Self-Regulatory Body (Novinarsko 
samoregulatorno tijelo), formed in 2003 and composed of representatives of journalist associations. 
Despite some progress, the body is still seen as in embryonic form, primarily as it does not 
incorporate all major print and broadcast media in Montenegro, which reduces its influence. For 
example, the second largest circulation daily Dan refuses to take part in any self-regulation effort.193  
 
The state-owned broadcaster Radio Television of Montenegro (Radio Televizija Crne Gore, 
RTCG)194 is in the process of transformation to a public service, but this is a complicated and 
difficult task. Among other problems, it involves a considerable downsizing of the staff, which will 
have significant social impact, especially in a small country such as Montenegro. The politicisation 
of this body remains a serious concern. While its statutes provide for an 11-member supervisory 
Council nominated primarily by the civil sector, it has far from provided leadership on building a 
reputable public service. The Council has not adopted or made public an RTCG financial report 
since 2004, and it does not publish reports about its work, as required by law. Its sessions are closed 
to the public more often than not. Furthermore, the Council president attended a pre-election 
political event and sat in the front row, while two other Council members are government 
appointees on the boards of public institutions, which is against the spirit of the Law on Public 
Broadcasting.195  
 
Box 24: 
In February 2006, representatives of the NGO sector and journalist associations 
accused two nominees of having misused the law by creating NGOs simply to 
nominate themselves to the Council. While both nominees denied the charges, one 
argued that “no one was bothered when other individuals, who were reproached for 
conflicts of interest, previous and ongoing connections with political parties or 
other power centres, were elected to the council.” The parliament delayed its vote 
on the question, and the two nominees ultimately quietly withdrew their names. 
 
In a further twist, when the NGO sector nominated its representative to the Council 
in late 2006, the parliament rejected the nomination, stating that the individual was 
close to one of the opposition parties and would essentially represent that party on 
the Council. The NGO community was outraged and claimed that the law gives the 
parliament the right to confirm appointments to the council, not to reject 
nominees.196 The situation had not been resolved at the time of writing this report.  
 
The OSCE intends to undertake an assessment of the Law on the Public Broadcaster in the fall of 
2007, which should result in useful recommendations on how to assist in the difficult transformation 
of RTCG into a true public service.  
 
 
                                                     
192 Available in Montenegrin at www.mminstitute.org/kodex.php.  
193 Nations in Transit, endnote 34, p. 332.  
194 www.rtcg.org  
195 Nations in Transit, p. 321.  
196 Ibid, pp. 320-322.  
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9.3 Civil Society 
The 1999 Law on NGOs is extremely liberal, defining no reasons for denying registration and 
giving very few details about revoking registration. As a result, Montenegro has more than 3,600 
registered NGOs, the majority of which either does not function or are small businesses, since the 
profit of economic activities of NGOs currently is tax-exempt as long as it does not exceed €4,000 
and is used to further the statutory goals of the organisation.197 No more than 200 NGOs in 
Montenegro can be considered part of the genuine civil society category, and only a handful is truly 
active.  
 
There has been a lack of public trust in NGOs in part due to the small-business misuse mentioned 
above, but there are other reasons, too. Many NGOs are also vehicles for additional contracts of 
people close to the government, and there have been numerous examples, also noted in this report, 
of NGO status being abused to gain access to government bodies’ councils or other positions. 
 
 
Box 25: 
In a state with underdeveloped public institutions such as Montenegro, there also 
exist examples of NGOs playing a detrimental role to the public sector capacity 
development. The Statistical Office of Montenegro (MONSTAT) is a case in point. 
Impaired by weak capacity and poor management, MONSTAT continues to lose the 
competition with the Institute for Strategic Studies and Prognoses (ISSP) even on 
projects that should, per definition, be carried out by state institutions, such as 
official economic statistics for the country. By contrast, the ISSP, established in 
1999 by Veselin Vukotić (mentioned throughout this report), is receiving a number 
of the most important contracts both by donor agencies and the Montenegrin 
government.  
 
 
The government sets aside some financial resources for non-governmental organisations. Part of the 
funding is a direct line item in the republic budget that is distributed through the parliament, and 
another part is disbursed through the Ministry of Culture and the Ministry of Tourism. Local 
governments also provide funds to NGOs. The process for distributing parliamentary funds is 
subject to great controversy. NGOs eligible for funding are those that deal with human rights, 
democracy, civil sector development, European integration, social activities, ecology, culture, and 
education. A parliamentary commission holds a competition every year to select those that will 
receive funding, but there are no defined criteria for decision making. In many cases, the 
commission provides much less than the requested amount without any clear indication of what part 
of the project the commission wishes to fund. Finally, there is no system to monitor the expenditure 
of funds or any reporting requirements. Clearly, the risk of political bias and embezzlement in such 
a system is significant.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
197 Ibid, endnote 29, p. 332.  
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Box 26: 
In 2006, there was a great deal of public criticism of the responsible parliamentary 
commission for giving funds to two organisations whose leaders were DPS 
candidates for municipal councillors and found other instances of NGO connections 
with ruling parties. After years of constant controversy and discord between civil 
society and the government, a coalition of the most active NGOs (ultimately 120 of 
them) – Cooperation Toward the Goal – was formed in August 2006 to address, 
inter alia, the lack of a clear structure for financing NGOs from public funds.  
 
The coalition produced a draft system for financing NGOs from public funds, and an 
NGO code of conduct, and these documents are to be approved at a national NGO 
conference in spring 2007, but full implementation of some measures may require 
legislative changes.198  
 
 
Despite the problems, NGOs have made an important contribution to the democratisation process in 
Montenegro, particularly on human rights issues. NGOs are also at the forefront of the fight against 
corruption in Montenegro, although more capacity building is needed so that NGOs can consistently 
produce highest quality research and analysis. This is particularly important for anti-corruption 
issues, where getting some things wrong carries the risk of completely undermining an 
organization’s credibility. The most prominent ones on corruption issues include MANS and the 
Association of Young Journalists, who have made remarkable impact on promoting the 
implementation of the freedom of information law; MANS and Centre for Monitoring (CEMI) keep 
high visibility on conflict of interest issues, and CEMI is the only organisation working on political 
party finance questions.  
 
MANS’ Executive Director is also member of the National Commission for the Implementation of 
the Programme for the Fight against Corruption and Organised Crime (hereafter: National 
Commission). Through her membership in the Commission, she was also to co-ordinate the work of 
other NGOs on corruption and to feed information back into the Commission. However, it has been 
difficult to solicit any such input, despite MANS’ actively reaching out to other organisations on the 
issue. The Directorate for Anti-Corruption Initiative has, as a result, launched a public invitation for 
NGOs to submit reports on the implementation of relevant activities in the framework of the AC 
Action Plan; however, only one such submission was registered by mid-June 2007.199 
 
It is difficult to find people to work for NGOs such as MANS. There is a perceived risk, not so 
much a physical threat as consequences for future employment of the activists themselves, and their 
extended family members. MANS’ Executive Director has been threatened, and she has 
counteracted by bringing the issue to the public. There is some consensus in Montenegro that going 
to the media is the only really effective form of protection.  
 
In addition, there is a great deal of suspicion that everyone is motivated by political ambitions and a 
thirst for power. An example is the transformation of one of the most vocal anti-corruption activists, 
the NGO Group for Changes, into a political party, Movement for Changes. Similar suspicions now 
surround the head of the most active NGO, MANS, whose Executive Director was designated in a 
                                                     
198 Ibid, pp. 318-319.  
199 The Directorate for Anti-Corruption Initiative intended to feed submissions by NGOs into the First Report on the 
Realisation of Measures from the Action Plan; the deadline was 15 June 2007, see in Montenegrin 
www.antikorup.vlada.cg.yu/vijesti.php?akcija=vijesti&id=24659.  
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June 2007 poll as the most popular public figure in Montenegro.200 At the same time, such positive 
public responses give reason for optimism that NGOs can be the catalysts for greater public interest, 
and possibly participation in, the fight against corruption.  
 
A capacity building programme for NGO anti-corruption activities that was jointly funded by 
Rockefeller Brothers Fund, Charles Stewart Mott Foundation, and UNDP will end in 2007. Despite 
this, the authors did not form the impression that funding for NGO activities for anti-corruption, in 
their current relatively limited scope, is a problem for the time being. However, continued donor 
support to NGOs will be an essential aspect of promoting the fight against corruption in 
Montenegro.  
 
 
 
 
                                                     
200 CEDEM, “Political Public Opinion in Montenegro,” June 2007, available in English at www.cedem.cg.yu/ 
opolls/images/CEDEM_June07.pdf.  
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10. Dedicated Anti-Corruption Programme 
10.1 International Obligations 
Since gaining independence in 2006, Montenegro has joined a number of international 
organisations, such as the United Nations, the Council of Europe, and the OSCE. The legal 
personality of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro has been inherited by Serbia, but 
Montenegro has become party to a number of international instruments and is in the course of 
signing and ratifying others.  
United Nations 
Montenegro has ratified the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC)201 in October 
2006. The Directorate for Anti-Corruption Initiative is, according to the AC Action Plan, in charge 
of analysing the compliance of the Montenegrin legal framework with the provisions set out in 
UNCAC. UNDP has made available resources to provide an in-depth analysis of the Criminal Code, 
the Criminal Procedure Code, the Law on Freedom of Access to Information, the Public 
Procurement Law, and the Conflict of Interest Law. The analysis is to commence in 2007, and will 
be carried out by an expert of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).  
Council of Europe 
Montenegro is the newest Member State of the Council of Europe – it joined the organisation in 
May 2007. For the topic at hand, the following instruments are relevant: Montenegro has signed or 
acceded to the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, the European Convention on Mutual 
Assistance in Criminal Matters, and the Additional Protocol thereto; and the Convention on 
Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime. Montenegro has signed, 
but not yet ratified, the Council’s Civil Law Convention on Corruption, the Convention on 
Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of 
Terrorism, the Second Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in 
Criminal Matters. The Additional Protocol to the Criminal Law Convention against Corruption has 
been neither signed nor ratified.202  
 
Montenegro has been subject to a joint first and second evaluation round in the framework of the 
Council of Europe’s Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) with the Evaluation Report 
adopted at the GRECO Plenary Session in October 2006; Montenegro is expected to report on the 
implementation of the 24 recommendations issued by GRECO by 31 May 2008.203  
Stability Pact Anti-Corruption Initiative (SPAI) 
Montenegro has participated in the Anti-Corruption Initiative of the Stability Pact for South-eastern 
Europe204 since its initiation in 2000. The previous director of the Directorate for Anti-Corruption 
Initiative, since 2004 also headed the Regional Office205 of the SPAI in Sarajevo. As pointed out 
                                                     
201 The Convention can be found at www.unodc.org/unodc/en/crime_convention_corruption.html.  
202 The Conventions can be found at the Council of Europe Treaty Office’s website at http://conventions.coe.int.  
203 See GRECO, Evaluation Report on the Republic of Montenegro.  
204 See the Stability Pact’s website at www.stabilitypact.org.  
205 See the Regional Office’s website at www.spai-rslo.org/en.  
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elsewhere, the SPAI has been crucial in putting the issue of corruption on the political agenda of the 
countries in the region – this is probably its main achievement. However, value added of the SPAI’s 
activities has been less clear against the background of countries’ aspirations to join the European 
Union and, linked to these aspirations, to comply with Council of Europe standards in the fight 
against corruption. It is questionable whether Montenegro, with its limited resources, should 
continue to give the same priority as in the past to this initiative,206 and whether it is not more 
sensible to focus on concrete domestic tasks at hand.  
10.2 Programme for the Fight against Corruption and Organised Crime 
Having been in the drafting process since 2003, the Programme for the Fight against Organised 
Crime and Corruption (Program borbe protiv korupcije i organizovanog kriminala)207 was adopted 
by the government on 28 July 2005. The Program’s rationale is that corruption represents an 
impediment to foreign investment and, therefore, economic development, and undermines reforms 
needed to accomplish the transition process. Poverty, as well as political instability, is seen as a 
factor contributing to corruption (rather than being caused by it). The stated ambition of the 
Program, elaborated “in co-operation with the NGO sector,” was to “become part of a broad social 
plan and a widely accepted system of measures and activities for fighting corruption and organised 
crime.”208 
 
The Programme is organised along 7 sections (5 of which contain also a short paragraph on 
priorities) as follows:  
 
- an “Introduction,” providing the document’s general rationale;  
- an “Analysis of the Current Situation,” providing a definition of corruption that includes the 
private sector, and results from various surveys and opinion polls, and statistical 
information available of criminal offences that contain elements of corruption, and such 
with elements of organised crime; the section also provides a breakdown of existing 
provisions of the Criminal Code relevant for the fight against organised crime and 
corruption;  
- a section on “The Political Obligation to Act,” highlighting the crucial importance of 
political will for the successful fight against corruption and organised crime, and giving 
high priority to the establishment of networks that include a broad range of stakeholders 
such as civil society and NGOs;  
- a section listing the “International Obligations” to be fulfilled, including the relevant 
international conventions and standards, as well as obligations under regional initiatives 
such as the Stability Pact Anti-Corruption Initiative (SPAI), and giving priority to achieving 
obligations stemming from the Stabilisation and Association process and membership in the 
Council of Europe’s instruments;  
- a section on “General Objectives,” in brief subsections outlining the need to effectively 
prosecute corruption and organised crime, to adopt effective measures for the prevention of 
corruption (with priorities established for the prevention of corruption in the judiciary), the 
necessity of the public, NGO’s, and the media participation in the fight against corruption, 
and the need for the establishment of “effective governance” and budgetary control 
                                                     
206 The Programme for the Fight against Corruption and Organised Crime and the Action Plan, for example, provide for 
measures to implement the Declaration of 10 Common Actions to Curb Corruption in South-eastern Europe (which can be 
found, for information, at www.spai-rslo.org/en). It is questionable whether this declaration adds anything to existing 
obligations other than another layer of reporting.  
207 Available in English at www.gom.cg.yu/files/1125055411.doc and in Montenegrin at www.gom.cg.yu/files/ 
1124287629.doc.  
208 See Programme for the Fight against Corruption and Organised Crime, p. 5. 
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(stipulating legislation such as the Law on the Budget, the Law on Public Procurement, the 
Law on the State Audit Institution, and the Law on the Financing of Political Parties);  
- a section on “Specific Measures,” providing more detail on the four directions of the 
previous section, and adding a part on “Effective Implementation of the Law and Measures 
linked to Special Control Institutions”;  
- a section that provides the mechanisms through which the Programme will be monitored 
and implemented, namely that a single body is to be formed to lead the oversight of the 
process of implementation; an inter-institutional team would be formed whose task would 
be the “organisation and co-ordination, synchronisation of the activities throughout the 
Republic of Montenegro, the administration of resources made available for the 
implementation of the Program, the establishing of priorities, the dynamics and deadlines 
for the implementation and measuring of achieved results.”209  
 
While stressing the fact that resources for its implementation have to be made available from the 
state budget (although not stipulating how much the implementation of the Programme is estimated 
to cost), the Programme has been written partly having in mind the need for foreign technical 
assistance and the document serving as a basis for fundraising with donors.  
 
The adoption of the Programme was widely covered in the national media, and was subject of the 
first international conference, in October 2005, on the topic of corruption in Montenegro, organised 
in a joint effort of the NGO MANS, UNDP, the Montenegrin government, and the Council of 
Europe’s Sida-funded PACO Impact project. A further objective of the conference was also to put 
additional pressure on the government to follow suit with the elaboration and adoption of an Action 
Plan.210  
 
PACO Impact had also provided technical assistance through experts’ advice during various stages 
of the drafting process of the Programme itself,211 and the subsequent operational-level Action Plan 
(see below). This assistance has substantially raised the profile of both the Programme and the 
Action Plan: while neither document was, as often heard, officially “endorsed” by the Council of 
Europe,212 the Council of Europe involvement has been the ultimate sign of approval for those that 
were involved in the drafting process[es], and has certainly facilitated the adoption of both policy 
papers. While this is, of course, positive, it is also worthwhile highlighting that not all of the 
concerns raised by the Council of Europe experts were taken into account (while many were, 
however) in the final versions of the documents. This is an entirely legitimate right of the 
government, but it also puts the level of Council of Europe “endorsement” of the Programme and 
the Action Plan into context. Concerns raised, for example, were the need for the final Programme 
to contain a thorough and honest analysis of the mechanisms and incentives for corruption in 
Montenegro, and taking such an analysis as the starting point for the measures to remedy the 
situation, and the recommendation to thoroughly cost the implementation of the Programme and 
Action Plan.  
 
 
                                                     
209 Ibid, p. 45.  
210 The conference material can be found on MANS’ website at www.mans.cg.yu/ACConference.htm.  
211 See, for example, Kristina Hemon and Goran Klemenčić, “PACO Impact Expert Opinion on the Draft Programme for 
Combating Corruption and Organised Crime,” January 2004, at www.coe.int/t/e/legal_affairs/legal_co-
operation/combating_economic_crime/3_technical_cooperation/paco/paco-impact/PC-TP(2004)44.pdf, or Bertrand de 
Speville, “PACO Impact Expert Opinion on Issues and practical implementation of a national anti-corruption programme: 
methods of measuring its progress,” December 2004, at www.coe.int/t/e/legal_affairs/legal_co-operation/ 
combating_economic_crime/3_technical_cooperation/paco/paco-impact/PACO_Impact_TP.asp.  
212 This is not working practice of the Council of Europe.  
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10.3 Action Plan for the Implementation of the Programme for the Fight 
against Corruption and Organised Crime 
Following the adoption of the Program, the government tasked the Ministry of Interior213 to form a 
Commission (Komisija za izradu Akcionog plana za sprovođenje Programa borbe protiv korupcije i 
organizovanog kriminala) which would draft an Action Plan spelling out the different measures 
needed in order to implement the Program. The Commission was chaired by the Head of the Police 
Department for the Fight against Organised Crime, and co-chaired by a senior inspector of the same 
police department, an advisor to the Minister of Justice, and the co-ordinator of the NGO MANS; 
the Commission further included an Assistant Minister for Culture and Media, an advisor to the 
Minister of Finance, the Head of the Department for Internal and International Co-operation of the 
Department for Money Laundering, an independent advisor to the then Ministry for Economic 
International Relations and European Integration, a deputy State Prosecutor General, a judge from 
the Podgorica Basic Court, and an independent advisor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; the 
secretary of the Commission came from the Directorate for Anti-Corruption Initiative. The 
Commission met up to three times a week from January 2006 to March 2006, and completed its 
work at the end of March; the plan was adopted by the government in late August 2006.  
 
The AC Action Plan214 covers the period from 2006 to 2008 (the Programme itself does not specify 
the timeframe over which it is supposed to be implemented), and follows, in table (matrix) form the 
structure of the Program, providing for detailed measures against each of the Program’s sections, 
including information on the responsible institution in charge, the deadline for the implementation 
of the measures, indicators of success, risk factors, and an indication of the source of funding 
(without, however, providing a cost estimate). Specific attention is given to measures needed to 
fulfil the obligations stemming from the European Partnership and those from international 
obligations.  
 
While maybe not as intensive as desirable, and maybe too late in the process to have a decisive 
impact, the Action Plan did undergo at least some public consultation. The Montenegrin Employers 
Federation, for example, used the opportunity in a follow-up to a roundtable to provide input into 
the Action Plan from the private sector perspective. Its submission highlighted one critical 
weakness of the plan – the lack of the coherency of its measures with ongoing reforms and 
deadlines already set by other strategic policy documents.215  
10.4 National Commission for Monitoring the Implementation of the 
Programme for the Fight against Corruption and Organised Crime  
The implementation of the Action Plan is overseen by the high-level National Commission for 
Monitoring the Implementation of the Programme for the Fight against Corruption and Organised 
Crime (Nacionalna komisija za implementaciju Akcionog plana za sprovođenje Programa borbe 
protiv korupcije i organizovanog kriminala), which was established by a decision of the 
government of 15 February 2007216 (i.e. with a substantial delay, as this was supposed to happen 
within the month following the adoption of the Action Plan), which nominated the members of the 
                                                     
213 The choice of the Ministry of Interior as the lead institution in this process seems natural given that the Programme 
encompasses both corruption and organised crime issues.  
214 Available in Montenegrin at www.gom.cg.yu/files/1157383512.doc. 
215 Written suggestions on the draft Action Plan by the Employers Federation given in hardcopy to one of the experts.  
216 See “Odluka o formiranju Nacionalne komisije za praćenje implementacije Akcionog plana za sprovođenje Programa 
borbe protiv korupcije i organizovanog kriminala” (Decision on establishing the National Commission for Monitoring the 
Action Plan for Implementation of the Programme for the Fight against Corruption and Organized Crime), available in 
English at www.gom.cg.yu/files/1186062102.doc and in Montenegrin at www.gom.cg.yu/files/1186062098.doc.  
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Commission, and also defined the terms of reference for the Commission’s work. The Commission 
is chaired by the Deputy Prime Minister for European Integration, the Commission’s other 11 
members include the Minister of Interior and Public Administration, the Minister of Finance, the 
Minister of Justice, the president of the Supreme Court, the State Prosecutor General, two members 
of parliament, the Head of the Police, the Head of the Police Department for the Fight Against 
Economic Crime, the Director of the Directorate for Anti-Corruption Initiative, and an NGO 
representative.  
 
The Commission meets four times a year; its first session was held on 16 March 2007, during which 
it adopted Rules of Procedure (Poslovnik o radu Nacionalne komisije za implementaciju Akcionog 
plana za sprovođenje Programa borbe protiv korupcije i organizovanog kriminala)217 and the plan 
of work until the end of 2007. The session also adopted the standard format of the monthly reports 
to be submitted to the Commission by the 30 institutions covered by the Programme and Action 
Plan, the template is published on the website of the Directorate for Anti-Corruption Initiative.218 
The reports are then analysed and prepared for submission to the Commission, by an “Expert Body” 
consisting of representatives of the Police, the Directorate for Anti-Corruption Initiative, the 
Ministry of Justice, the Prosecutor General and the Cabinet of the Deputy Prime Minister for 
European Integration.  
 
The first “monthly” report submitted by institutions covered the period from September 2006 until 
March 2007, while subsequent reports started to cover monthly activities and progress. On the basis 
of the first three reports submitted, a First Progress Report219 was adopted at the second meeting of 
the Commission in July 2007. It was presented to the public on 11 July 2007;220 the report has been 
adopted by the government and will now be submitted to various parliamentary committees.  
 
The report contains statistics of the level of implementation of the measures of the Action Plan 
(according to the report, 69 of the 280 measures were implemented, corresponding to 25% of 
achievement), an assessment of, and specific recommendations on the individual measures and to 
the agencies in charge of carrying them out. There are also a number of general recommendations, 
including the need for better co-operation of all agencies that would result in the fulfilment of the 
reporting requirements; the need for bringing the Action Plan up-to-date, including adjusting the 
timelines, clarification of the roles and responsibilities of some of the agencies, and cutting the 
reporting requirement for agencies down to once every three months; and a greater emphasis on 
work with the local administrations, and business associations and the private sector.  
 
There has been some criticism about the work of the National Commission. A substantial concern is 
that the members of the Commission who are representing the government, the Supreme Court and 
the Prosecutor General’s Office are, de facto, being asked to assess and, if necessary, to criticise the 
work of their respective ministries and institutions, which carries the risk of undermining the 
credibility of the entire exercise. While the fact that the majority of the 12 members of the 
Commission are very senior could also be an advantage, it is questionable in how much detail, from 
a practical point of view, they really can assess the quality of the work done implementing the 
multitude of measures under the Action Plan. This then, in turn, puts a lot of responsibility and 
authority on the work of the “Expert Body,” which is in charge of collecting, screening and 
                                                     
217 The Rules of Procedure available in English at www.gom.cg.yu/files/1186062381.doc and in Montenegrin at 
www.gom.cg.yu/files/1186062377.doc.  
218 Montenegrin language version of the template available at www.gom.cg.yu/files/1184847030.doc.  
219 Available in English at www.gom.cg.yu/files/1186144468.doc and in Montenegrin at 
www.vlada.cg./biblioteka/1184254299.doc.  
220 See Nebojša Redžić, “Crna Gora – Prvi izvještaj o realizaciji programa borbe protiv korupcije i organizovanog 
kriminala” (Montenegro – First Report on the Implementation of the Programme for the Fight against Corruption and 
Organised Crime), Voice of America, 11.7.2007 at www.voanews.com/serbian/2007-07-11-voa6.cfm.  
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analysing the monthly (in the future, quarterly) reports submitted by the agencies/institutions, and 
for preparing the findings for the inclusion in the reports to be adopted by the Commission. The 
reports are not being submitted to the individual members of the Commission, nor are they are not 
published on any web site.  
 
 
Box 27: 
The quality of the Commission’s First Report has been criticised for superficiality221 
and incorrectness. The NGO MANS – which has since the adoption of the Action Plan 
in August 2006 monitored its implementation, primarily through making use of the 
Law on Free Access to Information – has been one of the more vocal critics of the 
First Report. It published its own analysis of the level of implementation222 and 
arrived at a verdict that is less convinced about the success so far. This criticism is 
certainly in part justified: MANS has tried to independently verify the validity of 
some of the measures implemented, and has had to conclude that a number of 
documents said to be adopted or passed are not publicly available, making it 
difficult to verify the merits of the implementation. Criticism is also legitimate 
given the fact that a substantial number of measures are in delay – caused, in part, 
by the parliamentary elections that were held in autumn 2006 and which held up 
legislative activity.  
 
The Deputy Prime Minister, who is the Head of the National Commission, has 
reacted in a somewhat frantic way, sending a counter-statement to the MANS 
report via e-mail to an extensive list of local and international recipients. While it is 
encouraging to see that the report of an NGO such as MANS has the potential to 
cause substantial nervousness in the government, the statement was also alarming 
in that some basic concepts of democracy seemed not to be well understood. It is 
the legitimate right and role of NGOs to act as watchdogs and to criticise the 
government, and to portray this as “against the country interest” is out of order. 
After a reaction from MANS to her e-mail to the same distribution list, in a 
statement published on the government’s website, she provided an “explanation” 
(not, however, the text of her initial letter), the following day, that should be seen as 
toning down the initial statement.223  
 
 
It must be said that the quality of the First Report is mixed – as described in the relevant sections, 
some of the submissions from the relevant agencies seem to have gone completely unchallenged, 
and have thus undermined the exercise. However, it should also be conceded that the report does 
contain quite a number of critical observations, and that it is, at least in part, an honest attempt at a 
comprehensive analysis and stock-taking of measures implemented. It remains to be seen to what 
extent the recommendations contained in the report will be implemented in the months to come.  
 
The problem might partly lie on an entirely different level. What is crucially missing from the 
Program, the Action Plan, and the First Report is a clear link between the measures undertaken and 
to-be-undertaken, and their actual impact on levels of corruption. This echoes the criticism that had 
                                                     
221 Ibid.  
222 See Batrić Krvavac, “Izvještaj o sprovođenju Akcionog plana za borbu protiv korupcije i organizovanog kriminala. 
Septembar 2006–Maj 2007” (Report on the implementation of the Action Plan for the Fight against Corruption and 
Organised Crime). At the time of writing, the report was not yet available at MANS’ website (www.mans.cg.yu).  
223 See in Montenegrin Deputy Prime Minister Đurović’s statement of 3.8.2007 at www.vlada.cg. 
yu/vijesti.php?akcija=vijesti&id=25173.  
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been, inter alia, voiced by the Council of Europe experts during the drafting stages of the Program, 
namely that greater emphasis needs to be put on a thorough analysis of the incentives and 
mechanisms of corruption at present. This, in turn, might allow capturing the real progress made, 
and maybe the design and identification of more suitable follow-up measures and policies, rather 
than a ticking off of measures [this argument is being elaborated above (section 5.2) on the example 
of corruption in the Department of Public Revenues]. 
 
The lack of resources, too, is a recurring concern. As the First Report indicates, a number of 
measures were not implemented by agencies due to the lack of means. Yet, it is still unclear what 
financial amounts are in question. The question also concerns the resources available to support the 
work of the National Commission, on which no information had been available at the time of 
writing of the report.  
 
Whether the National Commission will be judged by the Council of Europe’s GRECO as fulfilling 
its recommendation to Montenegro to ensure the “efficient monitoring of the implementation of the 
anti-corruption programme through a specialized independent anti-corruption body with sufficient 
resources”224 remains to be seen. 
10.5 Directorate for Anti-Corruption Initiative 
The Directorate for Anti-Corruption Initiative exists since 2001. Initially, the Directorate was the 
liaison between national and international counterparts, and in charge of co-operation with 
international organisations. A decree of the government of July 2004 on the Organisation and 
Functioning of the Public Administration (Akt o unutrašnjoj organizaciji i sistematizaciji organa 
državne uprave)225 re-confirmed the mandate for the Directorate, which was also put under the 
supervision of the Ministry of Finance. Recommendations in the framework of the Sida-funded 
PACO Impact project emphasised the need to increase the independence of the Directorate, and to 
shift its accountability obligations away from the government to the parliament; however, no 
information is available as to what steps have been undertaken in this direction.  
 
The Directorate’s tasks are to “undertake promotional and preventive activities aimed at effectively 
combating corruption; working closely with the government towards adoption and implementation 
of European and international standards and instruments relevant to anti-corruption; enhancing 
transparency in business and financial operations; performing other activities that arise from 
Montenegro’s membership in the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe (SPAI) and other 
international organisations and institutions”; further, the Directorate is to be the interface between 
the citizens and the respective government institutions for complaints or information about 
corruption; and is to carry out any other tasks delegated to it by the relevant authorities.226  
 
The Directorate provided the secretariat for the inter-institutional team drafting the Action Plan, and 
has now assumed responsibilities in the framework of the “Expert Body” assisting the National 
Commission for the Implementation of the Action Plan of the Programme for the Fight against 
Corruption. However, the Terms of Reference for this expert body are not available.  
 
So far, the Directorate has worked mainly with 5 staff; thanks to external contributions (mainly 
through the Sida-funded PACO Impact project, and the OSCE), the Directorate was able to 
                                                     
224 See GRECO, Evaluation Report on the Republic of Montenegro, p. 32. 
225 Article 18. Available in Montenegrin at www.uzk.cg.yu/publikacije/dokumenti/zakon-o-drzavnoj-upravi-i-
inspekcijskom-nadzoru.pdf.  
226 See Council of Europe PACO Impact Project document “Anti-corruption services in South-eastern Europe/Policy 
Advising and Coordination Bodies,” PC-TC (2006) 15.7.2006, p. 38, available upon request from the Council of Europe.  
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temporarily employ an additional person. The Director of the Directorate is also the head of the 
Montenegrin delegation to the Council of Europe’s Group of States against Corruption (GRECO). 
An internal revision of the organisational structure of the Directorate, in particular in light of the 
increased workload due to the Directorate’s involvement in monitoring the implementation of the 
Action Plan, foresees an increase of staff to 10 by 2008 (a recommendation to this end was included 
in the First Report on the Implementation of the Action Plan). This will also require an increase in 
the Agency’s budget which has been, in 2005, € 62,006.36, in 2006 € 73,551.05, in 2007 
126,252.00 and should, in 2008, be between € 120,000 and € 130,000.  
 
Past activities of the Directorate have included, in 2006, the organisation of a public awareness 
campaign (through billboards and other media), and the establishment of a telephone hotline for 
citizens to lodge complaints and to receive advice on legal and institutional remedies for corruption. 
In 2007, there has also been, in co-operation with the Ministry of Education and Media, a series of 
public lectures addressing university students in Podgorica and Nikšić – a first for representatives of 
a government agency to pro-actively reach out to the public; these educational activities are planned 
to be continued in the future. The Directorate also recently conducted a corruption survey, but at the 
time of writing this report, it was still in the process of analysing its results.  
 
In addition to the ongoing involvement in the monitoring of the Action Plan, the Directorate is 
currently applying for substantial funding from the European Commission through IPA funds, and 
has discussed, with UNDP/UNODC, the funding for conducting research into corruption in the 
education and health sectors and for an in-depth analysis of the compliance of the Criminal Code, 
the Criminal Procedure Code, the Law on Conflict of Interest, the Law on Free Access to 
Information, and the Law on Public Procurement with the standards set out in the United Nations 
Convention against Corruption. This will enable the agency to fulfil at least part of its obligations 
under the Action Plan, which includes providing recommendations on the harmonisation of national 
legislation with international standards, and carrying out analyses and research into patterns of 
corruption.  
 
The Directorate is up against a relatively ambiguous reputation. Trust by citizens is low, but this 
might be primarily attributable to the fact that the Directorate is seen as a “new” institution, into 
which respondents of the NDI survey had little confidence across the board.227 Criticism has been 
caused by the overall aura of opacity surrounding the institution: the absence of a clear 
mandate/mission statement/Terms of Reference, and, connected to this, by frequent accusations of 
the Directorate having been created to provide a position for a person close to the government, 
exacerbated by the low level of visible actual activity of the Directorate. The Directorate, in turn, 
has successfully argued that due to limited resources it was unable to engage in more activities. 
Grievances (coming from both inside the public administration and from the NGO sector) seem also 
have been caused by the fact that staff of the Directorate had the opportunity to travel extensively to 
all relevant international fora and events, while staff of other agencies felt that it was them who had 
to do the actual, day-to-day grinding technical work.  
 
Another problem is how the Directorate sets its priorities. There is the impression that, at least in 
part, the path of least resistance is being chosen. Research into patterns of corruption in the health 
and education system might, from the perspective of the ordinary citizen, seem to be a good idea. 
However, there has been a recent audit of the health fund which appears not to have revealed any 
major irregularities; here, as in the education sector, the problems appear to be part of a bigger 
structural problem that is in the course of being addressed through projects by the World Bank. It 
would seem that there are more pressing topics at hand, as revealed in some of the surveys carried 
                                                     
227 See NDI, “Key Findings. Baseline Poll–February 2007.”  
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out recently, and the choice of health and education could be seen as shying away from the really 
difficult themes.  
 
Despite this, the Directorate has the potential to increasingly grow into a genuinely positive player 
in its own right in the fight against corruption in Montenegro. The above mentioned public outreach 
work, carried out by the staff of the Directorate themselves, is one case in point. There is intensified 
fundraising going on, the priorities for which are, at least partly, set by the Action Plan. The core 
staff of the Directorate has been involved in anti-corruption work for a substantial number of years 
now, and has been supported through capacity-building measures by a number of international 
organisations (Council of Europe, UNDP, OSCE etc.), which is certainly something that should be 
built upon for future activities.  
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11. Observations and Recommendations: 
1. Little is known with absolute certainty about how politics and institutions function in practice, 
and few benchmarks exist to monitor their performance over time. There is a notable scarcity of 
independent quality research and analysis on one hand, and a great deal of impressions and 
speculations, on the other. The authors have frequently confronted opposing but equally 
plausible assessments of particular institutions or processes, which makes it hard to reach 
definitive conclusions. Yet without this information, it is difficult to design appropriate anti-
corruption policies.  
 
Recommendation: 
Donors should support additional sector-specific research and analysis of corruption, including 
helping national institutions develop the capacity to benchmark their performance. It is also 
advisable to shift the emphasis from only measuring corruption to looking more at broader 
government performance; this means essentially moving away from detecting wrongdoing 
towards rewarding efficiency, transparency, and accountability.  
 
Care should be taken, however, to provide adequate technical assistance for state institutions 
that lack the experience to analyse and monitor their performance (e.g. by encouraging 
cooperation with academic institutions or NGOs, or supporting engagement of foreign experts, 
if necessary).  
 
 
2. While for most sectors, the performance score is somewhere in the middle, the most 
problematic areas tend to stand out. The government’s stubborn refusal to open privatisation 
files leaves little space for any other conclusion than that the irregularities that have occurred in 
the process are massive, and that revealing them would probably come at a high political price.  
 
Recommendation:  
While it might be unrealistic, and even not advisable, to re-open the privatisation contracts of 
the past, donors should, wherever possible, advocate for the remainder of the process to be as 
transparent and possible.  
 
 
3. Far-reaching politicisation of public institutions and the economic sphere is a cause for concern. 
Montenegro’s specific historical and contextual factors require an effort beyond the application 
of conventional wisdom on institutional independence. Original thinking is needed about 
mechanisms to ensure depoliticisation of state institutions, but given the concerns about certain 
institutions’ ability to police themselves, carefully weighing independence against 
accountability.  
 
Recommendation: 
Support new efforts by a wide range of stakeholders about depoliticisation and institutional 
accountability.  
 
 
4. A number of key anti-corruption regimes is extremely poor: the conflict of interest regime, 
financing of political parties and electoral campaigns, and to a lesser extent, freedom of 
information provisions. Deficiencies in these areas have been pointed out clearly in the past 
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years by the European Commission, the Council of Europe, and others. However, little effort 
seems to have been made to bring the laws and their application in line with European 
standards. Dramatic reform is urgently needed. 
 
Recommendation:  
Donors and other international partners should strongly advocate the revision the legislative 
framework, and particularly enforcement, of conflict of interest and political party/campaign 
finance provisions, as well as the shortcomings in the enforcement of the freedom of 
information law. An investment should be made to support a considered discussion on the 
appropriate norms and the mechanisms for implementation of conflict of interest rules, taking 
into account the constraints of Montenegro’s size and other contextual factors identified in this 
assessment.  
 
 
5. Barriers to business – caused by excessive discretionary powers at the local level, the lack of a 
proactive information outreach policy to entrepreneurs resulting in substantial legal uncertainty, 
and red tape – have been pointed out for many years, but decisive reforms have been missing.  
 
Recommendation: 
There are a lot of opportunities for the provision of technical assistance that would assist the 
development of the private sector in Montenegro. This ranges from helping local authorities to 
reach out to entrepreneurs, to sharing lessons learned for the start-up of business and increasing 
the skills of entrepreneurs-to-be. Private sector interest groups need continued support to 
effectively organise and lobby for their interests. However, the government should also be 
reminded that it is time to make progress on more systemic reforms, and that the parameters of 
these reforms have been set out in past years. 
 
 
6. A new constitution is being drafted, and will likely be passed in late 2007.  
 
Recommendation: 
Donors should advise on incorporating the provisions to assure a separation of powers, 
depoliticisation, and accountability of state institutions, with particular attention to the justice 
sector. .  
 
 
7. The aspirations of the government to bring Montenegro to the European Union are clear. The 
ultimate objective has to be that Montenegrins do not only have laws, structures and institutions 
that, from the outside, resemble those of a European Union member state. Citizens must believe 
that these laws, structures and institutions are equal for everybody, safeguarding their rights and 
offering redress. Given that many reforms to date have been on the surface at best, and that 
some of the frameworks created on outside pressure have been a farce in their day-to-day work, 
this process will take a long time. Nevertheless, small steps, and a long-term perspective will 
lead to a gradual erosion of the capture of the state by the ruling party.  
 
Recommendation: 
Montenegro’s EU aspirations should be used as the main instrument for advancing the political 
will for reform. The government’s European rhetoric should be matched with holding it 
accountable for implementing genuine reform. Donors should make clear, where possible, that 
they are ready to take an in-depth look into the quality of the reforms as reported by the 
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government. For example, the direction in which the new State Audit Institution is moving is 
alarming, and these concerns should be voiced.  
 
 
8. For the topic at hand, the Programme for the Fight against Corruption and Organised Crime and 
the Action Plan for its implementation – despite the deficiencies of both policy documents – 
should be one of the frameworks for the identification of technical assistance needs. The First 
Report on the Realisation of the Measures of the Action Plan should serve as a good basis to 
discuss possible interventions. An Anti-Corruption Action Plan for the local government was 
also being drafted at the time of writing this assessment, which will, when completed, provide 
an overview of opportunities to support the fight against corruption at the municipal level.  
 
Recommendation:  
Support to the implementation of the Programme for the Fight against Corruption and 
Organised Crime could be threefold: 1) through support of the Directorate for Anti-Corruption 
Initiative to strengthen their knowledge and capacity to carry out genuine monitoring of the 
implementation, including the adjustment of the plan in terms of measures, deadlines, and 
realistic and measurable success indicators; 2) through helping the Directorate for Anti-
Corruption Initiative to gain a better understanding of the mechanisms of corruption in 
Montenegro through funding of research and analysis, but insisting that it not shy away from 
“difficult” areas; 3) through funding of assistance to measures of the respective agencies 
identified in the Action Plan, in those areas where donors can add value and has a track record 
of providing successful assistance. Earmark funds for supporting municipal-level reforms 
anticipated in the forthcoming local government anti-corruption programme.  
 
 
9. In assisting Montenegro, donors will be confronted with a few dilemmas, the obvious one being 
that size does matter. Montenegro will inevitably have close family-business ties, and conflict 
of interest will almost inevitably always exist. The human resources will be limited, and 
institutions will suffer from small size. This affects the organisation of institutions, and it may 
be more practical to have a more centralised system, in fact.  
 
Recommendation: 
Technical assistance projects should, consider these limitations in project design, including in 
consolidating their assistance structures rather than creating new ones or recruiting new staff, 
as this would contribute to drawing even more scarce human resources away from where they 
might be needed in the public administration.  
 
 
10. However strong family ties are, assigning posts, be it in the public or in the private sector, 
through these ties poses a risk to Montenegro’s competitiveness, as considerations other than 
merit are put first. While the way things are “traditionally” done in Montenegro might help to 
understand the country better, donors should not fall into the trap of accepting lack of progress 
on the grounds that “this is how we do things.” If Montenegro wants to be a member of the 
European Union, and competitive on the global level, the country will have to change, no matter 
how strong traditions are.  
 
Recommendation:  
Assist Montenegrin authorities to understand that competitiveness is essential to its future 
success. Support and publicise research on shifting attitudes away from the “traditional” ways 
of doing business to debunk these myths. There are encouraging indications that the young 
people of Montenegro want a more competitive system, while surveys of small business 
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indicate that gifts representing “conventional hospitality” are perceived as nothing more than 
corruption. This means that there is some ground already laid for consistently promoting merit 
over ties. 
 
 
11. Application of the laws and new procedures is also necessary to protect decent civil servants. 
The current disrespect for the law at the top level of political leadership is discouraging to civil 
servants who try to do an honest job. They might feel at the mercy of, and even 
instrumentalised by politicians, and do fear negative consequences should they dare to strictly 
comply with the legal and regulatory framework.  
 
Recommendation: 
Support whistleblower protection initiatives.  
 
 
12. There appears to be a growing number of young people who feel increasingly disenchanted with 
being outside of the networks in which decisions are taken, suggesting some potential of people 
who want to see the rules of the game changed.  
 
Recommendation: 
Projects should try to build on this, and there might be arguments in favour of projects 
specifically targeting the young, even if outside the narrower scope of corruption/anti-
corruption work.  
 
 
13. Ordinary citizens need to be encouraged to exercise the rights provided to them by law. For the 
moment, many feel that their voice does not count, and even if they reported cases of abuse and 
corruption, nothing would happen anyway; even worse, they might suffer negative 
consequences.  
 
Recommendation:  
Support the design and implementation of effective mechanism to encourage and protect 
citizens wishing to report corruption, particularly in the form of loss of livelihood.  
 
 
14. The scarcity of information on the functioning of institutions, on legislation, procedures, rights 
and obligations, is omnipresent. Much more education does genuinely appear to be needed on 
many types of rules, both for state officials and general public. 
 
Recommendation: 
State institutions should be held to a higher standard of transparency. Initiatives/projects should 
be supported – both of NGOs and parts of the administration, such as those dealing with 
facilitating business development – that try to educate citizens/stakeholders on their rights (and 
responsibilities) and facilitate the access to the administration.  
 
 
15. The role of independent watchdogs – NGOs and the media – is extremely important in 
monitoring the reform process. Through these activities, they are gradually changing public 
opinion as to the new standards of behaviour and social norms.  
 
Recommendation: 
Continue supporting independent watchdog efforts, including mechanisms for their protection.  
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16. The international community has been quite tolerant of the deficiencies in Montenegro’s 
governance during the state-building process. With that process now nearly complete, time has 
come to decisively address governance shortcomings. 
 
Recommendation:  
Fighting corruption is a long-term prospect, and there are no quick fixes. That said, and being 
mindful of the structural and historical constraints that impact the pace of reforms, moving 
forward donors need to take a more critical stance on the delays in delivering reforms. Not 
doing so should not be viewed as “doing a favour” either to the Montenegrin government or its 
citizens, who deserve a competitive and well-governed state.  
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SUMMARY
This report was commissioned by the Swedish International Development 
Cooperation Agency (Sida) to provide an analysis of corruption and the progress 
of anti-corruption activities in Montenegro, with the objective of identifying 
priority areas and opportunities for potential future reform efforts. As there is 
little existing research and analysis on this issue, Sida is supporting this study 
both as a part of its strategic learning, planning, and programming, as well as for 
use both by donors partners and relevant national stakeholders. 
 The aim is to provide a qualitative analysis, supported with data to the extent 
available, in order to describe not only the current status of governance but 
also elucidate the structural and political factors that have, and will continue, 
to impact and constrain future reform efforts. Key sectors are then treated 
individually in some detail, with a discussion of the government’s anti-corruption 
programme—which can be viewed as a roadmap for future support to the fight 
against corruption—rounding off the analysis. The paper ends with a summary of 
key observations and recommendations for future reform efforts.  
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